Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

575. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 14, 1956—noon.

Delga 87. For Hoover from Lodge. Re Palestine—Suez. Last night Selwyn Lloyd and Dixon had dinner with me. In course of long conversation Lloyd returned again and again to question of US position if UK-French forces did not leave Egypt. Lloyd said question was whether an “effective” UN force could take their place. He insisted they were anxious to leave, had not the means to stay for any length of time, and have never had any intention of reoccupying Canal Zone. If, however, they were to get out without being assured an effective” UN force was already there, the whole thing would be a mockery and the British Government could not last.

Lloyd said several times that US had “led the hunt” against the UK and France thus far and question was whether we would do so again if they stayed in Egypt. An effective force to take their place would have to be a great deal more than 3,000–4,000 troops made up of “Finns, Scandinavians and Colombians”. It would have to be something closer to UK-French force which now numbered about 15,000 British and 3,000-4,000 French. Lloyd said they must not lose fruits of their action which were a settlement on the Suez Canal and a solution to Palestine question. The strong card they or Hammarskjold had to play against Nasser was UK force now in Port Said. The rest of Arab world, he said, was waiting to see whether UK would succeed. He said “you may feel we acted rashly, immorally and behind your backs, but UK had to do what it did. There was no alternative.” Otherwise, he contended, a gradual process of shutting UK out of Middle East would have taken place over the next year or two, with first their losing Jordan, next Libya, then Iraq and finally Kuwait. They simply could not take this and would rather risk loss of all at once. Dixon said this was historical moment to act and historians like Toynbee would say so in future. Both Lloyd and Dixon contended their action was necessary to save West and unless they were supported now, all gains would be lost. Lloyd said, moreover, UK knew that an Egyptian attack on Israel was planned and would have taken place in five or six months. At same time he said UK had over-estimated Egyptian capabilities as recent action showed. (He had no reply when we said we had not been informed before on plan for Egyptian attack.) He also said Israel was completely justified in doing what it had done, and that the right was all on Israel’s side.

Lloyd and Dixon both contended their action, if supported, would stop Soviet intervention in Middle East. Lloyd said their information had indicated Soviet penetration would have reached high point in five or six months and their action had stopped this. He discounted help USSR might be able give Egypt and Arab states now, and said even if there were 50,000 Soviet volunteers, UK force could take care of these. He clearly indicated he felt we were being bluffed by USSR and, if UK and France stood firm, USSR would back down and out of Middle East.

Lloyd and Dixon minimized their Charter obligations, saying it was monstrous to let small nations get away with aggression against them while accusing great powers of aggression when they acted in self defense. Lloyd said US had been guilty of aggression in Guatemala under Charter, but that we had been quite right in acting as we had there. Dixon said, in an aside, UK could not be held to so-called Charter principles they did not believe in. He felt question of force should have been argued out a month ago.

Towards end of conversation, we discussed question of clearing Canal and Lloyd said a large UK fleet was converging on Canal for that purpose and would reach there in a fortnight. He said he doubted there were any technicians who could handle clearing job as efficiently and quickly as UK experts. He said it could be done in half time if UK took it over. He was quite prepared to have UK clearance units under UN auspices, out of uniform and demilitarized. (He said clearance units were Royal Navy units with some few private contractors.) Lloyd felt he could work out clearance arrangements with Hammarskjold who, he felt, should be given task of negotiating Suez settlement rather than giving it to a committee as proposed in our resolution. He said Hammarskjold had been making progress in such negotiations prior Israeli action. In that connection he felt a committee probably was desirable for task of Palestine settlement. On latter point he had no specific thoughts as to a settlement except to say he believed Israel should announce its readiness resettle Gaza refugees, apparently assuming Israel would keep Gaza.

Close of conversation ended much as it began with Lloyd saying real problem was for UK to know where US stood if UK-French forces stayed in Egypt. He said flatly “we will not get out if we are not satisfied UN force is an effective one”. Dixon said he did not believe that a phasing operation of withdrawal and replacement would work.

Lloyd made it clear that he was so determined to have a strong force in Egypt—either Anglo-French or a really strong international force—that he was quite willing to risk Soviet intervention. His attitude struck me as reckless and full of contradictions. It has made me more pessimistic about the British than anything that has happened in my service here.

Recommended action:

1. He may be going to Washington this weekend to see the Secretary. I recommend that either Dulles or Hoover tell him we are strongly behind the cease-fire and withdrawal and want the Anglo-French forces withdrawn on phased basis with the entry of the international force just as fast as possible.

2. If he does not go to Washington, I recommend that I be authorized to tell him this flatly here. He is in a dangerous state of mind which could touch off a war, and which, I understand, reflects Eden’s view.

3. We should be prepared to face distinct possibility that British and French will not agree to get out because of their doubts that the UN force will be strong enough to suit them.

4. A further declaration of support by the President for the speedy unobstructed entry of the international force and the speedy withdrawal of the Anglo-French force would be a powerful help. If the President decided to make such a statement he might consider making it here—which would fortify the effect.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1456. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 12:32 p.m.