564. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State1
Washington, November 10,
1956.
T.S. #158734
1. We have been analyzing intelligence reports on developments in the Middle East (received to 1200 hours 10 November) and include in this memorandum the essence of our conclusions as to the situation that now confronts us in that area.
- a.
- The withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egypt as contemplated would tend to leave a vacuum of power in that country. In fact, the only military forces will be the Egyptian Army of some 90,000 men with considerable equipment and some recovered aircraft. Opposed to this will be the UN force which will have high moral authority but will, I understand not be expected to engage in any military action.
- b.
- Nasr remains in control of the Egyptian government and the remainder of its armed forces. He still exercises considerable influence over the military forces and sabotage units of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Recent USSR diplomatic moves and threats together with the cease fires and the promised withdrawal of the invading forces have all tended to rebuild his shaken prestige and self-confidence. He is receiving secret encouragement and publicized promises of material aid from Moscow. As long as Nasr remains in power, he will endeavor to frustrate any UN moves (including a Suez Canal settlement) which he considers hostile to his ambitions if he is convinced the USSR will back him in such action and that there will be no effective counter action by the USA. Nasr is probably presently convinced that the US will prevent any renewed aggressive action against him by the UK, France or Israel; however his amenability to US influence will be directly proportional to his conviction as to our resolution to block any Soviet intervention in the area.
- c.
- Syria is in a critical condition where a Communist coup might be pulled off particularly if Moscow is able to infiltrate hard core Soviet organizers plus a nucleus of a military force which would presumably be largely aircraft and air personnel. An overthrow of the Syrian government, and even possibly further Soviet pressures on the present government, could result in a Syrian invitation to Moscow to send troops into Syria ostensibly to protect Syria from Israel. This would lead to Syria’s becoming a Soviet base of operations in the area in support of Egypt. Syria thus presents a second power vacuum into which the Soviet might move even more openly than in the case of Egypt and where there would be no UN force to [Page 1102] cover the situation. Jordan is equally vulnerable but geographically less attractive to the Soviet.
- d.
- The Soviet notes to the US, Britain, France and Israel, the deep engagement of Soviet prestige in rescuing Nasr and the Arabs together with the promises of military assistance, indicate that it is likely that the Soviet will attempt a Syrian and possibly an Egyptian operation. The first would probably start as covert and become overt, if the Syrian government is subverted. The second would probably remain covert or under the guise of “volunteers”, as long as possible.
Allen W.
Dulles2
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a note from Allen Dulles to Goodpaster, November 10, which reads: “I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have just sent to Herb Hoover, Admiral Radford and Gordon Gray which I thought might interest you.” The copy sent to Hoover is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11–1056.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩