542. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Room, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, November 7, 1956, 11:10 a.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Hoover, Jr.
ALSO PRESENT
- Mr. Macomber
The Secretary opened the conversation by congratulating the President on his victory. The President inquired concerning the Secretary’s health, and this and the election results were briefly discussed.
The President then said that he had made a second telephone call to Prime Minister Eden suggesting that the Eden-Mollet trip to the United States be postponed. The President said that Eden, although quite disappointed, had agreed to the postponement. Eden was concerned about the Russians moving into the Middle East. The British realized that it is partly a propaganda effort but nevertheless they are scared. The President mentioned that Ambassador Bohlen also believed that this was largely a propaganda effort but at the same time felt we could not discount the possibility that the Russians would actually move into the area with force.
The President said that when Eden comes over here he wants to talk about “what the Bear will do and what we would do in the face of the Bear’s acts.” The President said he thought there was no point now in indulging in recriminations with the British, but rather that we should jointly consider what should be done in the face of the Russian threat.
The President pointed out, in this connection, that we have two problems at the moment: The first is that we have no military study of our own based on what we would do if the Russians do go into the Middle East. The second problem is that we have no coordinated intelligence estimate with the British. The President believed that we needed to get such an estimate which would take into account all the information which we and the British had. He also believed we should have the military study prepared as soon as possible.
[Page 1050]The President said that it was now clear that he would definitely have a Democratic Congress. In view of this he thought that there was a need for a meeting with the Leaders before he met with Eden.
The Secretary said he thought the first thing to do now was to see that there was no hitch in the cease fire. He said also that it was extremely important to get the British and French troops out of Egypt as soon as possible. He said that if this is not done—at least within a week’s time—the “fire will go on burning”, and it may be impossible to put it out. In this connection it was reported that Mr. Hoover had instructed Ambassador Lodge to tell Hammarskjold to move with all possible speed in getting UN forces to Egypt so that an excuse could be provided for the British and French to get out. The Secretary inquired whether the United States could supply the transportation for the UN troops. The President replied in the affirmative.
The Secretary said it was very important that some Asian troops be included among the UN forces. The Secretary again stressed the importance of getting the UN troops in and the British and French out quickly—repeating that if this is delayed beyond a week the situation may be beyond repair.
The President said he thought we should begin to put pressure on Egypt and Israel. The Secretary agreed and thought that Eban should be called and told that the Israelis must get back to their Armistice line in compliance with the UN Resolution. He believed that Eban should be told that unless the Israelis complied with this Resolution, the United States would put an embargo on all funds going to Israel. The Secretary, having in mind the election results, stressed that this was the right moment to take this step with the Israelis. The President concurred that this was the appropriate moment, but indicated that he did not wish to threaten the Israelis until we had first learned whether the Israelis would be willing to comply without threats being applied.
The President asked if we embargo all remittances to Israel, did we not have to place the same embargo on everybody else involved in the Middle East crisis? The Secretary did not comment directly on this, but said he thought it would have a major effect on Israel if we made it clear that we were prepared to embargo all remittances if Israel did not comply with the UN Resolution. The Secretary suggested that Secretary Humphrey could also make all remittances to Israel taxable. It was agreed that this could probably be done by Treasury Department regulation and would have a profound effect on the Israeli Government.
Mr. Hoover said that he felt it was important to set up a complete isolation of the Middle East. Otherwise, he felt that when [Page 1051] the British and French got out, the first thing the Egyptians would do, probably with Russian help, would be to repair their airfields.
The Secretary then asked about the status of our relations with Nasser. Mr. Hoover replied that they were not too good, that Nasser had renounced the cease fire until all foreign troops were off Egyptian soil. Mr. Hoover added, however, that at the moment there was a de facto cease fire in Egypt.
Next the question of how difficult a mechanical operation it would be to get the British and French out of Egypt was briefly discussed. It was agreed this would not be a particularly difficult operation to carry out.
The Secretary then said that the British and the French going into Egypt was “a crazy act”. The President said yes, although it was somewhat more understandable if in fact the Russians were going to act in any case. The President added, however, that even if this were true, the British and French action was still ill-advised.
The President indicated that one of the reasons Eden wanted to come to Washington was that he needs to associate himself with some spectacular act at this time. The President referred to a British opinion poll which Mr. Hoover had mentioned to him. This showed British public opinion running strongly against the actions of the British Government in the Middle East.
The President next made the point that the important thing to remember in this present situation is that “the Bear is still the central enemy”.
The Secretary then asked about the oil situation. The President said that at the moment there was just one pipeline operating, and we had intelligence that indicated that a recommendation had been made that this last line be knocked out. The President added that if this were done, then all the oil would have to come around the Cape of Good Hope. The Secretary said this would mean bringing Venezuelan oil in, and commented that once Venezuelan oil is out of the United States market, we would never get it completely back.
The Secretary then said that he wanted to make it clear to the President that he did not exclude the usefulness of a meeting between the President and Eden and Mollet. The President said that he understood this and recalled their discussions of this project before the Secretary’s illness. The President said that he told Eden in his second telephone call that he would send him a cable this afternoon, indicating “how it looks from here” with regard to the visit. (At this moment a note was handed to the President indicating that Mollet had also agreed to the postponement of the meeting and had also agreed that there would be no publicity regarding the meeting at this time.)
[Page 1052]The President said that Eden wanted to set a fixed date and was pushing for Wednesday of next week. The President thought that we should make the date of the meeting contingent on certain events taking place in advance. The Secretary agreed and suggested that first of all the meeting be contingent on the British and French having previously gotten their troops out of Egypt. The President said this could be put in the telegram that would be sent out this afternoon. The President said that he would ask the State Department to draft the telegram and would have it sent out to the Secretary before dispatching it. The Secretary said that he did not think this was necessary and that he did not want to slow things up. The President said that this would not slow it up.
The President then returned to the subject of a meeting with the Leaders. It was thought that such a meeting probably could not be set up before this coming Saturday.
The President then mentioned the fact that the present crisis in the Middle East, while it fell primarily in the domain of the State Department, also had many Defense Department implications. Because of this, the President said he had felt the need of a person who could coordinate the State and Defense efforts. He said that Governor Adams and Colonel Goodpaster were enormously overworked at this time and could not take on this added burden. The Secretary suggested Robert Anderson for this assignment. The President said that this had been his first choice, but he had some doubt as to whether Anderson could get away at this time. The Secretary suggested if Anderson was not available that Douglas MacArthur would be an excellent person. He was a first-class coordinator and in addition had a major responsibility in the Department for handling our liaison with the Defense Department. The President agreed that MacArthur would be excellent and he said he would take a look at this later in the day.
The Secretary then said that there was a danger that the Russians might really attempt to take advantage of the situation by coming to the aid of the Arabs. The President agreed and said he thought there was a danger of our “getting into the Arab doghouse” because of the opposition we would necessarily have to take to such Russian activity. The President added, however, that he had considerable confidence that the Arab leaders see the danger of the Russians coming into the situation supposedly in support of the Arab position.
The President then told the Secretary of his satisfaction at having a certain highly classified observation operation available to [Page 1053] him at this time.2 He felt that others had conducted operations with a similar objective, but these had been detected whereas our own had not been.
The conversation then closed with a discussion between the President and the Secretary regarding their medical experiences.