Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

50. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, August 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government

1. Forwarded herewith are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the above subject, which I should like to make available for the information of the members of the National Security Council.

2. I fully concur in the gravity of the implications of the recent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company, as outlined by the JCS, and I feel that the points raised by them in their memorandum merit the most careful analysis and consideration. In this connection I believe that all feasible political and economic measures should be taken before a decision is made to resort to the use of military force. I recommend that the members of the NSC be prepared to discuss these issues at such time as the Suez Canal situation may be brought before the Council.

Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.²

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)³

Washington, July 31, 1956

SUBJECT

• Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned with the implications of the recent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company. They consider this Egyptian action to be militarily detrimental to the United States and its Allies. Among the military implications of this action are those affecting the continued United States control of military bases and facilities in the general area; the future of the Baghdad Pact Organization; the economic and military strength of European nations and therefore of NATO; the French position in North Africa; the free flow of shipping through the Suez Canal; and those affecting the United States security interests if Nasser’s arbitrary action is tolerated and a further precedent for such arbitrary action thereby established.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this Egyptian action, with its attendant implications, to be of such importance as to require action by the United States and its Allies which can reasonably be expected to result in placing the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable date. Furthermore, they believe that, if action short of the use of military force cannot reasonably be expected to achieve this result, the United States should consider the desirability of taking military action in support of the U.K., France and others as appropriate. They are aware that the matter is receiving full consideration by other governmental Departments, but would emphasize their conviction that promptness in reaching an early decision and of taking definite and appropriate action is particularly important in this instance.

3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the Secretary of Defense request the National Security Council (NSC), as a matter of urgency, to formulate and direct the early implementation of appropriate courses of action designed to assure that the Suez Canal comes under the control of a friendly and responsible authority and that the danger of future actions elsewhere, of the nature of Egypt’s expropriation of the canal is minimized. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is an urgent requirement for the NSC to determine whether the western world can reasonably expect to obtain the necessary results without recourse to military action by any western power. Concurrently the NSC should appraise the desirability of a U.S. guarantee to give political and economic support to military action by the U.K., whether taken alone or in concert with France, while abstaining, ourselves, from direct military participation; and of a public commitment to prompt direct military participation by U.S. forces in the event that third parties intervene militarily on behalf of the Egyptians.

4. If there is reasonable assurance that non-military actions will achieve the necessary results promptly, it is preferable to avoid military action by any of the nations concerned. However, timely U.S. action in this situation is believed to be so vital that, pending the outcome of the NSC study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are conducting further military studies on:

a. The implications of this situation to the United States from the military point of view.

b. The extent and nature of measures required to support U.K. (or U.K.-French) military action without commitment of U.S. forces.

c. What U.S. military forces will be required if the United States participates in combined direct military action.

d. The military forces required if the United States is forced to take unilateral military action to protect U.S. nationals.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that Israel may be tempted to capitalize on the situation by taking unilateral action inimical to U.S. interests. Any such unilateral action should be prevented.

6. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor⁴
General, United States Army Chief of Staff

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Suez Canal Situation. Top Secret. Lay transmitted the memorandum and its enclosure to members of the National Security Council for their information under cover of a memorandum dated August 3. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95)
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
3. Top Secret. Bowie forwarded a copy of this memorandum to Dulles on August 3 under cover of a memorandum which reads: “I think you should read the attached JCS memorandum on nationalization of the Suez Canal. It recommends that the NSC discuss the matter. Would you want this put on the agenda for the meeting on Thursday, August 9?” (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East) Dulles initialed his approval.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.