Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

195. Draft Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, September 9, 1956.

Suez from Henderson. For Secretary.

1. We deeply regret failure of mission. Menzies and other members in my opinion did all possible in framework terms of reference to find common meeting ground with Nasser. Although he courteous and correct throughout our stay he never wavered from the position which he had apparently adopted prior our arrival—that Egypt could never agree to entrust any phase of operations of canal to body over which Egypt would not have unquestioned control. We were unsuccessful in our efforts during our discussions to get away from phrases which might be offensive to Egyptian nationalism and to concentrate on specific aspects of operations in hope that piece by piece we could erect institutional structure in framework our proposals which could be acceptable to Egypt. Nasser clearly unwilling abandon his general position that he unprepared consider any plan whatsoever which would permit non-Egyptian nationals not taking orders from Egypt to have executive powers over canal operations. We do not believe from our observations here that our Committee could have achieved success regardless degree of ingenuity and persuasiveness displayed. In our opinion Nasser had become an almost hypnotic prisoner of his own propaganda and ideology long before our arrival. He had already practically tied his own hands in the presence of Egyptian nationalism, international communism, and evangelical neutralism, particularly that brand found among certain members Bandung bloc. Not only would it have been almost impossible for him change his attitude re substantive matters during period our stay in Egypt, but it would have been even more difficult for him to make concessions to Committee representing powers which did not include nations that had been giving him sympathetic support.

2. Although, in our opinion, Nasser could not, without feeling that he was abandoning Egyptian nationalism and deserting his foreign supporters, accept our proposals or in fact treat us as representatives of all of users of canal, he nevertheless had sufficient respect for collective power and influence of 18 nations which we represented not to assume towards us attitude calculated to give offense. During our stay in Egypt, Egyptian press and radio continued to disseminate propaganda criticizing and ridiculing West. This campaign aimed particularly at UK and France and was somewhat restrained re US. Nasser personally, however, exercised extreme care in showing us every courtesy, consideration and facility. Without making counter-offers he made it clear that he recognized that users of canal had legitimate interest in manner in which canal was to be operated and should be given appropriate assurances that it would remain as waterway open without discrimination to vessels all nations. He indicated during our conversations that Egypt was prepared to enter into one or more conventions supplementary to convention of 1888, which should satisfy users. He at least hinted at willingness to consider devising some scheme whereby users could seek remedies in case they should believe Egypt guilty of violating such conventions. He expressed desire make use of most competent technicians available and of foreign technical advice. He was, however, rather vague in outlining what he had in mind. It difficult for us believe that he will not in almost immediate future make public in some way or other in more specific and detailed form what Egypt willing to do.

3. Although object of mission has not been achieved, we consider it has served useful purpose in that through the arguments which Committee has presented orally it has helped to cause Nasser to realize that interests of users in canal are so real and important that he cannot afford to ignore them. We believe that in spite of his refusal recognize London conference or 18 nations as accredited spokesman for users of canal, he was impressed by his study of the proceedings of the conference and by earnest, sincere, and yet friendly manner in which Committee presented and explained proposals of 18 powers. In our opinion the menacing gestures of UK and France have not been helpful to the work of our Committee, although success could not have been achieved in any event. We believe that those who think that threats of use of armed force can make Nasser and his associates more reasonable fail to understand psychology of current Egyptian nationalism buttressed as it is with the support of international communism and nationalism of Asian-African countries recently released from Western control.

4. Since our delegation was integral part of Committee and since each move and even every facial expression of our members were watched by Egyptians and others with idea detecting differences of opinion in Committee, we were not free to engage in type of exploration in which members of diplomatic group on other kind of mission might engage. We, therefore, not able as result firsthand probing, gauge with any degree assurance just how far Nasser might be willing go in efforts pacify at least some of users of canal. We believe, however, we safe in saying he would not accept, regardless threats of military action or extent application economic pressure, any arrangement which would take operations of canal out of Egyptian hands. He might at present be prepared undertake commitments which would give users of canal considerable voice in making decisions with regard to certain operational policies affecting canal and perhaps even to limited extent with regard to regulation of traffic through canal. For instance, he might agree not raise tolls without users’ consent and not make enlargements or other alterations canal without approval of users. He might be willing undertake commitments much more far-reaching and clear than convention of 1888 not to discriminate against any user. He might be willing agree to establishment some kind of international body representing all interested users of canal which could observe operations and examine policies re canal and which could serve as instrument for expression views users with respect thereto. He would not, we believe, work with any such body which had been established without previous consultation with Egypt or set up in atmosphere of pressure on Egypt. He might agree that such body could make suggestions re qualifications certain employees of canal, etc. He would not, we are confident, tolerate injection such body into operations. In order to give assurance to users of his good faith, he might be willing agree that differences re interpretations or violations of such conventions could be submitted to arbitral Commission to be established under such conventions or, in case flouting of decisions of such Commission, to ICJ.

5. In reading our speculations in paragraph 4 above, it should be borne in mind that what Nasser might be willing to do today he might not be willing do tomorrow. If conditions alter so that he would lose face in doing later what he considers himself able voluntarily to do now, his attitude would certainly harden. If, for instance, Western pilots should be withdrawn under undisguised encouragement their governments, if Western powers would concert in endeavor deprive Egypt of receipt of tolls, if display willingness on his part make concessions to users should be greeted by West as sign weakness, he might by further irresponsible acts widen and make more difficult of bridging present gulf between Egypt and West.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–1156. Secret. Forwarded to Dulles on September 11 under cover of a memorandum by Henderson which reads: “Attached hereto is a draft of a telegram partly prepared in Cairo and party enroute in which we summarized some of the views which we shared as we left Cairo.

   “We planned to send the telegram from London, but when it was decided for me to proceed direct to Washington it seemed preferable for me to take it with me. We thought that it might make a useful addition to the reports which we submitted from Cairo.

   “In preparing this report we realized of course that the unwillingness of Nasser to accept one or other plan for maintaining Canal as efficiently operated waterway open to the vessels of all nations would be merely one of various factors to be considered by the U.S. in determining what its policies should be with regard to the Canal.” This covering note is marked “Sec saw”.