Office of the Historian

165. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

London, September 3, 1956—5 p.m.

1270. Eyes only Chief of Mission and Henderson. I saw Selwyn Lloyd this afternoon and gave him Department’s views (Deptel 1590)2 emphasizing US serious concern developments with particular reference evacuation nationals and inquiring why large-scale evacuation taking place under present security conditions.

Lloyd explained evacuation as precautionary measure in line other military steps and necessitated solely by magnitude evacuation problem. He said there are 6,000 UK nationals in Egypt out of 13,000 British and some 2,500 in Jordan, figures with which it would be impossible to cope expeditiously if hostilities broke out. He claimed to be conscious of psychological effect being created by evacuation measures and said that for that reason British are minimizing evacuation to maximum extent possible. No evacuation being undertaken in the Persian Gulf, Iraq or the Lebanon (despite French report to contrary contained Paris telegram 1051).3

[Page 360]

Re intensified military preparations on eve Cairo discussions, Lloyd said preparations essential for British to be in position accomplish military intervention if such becomes necessary. Response my comment that preparations not helpful mobilizing world opinion behind Western position, he stated British conviction that preparations should have salutary effect on Nasser. His reports from Egypt indicate Nasser betting ten to one against military intervention and Lloyd said he would prefer if Nasser thought odds 50–50.

Lloyd concerned at ten days delay which has preceded talks in Cairo and stressed urgency concluding Menzies mission and proceeding to next steps. He acknowledged understanding that US committed to endeavoring find peaceful solution and that US intends pursue efforts towards such peaceful solution, even if Menzies mission not successful. He stated British have “not pushed any buttons yet” and gave impression further peaceful steps could be taken in absence successful Menzies mission. However, he noted if mission did not produce results in approximately a week, such further steps would have to be considered immediately and he also remarked that if military measures are to be taken they cannot be postponed indefinitely.

Barbour
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–356. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 5 p.m. Repeated to Paris, Amman, Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Rome, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. A copy in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series is initialed by Eisenhower.↩
  2. Document 160.↩
  3. The reference is evidently in error. Telegram 1051 from Paris concerns an unrelated matter.↩