Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

147. Note From the British Minister (Coulson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 29, 1956.

My Dear Secretary of State: I enclose the text of a message which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has asked me to communicate to you. As you will understand he is extremely anxious that no idea of its contents should become known.

I should be grateful for an opportunity to discuss this question with you as soon as you have had time to consider the message. There are also one or two questions arising out of the studies now proceeding in London which I should like to raise with you at the same time.

Yours sincerely,

J.E. Coulson

[Attachment]

Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles²

London, August 28, 1956.

As you know, it is our intention to proceed with our plans unless Nasser can be seen clearly and decisively to have given in. I have therefore been considering what our next step should be, if he rejects the proposals endorsed by the eighteen countries. I think that there is on balance much to be said for raising the Suez problem in the Security Council immediately we have his reply if it is negative. This course would have the advantage that it might affect his further attitude to our proposals. It would also put us in a better posture if we are obliged to take action against him.

2. I realize the risks involved. All sorts of things might be suggested. For example, a call to the parties to settle their differences by discussion, a call to the London Conference to resume, a reference to the International Court or the appointment of a Committee of the Security Council. There might be a desire to refer the matter to the General Assembly or even to despatch a peace observation commission to the area. I realize that it would be impossible to get from the Security Council a resolution justifying the use of force without further reference to the United Nations. Nor would it be possible to get even if we wanted it a resolution in favour of economic sanctions passed by a satisfactory majority.

3. On the other hand, the concentration of our forces in the Mediterranean is bound to result in someone raising the matter in the Security Council. It might be the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or even Iran under pressure from the Arab states. This last possibility would be most unfortunate.

4. Therefore I think that the balance of advantage lies in our taking the initiative in raising the matter in the Security Council immediately after a negative reply from Nasser. The following points of procedure arise:—

(a) Calling the Meeting

This could be done either by the United Kingdom alone, or by the United Kingdom and France or by the five members of the Security Council who supported the Eighteen Power Declaration with the possible addition of Belgium.

(b) Representation at the Meeting

So far as possible this should be at Foreign Minister level. Pineau and I should represent France and the United Kingdom. It is my hope that you will be able to come yourself. We should try to get Spaak to represent Belgium. His views are particularly robust.

(c) A Resolution

A resolution should be tabled emphasizing the seriousness of the situation and recommending the Eighteen Power solution and perhaps expressing regret at Egypt’s rejection of it.

5. The essence of the matter would be to infuse an atmosphere of urgency into the debate, making it clear that we want an expression of opinion from the Security Council within one week. And that we were not prepared to embark on a lengthy procedural discussion. The presence of Foreign Ministers would make it easier to attain such an atmosphere. If the proceedings become bogged down in procedural wrangles and interminable amendments, the Foreign Ministers would endeavour to wind up the debate, saying that the proceedings were futile and that the United Nations had shown itself incapable of dealing with the matter.

6. I cannot emphasize too strongly that your active help is essential to the success of this plan. The plan might pay a dividend with regard to Nasser’s reactions but the main object of the exercise would be to put us in the best possible posture internationally in relation to the action which we may be obliged to take. I think that moderate opinion would be shocked at forcible action by us without any reference at all to the United Nations. In view of the great issues at stake I venture to suggest that it is of the greatest importance to the United States that our action should be shown to be reasonable, that is to say that we had tried the Conference of twenty-two under Article 33 and then we had gone to the Security Council under Article 35, that neither of these courses had produced any result so we were bound to take police action to procure an international solution.

7. I know that to go to the Security Council is full of risks because of its dilatoriness but I believe that not to do so would be certain to have consequences of greater gravity. I had a brief talk with Pineau whilst the Conference was sitting along these lines. He did not dissent. I should welcome your views very urgently. If we could tackle the Security Council as a combined operation in the way in which we managed the London Conference I think that we could derive considerable benefit. After all the composition is not too bad. There are five signatories of the Eighteen Power Declaration together with Belgium, whose Government feels most strongly. In addition there are two friendly Latin Americans and the possibility of Nationalist Chinese support. It is not a bad membership and under your leadership I believe that we could pull off another success.

8. I cannot tell you how grateful we all are to you for your masterly handling of our case here during the Conference.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–3056. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Howe to Rountree, dated August 30, which among other points noted that although further information was expected from the British, Wilcox in coordination with Rountree would prepare a preliminary draft reply for Dulles recognizing that Dulles “may wish himself to draft or to hold up any reply until further word from the British.” Howe also noted that the attached message from Lloyd “must be handled with the greatest care.

   ”

   Dulles directed that copies of Coulson’s note and Lloyd’s message be forwarded to the White House for the information of President Eisenhower. The copies are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. A marginal notation by Eisenhower on the first page of Lloyd’s message reads: “Secret Files/D.E.”

2. Top Secret.
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.