Office of the Historian

119. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy, London, August 23, 1956, 11:45 a.m.1

USDel/MC/84
London, August 23, 1956, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • The United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Bowie
  • Indonesia
    • Mr. Abdulgani

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

  • Proposal Procedure

Abdulgani called at his request to discuss the procedural situation. He said he felt that if the New Zealand proposal2 was pushed, Indonesia would be eliminated from the Conference, which was contrary to its desire. They had come as the result of a special message to [from?] Sukarno3 even though the Cabinet did not fully favor it and had later given certain limiting instructions. He said that the Secretary knew Indonesia’s viewpoint. They were not against the principles of the United States proposal but questioned the manner of presenting it. They had made this clear to Egypt and to India [Page 268] which had included paragraph 3 of its proposal4 in response to Indonesian pressure. Under his instructions he could go no further and might have to withdraw if the New Zealand procedure was forced to an issue.

The Secretary said he hoped the Conference would end today to which Abdulgani agreed. The Secretary said he felt that the Conference had already contributed to peace, especially by the broad participation including the assurance and the atmosphere of conciliation. The others could hardly expect the eighteen nations not to promote their view in the negotiations, but he agreed that the Conference should not be asked to act on the New Zealand proposal but should merely be informed about the action of the eighteen. In that case Indonesia would not need to take a position and the only Conference action would be the transmittal of the Conference record, presumably by the Chairman.

Abdulgani said he expected the Soviets to put forward some proposal this afternoon for submission of both the five-power and the Indian statements to Egypt. He recognized that this would be unacceptable because it gave Egypt the means to lay aside the eighteen-nation proposal. As a way out he had worked up a draft communiqué (attached).5 On his way back he said that he intended to go through Cairo with the hope of persuading Nasser to negotiate.

The Secretary said that if Egypt had handled the matter wisely, it could gain a great victory even under the proposals of the eighteen. It would receive far greater revenues, foreign money could be attracted to expand the Canal, and Egypt might be able to finance the Aswan Dam itself from revenues. This would be far better than [Page 269] foreign financing which would only involve friction over the requisite austerity within Egypt. He explained that this had been our real reason for refusing to go forward with the Dam. Even under the eighteen-nation proposal the Secretary stressed that in his view the international participation would be primarily technical and mainly by nations with no political ambitions in the region. Thus the plan would end any British or French combination through the Canal and reduce foreign influence in Egyptian affairs. The present proposal was the minimum the French and British would accept and it had been sold to them only as a result of great efforts by the United States. Since many in France and Britain wanted to see a major defeat for Nasser, the Secretary anticipated that the United States would be very unpopular in those countries if Nasser accepts. If he rejects, then we will be back to a worse situation than two weeks ago.

The Secretary said that the Indonesian draft had some interesting ideas but stressed that the sentence calling for a committee was wholly unacceptable. Otherwise it would be possible to use the Indonesian draft if it should later be decided to have a communiqué. He said he would study it further.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 759. Secret. Prepared in the U.S. Delegation, but the source text does not indicate a drafting officer.↩
  2. See footnote 5, Document 117.↩
  3. Dr. Achmed Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia.↩
  4. The third paragraph of the Indian proposals reads as follows: “That consideration be given, without prejudice to Egyptian ownership and operation, to the association of international user interests with The Egyptian Corporation for the Suez Canal’.” The text of the principles and proposals, introduced by India on August 20, is printed in The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956, pp. 288–289.↩

  5. The text of the Indonesian draft communiqué, which is attached to the source text, reads as follows:

    “The London Conference participated in by the Governments of [blank] in its assembly from [blank] to [blank], after frank and fruitful exchange of views, expressing their concern about the gravity of the Suez Canal problem,

    “Realizing the legitimate interest in the Suez Canal as a waterway of international importance

    “Recognizing the respect for Egyptian sovereignty and dignity

    “Calls upon all Government participants of this Conference to feel the urgency to approach the Government of Egypt and to convey to the said Government the purposes and objectives of the Conference.

    “For this purpose a Committee will be set up of six Government participants.

    “The verbatim record of the Conference will be sent to the Government of Egypt.

    “The participants of the Conference are given freedom to work out their respective proposals as they deem necessary to arrive at an agreeable and lasting solution.”

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