97. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of 22 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General White. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy, MacArthur, Bowie, Robertson, and Rountree.]
1. Talks with the British and French on the Middle East.
Mr. Murphy reviewed briefly the conversation which he had held with the British and French Ambassadors on February 8 pursuant to the agreement during the Eden talks for a discussion by the three powers of their responsibilities under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.2 He said that there was general agreement at the meeting that the three places most likely to cause trouble between the Israelis and the Arabs at the present time are Banat Yaqub, where the Israelis are threatening to divert the Jordan River; Al Auja; and Eilath, where the Israelis are threatening to run the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Murphy said that the meeting had revealed the French position as very wary and hesitant with regard to the assumption of any responsibilities under the Declaration. It is obvious that the French would prefer to put the whole problem in the lap of the United Nations, whereas the United Kingdom is somewhat in advance of our own position as regards tripartite action. Mr. Murphy reported that we had asked the British and the French Ambassadors to consult with their governments with a view to presenting papers at the next tripartite meeting on what they would be prepared to do in the situation. He said that it was planned to have the next meeting at a lower level so as to avoid the intense press interest which had attended this first get-together.
Admiral Radford indicated some concern over British actions in respect to the Arab-Israel problem following the Eden talks. The British had prepared a planning paper and had then asked information of Admiral Cassady in London regarding the capabilities of our 6th Fleet. Admiral Radford said that in the view of our naval authorities such an inquiry was not within the terms of reference of understandings reached during the Eden talks, and that the effect of such activities would be to move joint planning activities to London. He said that he would not be prepared to undertake a joint planning exercise on this matter since the French in reality have nothing to contribute in the [Page 247] way of naval strength. The Admiral had no objection to the approach suggested by British General Whiteley of talks between him, Whiteley and French Admiral Valluy.
Admiral Radford declared that he did not anticipate any problem on the present expansion of naval calls on the eastern Mediterranean as agreed on with the British and asked whether the Department of State had received any comment on them. Mr. Murphy said that he was not aware of any political comment from our missions on the operation. Mr. Rountree pointed out that there had been some comment in the press of the area, particularly Lebanon, and Admiral Burke said that one news reporter had approached CINCNELM. Admiral Burke said that the Navy is treating the operation as a routine movement. Mr. Rountree expressed the view that our aim in getting word around as to our interest in continued peace in the area is being accomplished quietly but effectively through the increase in naval visits. Admiral Radford mentioned a recent visit to him by Representative Multer and spoke of the Congressman’s concern over Arab-Israeli problems.
2. Review of Admiral Radford’s Recent Trip to the Middle and Tar East.
Admiral Radford opened his remarks by saying that he thought that many of the opinions he had derived from his trip were already well known but that he would touch on some of the high spots. With respect to Iran, he found the Shah strong in his feeling of the need for tangible support from the U.S., particularly in view of Iran’s action in joining the Baghdad Pact. The Admiral expressed the opinion that, even though technically we did not urge Iran to join the Pact, they certainly knew we were in favor of their joining and we do, accordingly, have some obligations towards them. The Admiral considers Iran particularly important for the U.S., and he pointed out that after all our efforts there in solving the petroleum and other problems in recent years we have built up a considerable investment in Iran from the standpoint of our national interest. He said that the Iranians are not happy over the Zagros defense line. This is a British concept but it does not protect Iran. The Admiral thinks a defense line farther north would be perfectly feasible, provided we move with determination on strengthening the area.
With respect to Pakistan, Admiral Radford commented that after more than a year we have still not straightened out the problem of support of certain Pakistan forces for which we had agreed to pay. He declared that we are going to be in serious trouble all around the world unless we get some better administrative procedures for our aid programs. There is a very real need throughout the Middle East and elsewhere for governments to make their defense plans on the basis of at least three years in advance. This is a very understandable need and [Page 248] is really the only practical way to plan. Having to depend on annual appropriations for our aid program and on various schemes for having money become available on a delayed schedule, such as through the use of PL 480 funds and triangular arrangements, is simply not adequate to the situation. The Pakistan matter, for instance, has become so complicated that it seems almost impossible to unravel it.
Admiral Radford stated that there is a real problem in our being merely an observer as regards the Baghdad Pact. He argued that the U.S. must take a more active part in the military planning going on under the Pact and pointed out that the JCS has recommended that the U.S. adhere to the Pact. He asserted that the U.S. will have to pick up the price tag in any event and that, if the UK has provided poor or wrong leadership with respect to planning, we will have little grounds to criticize the decisions if we have not taken part in the planning activities. In the Admiral’s view, even if it is decided that the U.S. will not join the Pact, we must find ways to be more than a mere observer and to participate actively in the joint planning so as to protect our own interests.
Admiral Radford said that he found confusion throughout the Middle East as to U.S. intentions due to the lack of a clear, definite U.S. policy. The U.S. press continues to present a picture abroad of confusion at home, and things often move so fast in Washington that it is impossible to keep the field adequately informed as to the latest trends of thought and decisions in Washington. [4 ½ lines of source text not declassified] The Admiral reiterated his remarks of the previous meeting with respect to the problem of our aid to neutrals. He said that there was bitterness in Iran over our plans to aid Egypt on the Aswan Dam and that there were similar grievances in Pakistan over our aid to India.
There was a discussion of the problem of personnel in the MAAG units and the difficulties often caused by transferring key personnel just when they had achieved a position of confidence and influence among local officials. There was agreement that General McClure should be kept on as chief of the MAAG in Iran if arrangements could be worked out.
[Here follows discussion of Admiral Radford’s trip to Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines.]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.↩
- See vol. XV, pp. 159–160.↩