84. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,
South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, November 28,
1955.
SUBJECT
- FY 1957 Military Assistance for the
Middle East
The Defense Department’s proposal for military assistance to Middle
Eastern countries for FY 1957 reflects a
failure to accord an adequate priority for US military assistance in
that area. In our view it falls far short of what is necessary in the
field of military aid to counter the new Soviet efforts to disengage the
Middle East from the West.
[Page 208]
These efforts and the formation of the Northern Tier have radically
altered the basic assumptions upon which our programming has been
based.
With our encouragement, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan have firmly
aligned themselves with the West and to the defensive system implicit in
the Northern Tier arrangement. If it is to be effective, the Baghdad
Pact group must develop political unity as well as a sense of increased
security and confidence through firm Western backing; they must,
moreover, have a certain degree of real defensive capability. The
Northern Tier countries’ principal interest in military strength is to
improve their ground forces. The State–Defense Working Group Report on
Middle East Defense, dated June 6, 1955, indicated this to be the field
in which our efforts might most economically and usefully be
concentrated to achieve an early and appreciable increase in the area’s
indigenous defense potential.
By virtue of our previous assurances, the Baghdad Pact countries have
good reason to expect much greater US military assistance than that
forecast in the current Defense Department’s proposal (see Tabs A and
B2 for
details). The adequacy and timeliness of our support will be a major
factor in the development and maintenance of an effective defense
organization which is so important to the political and military
alignment of the entire Middle East. A minimum rate of progress in
providing for equipment deficiencies of the Pact armies would be
generally consistent with existing NSC
policies. Moreover, we consider appreciable military aid to these
countries, which have frankly declared themselves to be our friends,
particularly important in the period ahead when we are endeavoring by
all feasible means to prove to the peoples of the area the value of
American friendship as contrasted to Soviet blandishments. Whether
correct or not, most Middle Easterners believe that the prestige and
future influence of the West in the area is at stake.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That you discuss with Secretary Wilson, Secretary Humphrey, Mr. Hollister and Mr. Hughes the
urgent need of according a high priority to US military assistance
to the Middle East, particularly to the countries comprising the
Northern Tier, advocating for the latter a FY 1957 program that would provide for reasonable
progress in meeting their equipment deficiencies (see Tab A).
- 2.
- That you advocate providing flexibility in a Middle East military
assistance program adequate to meet urgent requirements which may
come up during the year, such as in connection with the
renegotiation of the Dhahran Base Agreement, Wheelus Base Agreement
in Libya, etc.
[Tab A]
The status of our military assistance relationship with each of the
Northern Tier countries and the extent of the Defense FY ’57 proposals for Ground Forces is as
follows:
- Turkey. The effect of our
commitment of June 1954, and reaffirmation at the NATO Annual Review in
December, is that the Turks understand that the United
States would, to the best of its ability, provide equipment
to help them achieve NATO
Army force goals in four or five years. This program has
more recently been costed at around $630 million. In three
years only the slightest start will have been made since the
programs for FY ’55 and ’56
combined with the FY ’57
proposal would fund roughly one-fourth of equipment needs.
Thus after three years, three-fourths of the program will
remain unfunded. The FY ’57
proposal would be the smallest portion of this funding. Only
$22.2 millions is devoted to new equipment.
- Pakistan. The effect of our
commitment of October 1954 is that the Pakistanis understand
that the United States will provide, roughly by mid FY ’58, equipment to fill
existing deficiencies in 5½ army divisions. At the time of
the commitment the Pakistani program was costed at roughly
$170 million for all services, but since that time it has
become clear that the Army portion of such a program was
considerably underestimated. While the FY ’57 proposal would probably
bring the total aid beyond the $170 million mark, it does
not make a material contribution toward the deficiencies of
the 5½ divisions.
- Iraq. In connection with our
Military Assistance Agreement, assistance in addition to the
initial aid program was conditioned upon Iraq’s taking steps
to promote regional defenses. Having fully carried out this
condition by playing a key role in the formation of the
Northern Tier, the Iraqis fully expect further help in
meeting their legitimate defense needs. The initial program,
of roughly $11 millions, was funded in FY ’54. With the exception of
Centurion Tanks provided in FY ’56, there has been no continuing program
for the subsequent two years. While the provision of the
tanks was successful psychologically, there remain basic
equipment needs, costed roughly at $60 millions, which are
not being met. The FY ’57
proposal provides only for additional tanks and some
maintenance, but nothing towards basic equipment
needs.
- Iran. Convinced that neutrality is
unrealistic, the Shah of Iran recently took the step of
closing the gap in the Northern Tier by acceding to the
Baghdad Pact. This was done in the belief that the US would
assist Iran to achieve an effective Army to carry out
responsibilities under the Pact, and to develop some
capacity to resist Soviet pressure. Since the fall of 1954 a
MAAG/Tehran proposal
for building up the Iranian Army has been held in abeyance
awaiting final action in Defense. Despite some disagreement
on details it is generally agreed that a military aid
program of slightly under $200 million covering a three year
period would be necessary to make the Iranian Army
effective. The present program consists of deliveries from
the small pipeline based on funds from FY 1954 and earlier. Practically
no funding was undertaken in FY ’55 and FY
’56. The FY ’57 proposal
makes no significant provision for filling Iranian Army
equipment deficiencies. This is politically very dangerous,
occurring as it does immediately after Iranian accession to
the Pact, and in view of a commitment made to the Shah last
July for a somewhat increased program in ’57 and ’58.
Without commitment to the above $200 million program or to
any other specific program, it should be possible and is
certainly necessary to do more in the way of providing new
equipment than is contemplated in the ’57 Defense
presentation.
The Defense Department FY ’57 proposal
for this area, as throughout the world, is primarily designed to
maintain forces now in being at present levels, to meet fixed costs,
and obligations as construed by Defense. As indicated above this
programming is politically inadequate for support of the Northern
Tier. While in the last analysis the specific decisions concerning
programs should be made by Defense, political considerations can be
met if the FY ’57 proposal is
increased to provide for one-quarter of the Army unit equipment
deficiencies in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and one-half of such
deficiencies in Pakistan.
