Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

68. Memorandum of Discussion at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 13, 1955¹

Washington, October 13, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3 concerning the CIA Semi-Annual Report, the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and the Report by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament. Items 2 and 3 are printed in volume XX, pages 211–221. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

4. U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428; NSC Action No. 1447–c)

Dr. Flemming inquired of the Vice President whether, in view of the hour, the Council would proceed to a discussion of the Near East which was the next item on the agenda. The Vice President suggested that the Near East item as well as further discussion of the disarmament problem should both be put over to next week’s meeting. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that he would require the maximum possible time next week in order to have guidance for conducting the negotiations of the Foreign Ministers.² While he was agreeable to scheduling the Near East problem for discussion next week, there were one or two points in connection with the Near East that he would like to mention before this meeting was adjourned.

Secretary Dulles said that he particularly wished to comment on the situation in Iran. Following last week’s Council action on Iran, Secretary Dulles had had a number of conferences and consultations on the question of Iran’s joining the Baghdad Pact. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he noted, were disposed to have Iran join the Pact at this time. Secretary Dulles said that he had sent a message to Ambassador Chapin at Tehran in which he explained to the Ambassador our apprehension over Iran’s acceding to the Baghdad Pact at this precise time in view of the probable Soviet reaction. Accordingly, he had gone on to state to Chapin that if the Iranians felt that they could defer joining the Baghdad Pact without a serious loss of momentum, this would be the desirable course. Thereafter, Chapin had talked to the Shah who felt that as for the Iranians joining the Baghdad Pact, it was “now or never”. Accordingly, Iran had announced that it would join the Pact subject to agreement by the Iranian Parliament which was assumed to be assured.

Secretary Dulles then referred to the Soviet note³ which stated the grave view taken in Moscow of the Iranian action. He added that he still retained his anxiety that the Iranian action would have grave repercussions and would face the United States and the free world with new dangers but, in any case, the record is clear that the United States had not put pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact at this time and, accordingly, the United States could not be blamed for the consequences.

As for other problems in the Middle East, the Soviets have duplicated their offer of arms to Egypt by offering them next to Saudi Arabia and Syria. Both these countries have also asked the United States for additional arms. In fact, the Syrian list of armaments desired had reached the State Department yesterday. Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that we had responded to the request from Saudi Arabia by stating our agreement in principle to supply arms. Nevertheless, it was Secretary Dulles’ guess that the Saudi Arabians would turn to the Russians for the arms they thought they needed because the Russian price would be so much cheaper.

With respect to the situation in Syria, Secretary Dulles said that we had inquired of Premier Nuri Said of Iraq for advice as to how to handle Syria’s request for additional arms from the United States. Secretary Dulles said that his guess was, at this time, that we would turn down Syria’s request. Meanwhile, we were awaiting the views of Nuri Said.

Turning to the Arab-Israel problem, Secretary Dulles said that he understood that a paper with recommended courses of action on this subject was in course of preparation in the National Security Council Planning Board but that progress on the paper had been poor. Turning to Admiral Radford the Secretary said that he hoped we could get as much help on this problem from his people in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as possible. Had it not proved rather difficult to get such assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff people in the initial stages of the preparation of this report?

Mr. Dillon Anderson broke in to state that while progress on the preparation of the report by the Planning Board had been difficult at the outset, it was now proving much easier and he anticipated that a paper would be ready for Council consideration at next week’s meeting.

Secretary Dulles continued that the heart of what we needed to study now with respect to the danger of war between Israel and the Arab states was what the United States could do in case it was unable to convince the world that one or another of the two antagonists was guilty of a clean-cut aggression. We also needed to know how vulnerable Egypt and Israel would be to a blockade and finally whether we could make use of NATO-committed U.S. forces without leaving NATO with the feeling that it was being wrecked.

Admiral Radford assured Secretary Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves had discussed the Arab-Israel problem. They had reached the conclusion that it would be relatively easy to establish and to maintain a maritime blockade. It would probably be also possible to establish an aerial blockade although there were no precedents to go on here. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that we would not be obliged, in the contingency of war between Israel and the Arab States, to go as far as instituting an aerial blockade.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed the comments by the Secretary of State on developments in the Near East since the last Council meeting, with particular reference to the Baghdad Pact, and the requests for military assistance from Saudi Arabia and Syria.

b. Noted an oral report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the NSC Planning Board report on the subject, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1447–c (Item 2–c of the Record of Actions, 260th NSC Meeting), will be ready for Council consideration at its next meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 14.
2. Secretary Dulles met with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva October 27–November 16, 1955. Documentation on discussions concerning the Middle East is printed in vol. XIV, pp. 657 ff.
3. See Document 340.
4. Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 1452, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)