Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

60. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 11, 1955¹

Washington, August 11, 1955

SUBJECT

• Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• United States—State Dept.
  • Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.—The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Robert Murphy—Deputy Under Secretary
  • Mr. George V. Allen—NEA
  • Mr. Elbert G. Mathews—S/P
  • Mr. B. F. Dixon—NEA
• Defense Dept.
  • Col Russell F. Akers—JCS
  • Col. Frank B. Elliott—OSD ISA
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Roger Makins—British Amb.
  • Mr. W. Morris—British Embassy
  • Col. Victor Fitzgeorge-Balfour—British Representative NATO

These portions of the text in quotations shown below are the prepared position of the Department as presented by the Under Secretary to the British Ambassador.²

“Introduction

“I regret that so long a time has intervened since our meetings of June 23 and 24 when you gave us UK views on the problems of Middle East defense. Since then we have been applying ourselves to the issues you highlighted. Meanwhile, some of these issues were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister and by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan in Paris and Geneva. In view of the latter development it seemed advisable that we defer resuming our talks until the participants at the Summit had returned to Washington and London and we could have the benefit of their latest views.

“I shall now outline US views under the agenda headings that you suggested prior to our June meetings.”

Ambassador Makins stated that he did not expect to make substantive responses at that time but would give answers later.

“Agenda Item 1 (a)—The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in Peace

“We consider that the USSR regards the Middle East as a soft area particularly susceptible to propaganda and subversion. The Russians probably do not anticipate that any part of the area will fall to their control in the near future but they may well believe that they can capitalize on existing discontent and unrest in order to make the area of doubtful utility to the West. It is unlikely in our opinion that the USSR would attempt military adventures in the area as such.

“Undue optimism arising from the results of the Geneva meeting might lead the Middle Eastern states, excluding Turkey and less positively Pakistan, to become even less concerned about the communist threat and, as regards the Arab states, even to concentrate more on the alleged Israeli menace. We foresee that the USSR will attempt to take advantage of this situation by making further gestures of support of the Arabs against Israel and by increasing its efforts at ideological and economic penetration in the Middle East.

“The most worrisome spots at the moment are Syria and Egypt. As regards the former the unstable internal political situation is made to order for communist manipulation. As regards the latter, we have been disturbed by Nasser’s apparent susceptibility to Soviet diplomatic blandishments and offers of trade and arms. Fortunately, the situation in Iran has improved since the fall of Mossadeq. The US is doing what it can to ensure that the Shah and other pro-Western elements maintain their determination to resist communism and develop their country.

“As regards Saudi Arabia which was discussed briefly in the June meetings, we find evidence of growing unrest in the country which could become serious. While there has been some slight indication of communist activity, actual party activity is under exceedingly strict surveillance and is not, at the moment, an important factor. More significant is the general impact on Saudi Arabia of new ideas coming from the Western world and from the more advanced Arab states. These ideas come into natural conflict with the [1 line of source text not declassified] generally backward states of political development. We consider it important, therefore, to do what we can to improve internal security and to encourage the regime to use its resources to promote healthy development, economically and politically.

“As you know we have for some time been disturbed by reports from Kuwait indicating the existence of communist-inspired propaganda and activity and suggesting the presence in the Sheikdom of unhealthy political rivalries that could jeopardize the stability of the state. In addition, the Kuwait Oil Company is experiencing increasing difficulties.

“Both of us have an important stake in Kuwait oil. Up to the present time, the protection of that stake against adverse political developments in Kuwait has been exclusively a UK responsibility. If the information we have been receiving from Kuwait is correct, and we think that in general it is, US and UK stakes in the Sheikdom might be endangered with disconcerting suddenness. This would cause adverse reactions in both our countries.

“Let me make it clear that the US has no desire or intention to undermine UK influence and prestige in Kuwait. All that we seek is an opportunity to work with you to correct situations that threaten common US and UK interests. I do not propose to pursue this aspect of the matter further in the context of these meetings on Middle East defense, but I believe it is a subject that we should explore together at another time, and we will send you a separate note on this subject. The general problem of stability in Kuwait is, of course, relevant to our present discussions.

“In summary, the US estimate and the UK appreciation of the Soviet threat to the Middle East in peace seem to agree with respect to the general situation. As regards specific countries, the US foresees greater dangers in Egypt and Kuwait than does the UK; conversely, you are more concerned over Iran than we. Neither of us is complacent about the situation in any part of the Middle East.”

The Ambassador stated that as they had indicated before they had recently become concerned over Iran. There were many reports from British representatives that the Ala Government was not doing well. It failed to accomplish anything. It was gradually losing its control and authority throughout the country. Generally disintegration seems to have set in. The Shah seemed to be taking over many of the active government functions. Although he must be aware of the inadequate performance on the part of the present government, he did not seem alarmed. The British Government had thought at one time of coming to the United States Government with a view to considering steps which might be taken and which might have a curative effect. However, they had decided not to proceed with this for the present but were continuing to watch developments carefully.

The Under Secretary commented that the Shah obviously wished to be his own Prime Minister. It was quite possible that this was an evolutionary process during which the Shah might decide that being Prime Minister is not so much fun and return to his constitutional status.

The Ambassador said that he was interested in the Under Secretary’s remarks concerning Saudi Arabia and would like to know the extent of the Communist problem. The Under Secretary replied that in large measure the oil fields were at the bottom of this problem. Because of the large scale oil operations in Saudi Arabia it was necessary to bring in people from outside Arabia. The Communists had been able to infiltrate the ranks of those being brought into the country. The Saudi Government had been ruthless in putting down such Communist activities as were noticed in the country, but we wished the Saudis to take the Communist problem throughout the Arab area more seriously.

Adverting to the Saudi [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] resources the Ambassador said that similar problems existed in the Sheikdoms. With regard to the Under Secretary’s remarks concerning Kuwait, the Ambassador said that he had reported to his government the views previously expressed on this subject. He took note of the fact that the subject would be taken up again in separate channels and that he would brush up in order to be prepared for it. In this connection the Ambassador inquired as to the particulars of US fears regarding Kuwait. The Under Secretary replied that the penetration of Communists into the country through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unemployed intellectuals who dally with Communist ideas were potential dynamite.

“Agenda Item 1(b)—The Soviet Threat in the Middle East in War

“The US considers that Soviet objectives in war would be to destroy Western bases in the Middle East; to prevent a build-up of indigenous or Western forces in the area; to seize the outlets of the Black Sea; and to deny Middle Eastern oil to the West. With the advantage of surprise and in the absence of a strengthening of existing Middle East defenses the USSR might well have the capability of achieving all of its objectives except seizing the outlets of the Black Sea. The effects of nuclear attack would probably, however, seriously impede the Soviet effort.

“US and UK views on the Soviet threat to the Middle East in war seems to be generally in accord.

“Agenda Item 2—Political and Strategic Aims in the Middle East

“US political objectives in the Middle East are:

a. To assure that none of the Middle Eastern states or resources fall under communist control or for any of the states to become firmly ‘neutralist’.

b. To develop a situation giving the Middle Eastern states a feeling of confidence in their security against aggression or subversion by:

i. promoting internal stability and peace among the states of the area and

ii. encouraging, initially in the ‘Northern Tier’, the development of regional arrangements for defense against communist subversion and aggression.

c. To bring about and maintain political and economic cooperation between all Middle Eastern states and the West; in particular to assure that Middle Eastern oil, other resources, and communications routes remain available to the West.

d. To establish relationships assuring the continued active cooperation of the Middle Eastern states with the West in time of war.

“US military objectives in the Middle East are to secure the NATO right flank, base sites, the Turkish Straits, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-bearing areas.

“We believe that US and UK political and military aims in the Middle East run parallel. Although it is too much to expect that we shall always see eye to eye on every issue that may arise in the area, we can and must work together to forward our common general purposes.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Agenda Item 3—The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization

“The Baghdad Pact

“The US initiated the Northern Tier concept and encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact. We intend to continue to support it as the best basis for regional defense arrangements in the Middle East. We recently sent to all our missions in the area a re-statement of our position supporting the Pact and authorized the missions to use this statement in talks with local officials. We encouraged and welcome the recent Pakistani decision to accede and believe that this has served to give renewed momentum to the Pact concept. We are giving thought to an appropriate public statement at the time of Pakistan’s formal accession. We consider that Iranian adherence, which would complete the ‘Northern Tier’, would give further impetus and we hope that this may take place within the next six months to one year. The US will take such steps as it can, including a modest increase in military assistance, to encourage Iran to join but we do not intend to use pressure.”

The Ambassador said that this was very interesting and encouraging. He had had some fears that perhaps the US had not been as keen regarding Middle East defense as previously. Therefore, he was pleased that the Under Secretary had reaffirmed the previous position. Regarding Pakistan the Ambassador said he believed it would adhere to the Pact. The UK opposed the reservations which the Pakistanis proposed and believed that they were not in order. However, the UK was not having much success in convincing the Pakistanis at [on?] this point. The UK has also suggested that Pakistan not subscribe to the letter regarding the United Nations resolution on Palestine, but he believed they would do so anyway.

With regard to Iran the UK would be pleased to have the Iranians join the Pact, but they did not expect to use pressure to bring them in. He stated that the UK did not expect to enter into a military commitment to Iran and added that one could not expect the Iranians to bring any appreciable military capability to the Pact. In this connection he asked if the United States had received reports on the progress of our special training mission. The Under Secretary said that we had not, but that basically the United States was apparently more optimistic about the potentialities of the Iranian forces than was the United Kingdom. The British Ambassador said he believed this to be the case.

Mr. Allen queried the Ambassador’s statement to the effect that they would not give a special commitment to Iran under the Pact. The Ambassador pointed out that a special agreement had been made with Iraq at the time of the British accession to the Pact. He was concerned that the Iranians might also seek a commitment. The United Kingdom itself would not wish to give such a commitment. However, he could only speak for the United Kingdom in this respect, and the other Pact members are, of course, free to take such steps as they wish. His Government would like to see the Iranian Government and armed forces strengthened before they become members of the Pact. This, of course, did not mean that the United Kingdom would not welcome Iran to join the Pact if she were of a mind to do so on her own accord. The Under Secretary reiterated that the United States did not wish to press the Iranians to join the Pact.

“We believe that the US and the UK should concentrate on the completion and strengthening of the ‘Northern Tier’. Although it rests with each of the area states to decide whether or not it will accede to the Pact, we do not presently consider that the adherence of additional Arab states would be desirable until Arab-Israeli tensions have lessened. Israeli accession is, of course, out of the question in any foreseeable future. We recognize that at some later stage the adherence of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan would serve to provide lines of communication and additional base sites. We share the UK view that bases in an Egypt friendly to the West and committed to Middle East defense would be useful. We foresee, however, that for reasons of Egyptian prestige, if nothing else, Egypt’s role in regional defense may have to be played outside the Baghdad Pact orbit.

“The US does not consider that French participation in the Pact would serve any useful purpose. If, however, Syria and Lebanon eventually join, it probably will be necessary to go along with French accession. It is, of course, possible that Arab emotions over the North African situation would cause Arab member states to resist French adherence. We would not favor Greek or Italian participation. At a much later stage South African participation might be considered if the other members are agreeable.”

With respect to South Africa the Ambassador said that the United Kingdom very recently concluded a new agreement with South Africa mainly concerned with the Simonstown Naval Base where the British had retained full rights. In the discussions and negotiations the British had found the South Africans very cautious with respect to extending their commitments. Presently they are primarily interested in defense arrangements in the area south of the Sahara. Eventually they might come to realize the defense of Africa lies primarily in the Middle East. In the Ambassador’s opinion it is only when the South Africans arrive at this point of view that it would be useful to approach them regarding participation in a Middle East defense pact.

“The question of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact has been given the most careful consideration within the US Government. We have concluded that under existing circumstances it would not be wise for us to adhere to or otherwise formally associate ourselves with the Pact at this time, primarily because we believe such a step would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. We do not consider that this is a matter requiring immediate action on our part because we already have security arrangements with two of the Pact members, in addition to the UK, through NATO and SEATO. Furthermore, our military assistance programs to the Pact countries, and to the potential member, Iran, are clear and tangible evidence of our interest in the security of the area. We have by no means ruled out the possibility that we shall eventually accede and we shall keep this question under constant review. With the relaxation of Arab-Israeli tensions we would be prepared to adhere to the Pact and we would be willing to inform Prime Minister Nuri Said of this position at an appropriate time.”

The Under Secretary said he assumed the Ambassador had been notified of the discussion which had taken place on the last point between Mr. Macmillan and Secretary, Dulles in Paris. In response to a negative reply from the Ambassador the Under Secretary stated that the Department would send a memorandum to the Ambassador setting forth the substance of this exchange.

“As an interim measure the US will establish close liaison arrangements with the Pact Organization so that we may coordinate our plans and aid programs for the development of defensive strength in the Middle East with the plans and efforts of the other states concerned. The nature of our liaison arrangements will, of course, depend upon the type of organization created by the Pact members. We are now thinking in terms of having our Ambassador in Baghdad maintain liaison at the political level and initially our Army Attaché at the military level. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff are presently studying the question of liaison at the military level, and we will be prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail later.”

The Ambassador stated that he was very pleased that the United States would take steps to have an informal but positive liaison with the Pact after Pakistan acceded and the organization was established.

“Other Regional Pacts

“The US considers that the Arab League Collective Security Pact is wholly unsuitable as a framework for effective Middle East defense. The projected Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact would be even worse. We have made clear to the area governments our belief that the latter pact would be non-productive. Although we still hope that it will not come to fruition, recent reports indicate that the three prospective participants are making progress in agreeing upon the terms and conditions of their association. If [1 line of source text not declassified] the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact is signed, we think it would be useful for the US and the UK and other Baghdad Pact members to adopt a common posture. In our view an outburst of criticism and complaint should be avoided. All of us should as far as possible refrain from public statements about the Pact; such statements as we have to make should follow the line that despite our doubts about its utility we do not intend to criticize the Pact or permit its existence to inhibit our friendly relations with the three participants.

“All of us should do what we can to direct the activities that may develop under the ESS Pact into constructive channels. As an example, the US would try to persuade King, Saud, who is showing greater awareness of the communist menace, to use Saudi influence within the scope of the Pact to persuade the two other members to take more effective action against communist infiltration.

“Although the Turk-Pakistan Pact, which we once thought might serve as a framework for Middle East defense, has been superseded in that regard by the Baghdad Pact, the US considers that this special link between the two strongest Middle East states still has its own value particularly in the fields of cultural and other non-military relations.”

The Ambassador stated that he would not comment at this time regarding these suggestions for action should the ESS Pact come into force. His feeling was that we should not adopt any course which would give the impression that we had changed our position. This would have adverse repercussions particularly in Iraq. However, it was his view that the Pact would not materialize, principally because of the failure of the Syrians to act. The Under Secretary replied that we would, of course, be considering this matter further and would certainly consult in case the ESS Pact is signed.

“Importance of Iran

“It is clear from my comments a few minutes ago that we attach considerable importance, perhaps more than you, to Iran’s role in the ‘Northern Tier’ and in the Middle East generally. Our estimate of Iran’s importance rests largely on four considerations. First, Iran is the only country in the Middle East besides Turkey and Afghanistan that has a common frontier with the USSR, and the Russians have always found this frontier a great temptation. Second, the ‘Northern Tier’ concept cannot materialize until Iran becomes a participant in the defensive organization under the Baghdad Pact. Third, the most suitable line of defense in the Middle East lies in good part in Iran. Fourth, the availability of Iranian oil for free world markets is a very good thing for you and for us. Although its recently renewed availability created a surfeit of Middle East oil, and we in consequence have had to cope jointly with a number of problems, this surfeit is an insurance against our being held up by any of the oil producing states of the area. It is in the interest of both of us to take steps that will help to keep Iranian oil in the market; one of those steps, in the US view, is to bring Iran into a regional defense organization. As I said earlier, we hope that Iran will accede to the Baghdad Pact within the next six to twelve months. We do not expect to use pressure to induce Iran to join.”

The Ambassador said he wished to make the point clear that the British did not rate Iran any less important than did the United States. The importance of its geographic position and its oil was fully recognized. The difference between the US and the UK views on Iran regarded what Iran was capable of doing administratively and militarily. The United Kingdom appraised the Iranian ability to take on tasks and to carry them through at a somewhat lower level than did the United States. The United Kingdom would like to be more optimistic about Iran but could not in candor be so. It was, however, very willing and anxious to do what it could to help bolster up Iran politically, administratively, economically and militarily. The United Kingdom had been somewhat alarmed at the retrogression which had taken place in these four fields in Iran. The Ambassador discussed again the recent UK reexamination made of the Iranian situation. He reiterated that they would continue to watch developments very closely and would be in touch with the United States Government in the future if things continued to worsen. The Ambassador inquired of developments in Iranian oil. The Under Secretary replied that the oil officials concerned believed that things were going fairly well. The Ambassador said that he had not received any particular news about oil recently and he assumed this to be a good sign; if developments had taken a turn for the worse he would have certainly heard of it.

“Miscellaneous

“To conclude my comments under the third agenda heading, I shall touch briefly on four points which you made in our earlier meetings.

[1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The Ambassador agreed.

“French Attitude Toward the Baghdad Pact—It is our impression that the French have recently been at least passive in their approach to the Baghdad Pact. If we had reason to believe they were resuming some of their earlier maneuvers against the Pact, we should use our best efforts to dissuade them from such tactics.”

The Ambassador said that he had the impression that the French had given up working against the Pact. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

“Jordanian Accession to the Baghdad Pact—We appreciate that there are reasons making an early Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact desirable, nevertheless, we believe the disadvantages in Jordanian adherence arising from Jordanian contiguity to Israel are overriding. We hope that the UK will not encourage the Jordanians to seek membership in the Pact until the Arab-Israeli situation has improved.”

The Ambassador agreed with the United States position. He pointed out that the UK view which had been expressed was that only after Pakistan and Iran had joined the Pact should the possibility of Jordanian adherence be considered. Only if the momentum of the Pact lagged and it were necessary to bolster it up again would the UK consider the possibility of Jordanian accession at an earlier date.

“Defense Arrangements with Israel—The US shares the UK view that we both should, if possible, stay away from a defense arrangement with Israel. We have no present intention to enter into such an arrangement and hope to maintain this position for a long time. We recognize, however, that it may become necessary at some stage in the development of the Arab-Israeli situation or of regional defense arrangements for either or both of us to revise our attitude.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Agenda Item 4—Type of Organization Required Including Its Relationship to NATO

“The United States assumes that after the formal adherence of Pakistan, the fourth member of the Baghdad Pact, the permanent Ministerial Council provided for in the Pact will be established. We also assume, with the UK, that although the Ministers might meet occasionally, the requirement of permanency would be met by the designation of deputies. We also agree that these might well be the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Baghdad plus an appropriate Iraqi official. Baghdad would seem the logical seat of the permanent council as the Pact was signed there, but we consider this a question that could well be left to the Middle Eastern members of the Organization to determine.

“In general the United States urges that the organizational arrangements be kept as loose and simple as possible. Rather than establishing a permanent military planning staff, it seems to us that it would probably be adequate to have periodic meetings of military representatives as is done in SEATO. If any Secretariat should in fact be found to be necessary it is our view that it would be desirable for it to be small.

“The United States considers that liaison between the Baghdad Pact Organization and NATO should be informal. We shall wish to keep in close touch with developments in this regard.”

The Ambassador said he had nothing to add. It was, of course, their view that the organization should be small and simple. They believed that it was necessary to have a secretariat, and they also contemplated having a small planning staff. Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour added that although it may not be an official British view it was his own personal opinion that the SEATO model was a good one.

“Agenda Item 5—A Concept of Operations

“The US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the concept of operations set forth in the Tripartite London Military Report of last February is acceptable as a point of departure for further consideration of the nature and scope of defensive military operations in the Middle East in the event of Soviet aggression.

“Agenda Item 6—Requirements for the Development of the Operational Concept into a Realistic Plan Including the Following

“(a) Command Organization for the Area

“The United States shares the UK view that it would be premature to consider the creation of a command structure under the Baghdad Pact now or in the immediate future.

“(b) Contribution Required from Middle East Countries, the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth Countries Directly Concerned and the United States

“The United States considers that the Tripartite London Military Report contains a useful preliminary study of military requirements for the defense of the Middle East. We see little early prospect of meeting these requirements, particularly for defensive air and naval capabilities and for lines of communications. We hope, however, to remedy some of the existing deficiencies through our military assistance programs for Iraq and Iran. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

“In general we believe that the creation of the forces and facilities required for an effective defense of the Middle East against Soviet aggression would be a prolonged, difficult and expensive process. However, by continuing our present level of military assistance to the Middle East and UK assistance and sales to the area, some military strength can be developed in the Middle East. The primary objective of the US and UK military cooperation with the Middle Eastern states should in our view be to keep up their morale and while encouraging them to continue to maintain or improve their internal security, to help lay a basis for future area defenses.

“(c) Supply of Arms, Equipment and Training Facilities for Middle East States

“General US Policy on Supply of Arms

“United States policy with respect to the supply of arms to Middle East states, excepting Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, is based upon the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. We have in the recent past made few and small shipments; not even Iraq has yet received substantial supplies. We are considering the possibility of meeting some Egyptian requests, primarily to dissuade Nasser from turning to the USSR for supplies. As regards Saudi Arabia we find it necessary to respond to the more urgent Saudi requests for heavy military equipment for training purposes. We also supply other equipment for the general strengthening of its armed forces. All of this equipment is made available on a reimbursable basis. In approving military supplies for Saudi Arabia we keep in mind the problems existing with neighboring states and sheikdoms and the particular interests of the UK in the area. We do not consider that the equipment we are providing so strengthens the Saudis as to pose a threat to their neighbors.

“We have not been making arms available to Israel, and we share the UK concern at recent French deliveries of jet aircraft and tanks. We spoke rather vigorously to the French about the late model Mysteres they intended to deliver and hope that the French will hold these back. We have our own problems, however, in that if we do release some equipment to Egypt, we shall have to make some supplies available to Israel.”

Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour said that this position seemed entirely consistent with what he had understood the United States position in the past to be. The Ambassador said that his only concern was with Saudi Arabia. While it was probably true that this equipment did not give Saudis capabilities of conducting forays against their neighbors, the neighbors didn’t necessarily realize this fact. The prestige of having the equipment and display of equipment would have a bad effect on the neighboring Arab states. While understanding the reasons for our policy with regard to Saudi Arabia, the UK still remained somewhat unhappy regarding it. The Under Secretary pointed out that the Saudis had acquired the equipment on a reimbursable basis.

The Ambassador noted that the US and the UK had similar views with regard to Israel and Egypt. The UK had recently been reviewing the function of NEACC and with one exception felt that no changes should be made. In their view it did not seem necessary to request committee approval for every bullet shipped. This had been the case in the past and the Ambassador believed it was useful to divide military equipment into two types, important items and unimportant items. Only the important items in his view should be submitted to the NEACC for its consideration. The UK was not prepared at this time to make a formal proposal to this effect, but would probably do so in due course.

“US Policy on Offshore Procurement

“I believe I should preface my more detailed comments on United States offshore procurement with respect to Iraq and Pakistan with a general and frank statement. We have made provision for procuring in the UK as much equipment for these programs as is feasible within the limitations upon us and the considerations by which we must be guided. However, we realize that this has not given you full satisfaction, and that we have not been in a position to procure in the UK all the items which you would wish. We do, however, wish and intend to cooperate with you just as far as we can.

“Iraq

“In formulating and administering our military aid program for Iraq, we have sought to coordinate our activities with UK-Iraq arrangements, to avoid dislocation of the pre-existing re-equipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces and to minimize logistic difficulties. In determining those items to be offshore procured in the UK we have been governed by the following considerations:

a. The desirability of maintaining the habitual sources of supply.

b. Specific requests for UK military equipment to meet known requirements.

c. The fact that, in some cases, the ends of the program can best be served by the purchase of UK equipment.

d. The limitations on offshore procurement contained in the pertinent Mutual Security Legislation of 1954.

“The United States intends to continue to be governed by these considerations with regard to further offshore procurement in the UK for Iraq. Under the existing program in addition to the contract for 75 120 mm recoilless rifles valued at $704,000, of which 12 have already been shipped, the US has now let contracts in the UK amounting to $3,013,000. Two items, 2,000 rounds of high explosive 120 mm shells and 2,000 120 mm shells, the UK has been unable to provide. Another item of 9,000 25-pounder shells is yet to be let. This offshore procurement has been taken out of a total program of $10.9 millions for Iraq and includes scout cars, tank recovery vehicles, fire direction equipment, guns, ammunition, and communications and engineering equipment.

“We believe that the policy we have been following is in consonance with the US-UK Memorandum of Understanding of February 1954 as we understand it. Although that Memorandum is technically no longer in effect, as it was based on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 since superseded, we intend to continue our current policy.

“We are certain that the Iraqis are aware that the US is coordinating its military aid program with the UK. Because of this we doubt the utility of now stating explicitly what the Iraqis already know implicitly. We are, nevertheless, agreeable to telling the Iraqi Government, if the UK so desires, that the US and UK do coordinate their military programs for Iraq. [2 lines of source text not declassified]”

The Ambassador noted Mr. Hoover’s remarks with gratification. He would like to consult London regarding this matter and take it up again later.

“You discussed in our earlier meeting the Iraqi request for Centurion tanks and proposed that these be provided through OSP. Inasmuch as this matter was raised at a high level during the Geneva Conference, and that specific proposals are now under consideration by our respective Governments, I would not propose that we discuss it further at this point.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Pakistan

“Our program of military assistance for Pakistan is designed to help equip 4 divisions, 3 armored brigades, 4 fighter squadrons and to supply two mine sweepers and equipment to modernize and maintain existing naval establishments. We have estimated the total cost of such a program at roughly $170 million. Our initial annual military assistance program amounted to roughly $50 million of which $39 million is for military equipment and $11 million for military support costs. In general, the items being furnished under the program are light tanks, light artillery, motor transport, small arms and artillery ammunition, signal equipment, radar, fighter bomber jet aircraft and naval equipment. Out of the current program of $2,018,000 originally planned for OSP for the Pakistani Navy $1.5 millions has been contracted for in the UK. Two hundred thousand dollars is to be supplied from continental US sources in order to expedite delivery and due to changes in equipment required. Of $544,000 programmed for OSP for Army matériel, radar and directors [detectors?] originally scheduled for procurement in the UK at a figure of $515,000 were cancelled because of excesses of these items developed in UK due to the cancellation of your AAA Command. Pakistan will be supplied from these excesses generated under existing contracts or from recapture of delivered items in the UK. Ammunition, programmed at $29,000 was purchased for $21,000.

“In determining items to be offshore procured for Pakistan we are guided by the same considerations as in the case of Iraq. We are fully cognizant of the importance to us as well as to you of the Commonwealth link between the UK and Pakistan, and we wish to see existing close relations between the UK and Pakistani armed forces maintained.

“I was disturbed by your reports of friction between US and UK military people in Pakistan and we have reminded our missions in both Pakistan and Iraq of standing instructions that emphasize the necessity of close US-UK cooperation and the dangers of permitting the local people to play one of us off against the other. This is a problem which we both should keep under continuing review and if necessary inform each other of unsatisfactory developments.”

The Ambassador said that he was extremely grateful for our statement and he would call this to the attention of the Foreign Office. He was certain that the UK would reciprocate in this respect.

With regard to offshore procurement the Ambassador said that he was not sure that he had jotted down the entirety of the Under Secretary’s remarks due to their detailed nature. He requested that a member of his staff be permitted to call at the Department and obtain a precise statement regarding this section. The Under Secretary said that this would be agreeable.

“(d) Political and Financial Aspects of Infrastructure and Stockpiling

“The United States is fully aware of the political and financial difficulties of making adequate provision for infrastructure, stockpiling and lines of communication in the Middle East. While we see no immediate prospect of substantial progress in solving these problems our aid programs in Iraq and Iran will be of some help.

“Agenda Item 7—The Program for Meeting These Requirements

“I have already said that we consider it unrealistic to anticipate the fulfillment of the total military requirements of an effective Middle East defense in the immediate future. The most likely area of relative progress is in the strengthening of indigenous ground forces. We would hope that the UK might find ways and means of doing more to this end in the area. We shall, of course, continue our efforts in the ‘Northern Tier’ countries.

“Pending the development of an effective defense structure in the Middle East, we may be able as an initial step, as I have suggested earlier, to stimulate in the area a greater realization of the dangers of communist infiltration and subversion and a greater will to counter these dangers in addition to laying the basis for future defenses. Infiltration and subversion are evidently more immediate threats than communist military aggression, and it is in the interest of both the US and the UK to do everything practicable to reduce these threats. In the countries where we have Military Assistance Programs, one of our objectives has been to foster a capability to meet internal subversion. In addition to what the US will continue to facilitate in this way, we believe the new organization might also profitably devote attention to other aspects of combatting the internal security problems.

“We have been encouraged by the progress that is being made within SEATO to focus the attention of the Southeast Asian states on the problem of subversion, and we would hope that the Baghdad Pact organization could be induced to include this problem in its terms of reference. As we see it, the types of assistance that the Pact members might render one another and which might usefully be discussed in the Permanent Council or in some appropriate body include the following:

1. The exchange of information on communist personalities and communist subversive activities and propaganda within the ‘Northern Tier’ states;

2. Mutual assistance in the control of the movement of communist agents and personalities, lines of communication, or of communist propaganda materials;

3. Exchange of information on the kinds of measures that have proved effective against communist subversion;

4. Assistance in the development and strengthening of local security forces which could include (a) help in the training and indoctrination of such forces, and (b) the exchange of views and experience as to how they may be used in combatting communism;

5. Exploration of the possibility of joint political action, supported by official statements, propaganda, and other activities, to counter subversive political movements against one or more of the signatory powers, especially movements that are based outside of the territory of the nation at which it is directed.”

The Ambassador said that he had reported the Under Secretary’s views as presented at our first meeting regarding combatting subversion in the Middle East. As yet he had had no response from London. He was grateful, however, for these specific suggestions and his government would, of course, consider submitting them to the Council after its formation.

The Ambassador said that he was greatly encouraged by these talks. In general it appeared to him that in all issues the US and the UK see things very much the same way. There were, of course, some differences as to points of approach, but if there were no differences, it would be unhealthy. He very much appreciated the carefully prepared views which had been presented. If there were specific subjects which needed further discussion he suggested that we could meet later to do so. He noted that separate channels would be used to discuss Kuwait and offshore procurement of Centurion tanks for Iraq. The Under Secretary said that he believed the Secretary had discussed the question of Centurion tanks with the Ambassador. The Ambassador replied that the Secretary had but it had been decided to hold the matter in abeyance and he had not reported the discussion to London.

Mr. Allen said apparently the US thought of the Baghdad Pact more along the lines of a defense organization than the UK. Ambassador Makins replied that it was, of course, a regional organization, but special agreements were necessary to put teeth into it. The UK has already made special agreement with Iraq but does not contemplate a special agreement with Iran. If after the Iranians had joined the Pact or became stronger the UK would, of course, take another look at this problem. Mr. Allen said he was afraid that from the public point of view it would appear that Iran had entered into a defense arrangement with concomitant guarantees when in fact there would be no guarantees. Ambassador Makins replied that the overtones were certainly those of a guarantee. The Pact itself was the first step in making security arrangements. Once it came into effect pressures would build up to conclude special agreements and they would come in due course. Mr. Allen asked if the Ambassador thought Iran would be willing to join the Pact without a commitment. The Ambassador replied that this was one of the problems that gave the British pause. From a military point of view Iranian participation in the Pact would, in effect, add considerable liabilities to the Pact without compensating assets. The Iranians could not contribute effective forces to area defenses at this time and the United Kingdom was unable to increase its own military forces. On the other hand there are, of course, considerable political benefits to be obtained by Iranian membership in the Pact. Therefore, the British position has been that while welcoming Iranian membership they have not pressed the point and do not foresee giving a special commitment at this time.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Dixon.
2. The portions in quotation marks are from a talking paper sent under cover of a memorandum from, Allen to Hoover, August 4. (Ibid., 780.5/8–455)