Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

56. Department of State Position Paper¹

Washington, July 11, 1955.

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

1. Under existing national policy the Departments of State and Defense have been encouraging the development of indigenous regional defense arrangements and helping to bring into being the “Northern Tier”, to be composed of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. While in the long run such a grouping could eventually lead to the building up of useful defensive strength, its initial importance lies in helping to keep those key countries western oriented and politically stable. A cornerstone for the “Northern Tier” was created by the signing of the Turk-Iraqi Pact at Baghdad in February 1955. The United Kingdom has acceded to that Pact and the Government of Pakistan has just decided to adhere. The Pact calls for the parties to, “cooperate for their security and defense”. We are hopeful that Iranian adherence may be forthcoming during the next several months, but this will depend upon our ability to provide military aid to Iran.

At the request of the United Kingdom, informal politico-military discussions have been conducted in Washington between Under Secretary of State Hoover and Ambassador, Makins. Preceding these discussions there were extensive military staff conversations among the United States, United Kingdom and Turkey, in which general agreement among the representatives was reached as to the military objectives, strategy, concept of operations, and other factors relating to the defense of the Middle East. In this connection it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the results of these conversations acceptable as a point of departure for further consideration of the Middle East defense problem; the Department of Defense concurs in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the politico-military conversations in Washington held the end of June and referred to above, the United Kingdom made certain basic points. These points, and the position we propose to take with respect to them, are given below:

a. Basis of Defense Arrangements

British Position—Defense arrangements in the Middle East should be based on the Baghdad (Turk-Iraqi) Pact.

United States Position—The United States supports the development of a Northern Tier defense organization within the framework of the Baghdad Pact.

b. Middle East Membership of the Pact

British Position—Pakistan should be induced to adhere promptly to the Baghdad Pact. Iranian adherence is also desirable but its timing should be left entirely to the Iranians.

United States Position—Pakistan has already decided to adhere, and we have encouraged it in this course. Iran should also be encouraged to join in the near future, and we expect to encourage this by an offer of increased military assistance. The membership of the Baghdad Pact should therefore include Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. It should not extend to other Arab states until Arab-Israel tensions are lessened.

c. United States Adherence

British Position—The United Kingdom would like the United States to become a full-fledged member, but if United States participation is delayed, as a minimum they hope for United States association with military planning in the area.

United States Position—Under existing circumstances, the United States does not think it wise to adhere or otherwise formally associate itself with the Pact, particularly because this would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. We do not, however, exclude the possibility that we shall eventually adhere, and we shall keep this question under constant review in the light of developments.

The United States will establish close liaison arrangements with the Pact organization so that we may coordinate United States plans and aid programs for the development of defensive strength in the Middle East with the plans and efforts of the other states concerned.

d. French Adherence

British Position—French adherence to the Pact would not be helpful but is likely to be inevitable, especially if Syria and Lebanon should join.

United States Position—We concur.

e. Organization Under the Baghdad Pact

British Position—Organization under the Baghdad Pact should include a ministerial council, a military planning staff and a small secretariat; the question of command should be avoided at this time.

United States Position—The United States will urge that organizational arrangements be kept as loose as possible, following the SEATO pattern. Specific views are that the ministerial council should meet periodically to coordinate plans and exchange views; possible there should be a small secretariat; no command organization should be established.

[Paragraph f and 2 subparagraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

g. Increased United States Offshore Procurement in the United Kingdom for Iraq and Pakistan

British Position—The United Kingdom asked that the United States re-confirm the United States-United Kingdom Agreement of February 1954 regarding aid to Iraq, under which the United States agreed to give consideration to offshore procurement in the United Kingdom for Iraq. Additionally, they requested information regarding United States aid programs for Pakistan and maximum use of offshore procurement in carrying out these programs.

United States Position—The United States would inform the United Kingdom that the United States intends to continue the present policies on offshore procurement in the United Kingdom for Iraq and Pakistan; the United States does not as a general rule consult third parties in advance regarding United States aid programs but will keep the offshore procurement aspect very much in mind and will advise the British as appropriate.

3. It is probable that pressures will increase on the United States for adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly since the United States is already allied with Turkey through NATO and Pakistan through SEATO. The position of close collaboration but non-adherence can, however, in all probability be sustained for 6 to 12 months, pending the hoped-for amelioration of the Arab-Israel conflict.

4. Finally, it is noted for your information that prospective military aid availabilities will not permit the United States to increase its total level of effort for the Middle East, except in the case of Iran where it is hoped that a moderate increase will encourage its adherence to the Baghdad Pact. It may be possible and desirable to shift funds among countries to gear our aid programs more closely to any regional plans which the Baghdad Pact planners may develop.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret. Attached to an unsigned draft memorandum to the President, drafted by Jernegan, which in turn is attached to Hoover’s memorandum, infra. The covering unsigned memorandum to the President indicates that the paper was prepared for the President’s use at Geneva. “It has the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

   Hoover presumably carried a copy of the memorandum and the position paper to a meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on July 11. Another copy of the position paper is attached to a note of July 11 from Robert C.F. Gordon to Murphy that reads as follows: “Attached is the revised copy of the Memorandum to the President which Mr. Hoover took to his meeting with the President today.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1155)

   The position paper was transmitted to 11 Middle Eastern posts, London, and Paris, in CA–2275, September 17. (Ibid., 780.5/9–1755)