Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

461. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, August 3, 1957—noon.

149. Department’s 237, July 31.² I feel that our military aid program for Iraq should be placed on a more realistic basis than is the case now, that in giving program effect, we should have greater freedom of action than we at present enjoy, and that we should be in position, which we are not in now, to deal with Iraqis in matter of arms needs frankly and openly. MAAG Chief, in his memo 9–124 May 27, stressed desirability of realizing these same objectives. That was why I concurred.

The US/UK memorandum of understanding is based on treaty which no longer exists and, moreover, presupposes for the UK in Iraq a predominant position which the UK no longer enjoys. The memorandum therefore, I feel, should preferably be abandoned or at least rewritten in general terms, as suggested by MAAG Chief. The hard facts are, as I see them from the vantage point of Baghdad, that the UK today has neither the material strength nor moral prestige, especially since the attack on Egypt, to play the primary role in Iraq.

I am not at all suggesting that an end be made to offshore procurement in the UK. I would like though to see us enjoy the unquestioned freedom to procure needed arms for Iraq wherever price and quality are most favorable, just so long as they fit into existing pattern. I feel I should point out, however, that it is just because of price and quality that Iraqi military authorities generally favor US arms and equipment, and incidentally, as observed by MAAG Chief, same preference is being manifested for US training methods.

Iraqis one of our most dependable allies, if not the most dependable one we have in this sensitive part of the world. To continue with the arming of Iraq on the basis of a secret understanding with the UK, knowledge of which is withheld from Iraq and which unrealistically places the UK in a preferred position, is, in my view, endangering our best interests.

Please see our despatch 456, March 29, 1955³ and Department’s reply CA–2717, October 5, 1955.⁴

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/8–357. Secret. Repeated to London.
2. Supra.
3. Despatch 456 contained the views of Gallman, the Chief of MAAG in Iraq, and the Army and Air Attachés on modifications of the 1954 U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–2955)
4. In this instruction, the Department stated that it viewed the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding as no longer in effect since the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. The Department noted that it had told the British, however, that it still planned, for the present, to continue the policies established under the memorandum, especially in regard to offshore procurement. The Department added that it had taken the position that since the memorandum was no longer in effect, there was little to be gained by informing the Iraqis of the existence of the document. (Ibid.)