Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 15, 1956—2 p.m.

692. Recent developments in NE and forthcoming Eden visit² prompt us submit following current appraisal Iraqi political situation.

1. Despite several recent disturbing political crises in area, GOI has remained comparatively stable. Reconstitution of Cabinet by Nuri last month was matter of form rather than substance and connotes no basic change policy. Nuri while somewhat less strong than year ago still holds adequate power.

2. Speaking to Chamber last week Nuri divided Iraqi foreign policy into regional and purely Arab aspects. Seen thus his principal accomplishments have been in sphere regional policy which centers in Baghdad Pact.

3. Both Nuri and Bashayan³ have recently made statements in Parliament emphasizing immediate objectives prompting conclusion Baghdad Pact were (a) terminate Anglo-Iraqi treaty 1930 and (b) win new friends for Iraq on Palestine problem and other problems. Long-range objective Nuri emphasized was to meet Communist threat highlighted by proximity USSR to Iraqi borders. At same time Nuri reiterated Baghdad Pact requires no GOI commitment outside its borders.

As we see it pact organization now far advanced. Council has been established, deputies are meeting regularly and economic committee has just completed its inaugural session. Military planners will soon meet and other committees including those charged with combating subversive threat expected be functioning soon.

4. In sphere what he calls Arab policy Nuri government has been static and at times even on defensive. GOI has repeatedly stated Iraqi membership in Baghdad Pact should not be interpreted as Iraqi withdrawal from Arab camp. Iraqi Arab policy Nuri and other leaders have pointed out is to stand by AL charter and ACSP. Government’s Palestine policy is in accord with general Arab policy on subject and calls for implementation UN resolution. Nuri personally would like see Arab-Israeli problem settled now but GOI feels it cannot take initiative in matter. GOI, however, as long as Nuri heads government may be expected place no obstacle in way any Arab state which may seek actively settle problem.

Iraqi relations with other Arab states at present largely unsettled. Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue strongly oppose Baghdad Pact, attack Iraq for having concluded it and seek by overt and covert means prevent any other states from joining. Leftist drift in Syria and apparent inability Syrian Government stand up against leftist elements in Syrian army remains source concern to Iraq. Recent developments in Jordan where Iraq has always felt it had strong voice found particularly disturbing. Only relations with Lebanon appear be on somewhat even keel but latter recognized as traditionally pursuing middle course and no real positive support expected from this quarter. GOI’s hope that either [Jordan?] or Lebanon or both might soon join Baghdad IACS [Pact] seems at present effectively scotched.

GOI would probably still like take more active measures in both Syria and Jordan to restore normalcy in those countries but would do so only on conditions (a) it invited by competent authorities of either Syria or Jordan intervene to protect legally constituted authority and (b) US and UK gave approval for such action. Long-range Iraqi Fertile Crescent unity objectives incidentally less of a consideration on this score than is immediate Iraqi concern re security of area.

5. In sphere internal policy Nuri has for past six months or more publicized his proposed internal reform program. Its principal objectives are to purge government of corrupt and inefficient elements, establish new land tax and activate housing program. While these points still largely in formative stage Iraqi development program based upon new five-year plan inaugurated by GOI last year proceeding apace. Level of economic activity resulting from program steadily rising although benefits not yet fully appreciated by public.

Nuri has indicated too he favors return to political party life and has been seeking induce principal opposition leaders form opposition party after which government party will be formed.

6. While government remains relatively strong political horizon not without clouds. Some opposition ultimate strength of which still unclear but which certainly greater than last year manifesting itself. This opposition remains heterogeneous and unorganized and includes Salih Jabr⁴ followers, some of Jamali⁵ supporters and small core neutralists.

Opposition’s principal arguments to date are:

A. Foreign policy:

1) Baghdad Pact which it contends had initially been accepted by many non-Nuri men in belief it would induce Western Powers support pro-Arab solution to Arab Israel problem based on implementation United Nations resolutions failed bring expected “benefits”. Implication is Nuri has failed use it as bargaining factor with West to insure this.

2) On contrary Baghdad Pact has isolated Iraq from rest of Arab world—which no Iraqi wants. Some original supporters of Baghdad Pact have even joined this chorus charging isolation from Arab world has been due inept handling of development Baghdad Pact by Nuri and by United Kingdom.

3) While Egyptian and Saudi hostility not unexpected apparent loss Syria and possible loss Jordan ascribed by some as due failure Nuri policy. There are those who decry Nuri’s unwillingness spend more in these countries to counter Saudi bribery.

4) Nuri government has failed obtain needed military assistance from United States in sufficient quantities to meet existing deficiencies. Progress deliveries opponents contend has been slow and has been responsible for whatever lag exists in Iraqi arms buildup plans. United States arms aid to Iraq has unfortunately lacked psychological potential of Egyptian Czechoslovakia arms deal.

B. In sphere internal policy:

1) Promised internal reform programs slow in developing and various critics hold will probably be inadequate in scope, some too question earnestness Nuri desire effect internal reform.

2) Government’s new educational policy allegedly short sighted.

3) Development program too slow and not producing sufficient tangible benefits.

4) Normal political life in Iraq still suspended. Despite Nuri’s efforts induce his principal opponents form party none has done so—realizing probably that by refraining Nuri remains vulnerable on this score.

7. It likely in our view that this opposition will grow. While we do not question Nuri’s own sincerity regarding internal reform program we fear its actual implementation may well be disappointing. Some of Nuri’s Cabinet members unfortunately are probably only giving lip service to it and moreover are not overly competent. Factors beyond his control also of [are] contributing to lag. Thus for example proposed land tax reform for which expert was requested from United States and United Kingdom last May arrived late and possibility is that draft bill on subject when presented will in [be] inadequate. Actual positive accomplishments of promised reform program during coming year we fear likely be minimum and for this reason will probably give rise further criticism.

Pull of Arab Islam ways strong and any lack success in Arab policy whatever [would?] be reasons for it certain be exploited for purpose criticism.

8. Yet notwithstanding its shortcomings Nuri government may fairly be considered most effective friend West can expect in Iraq in near future. It is decisive, reasonable and we can work with it. Unless some positive steps are taken strengthen Nuri government during next few months however Nuri’s departure from office sometime later this year cannot be entirely precluded. This need not necessarily be brought about by any attempt to force him out of office for few would question he has strength successfully to resist any such development but rather because he may himself choose to resign. Experience has shown frequent Nuri tactic has been meet mounting criticism by suddenly resigning, thereafter confronting successor with overt or covert opposition calculated to demonstrate to all that nothing can be done in Iraq without his support. Department will recall most recent effective demonstration this tactic was during Jamali Cabinets in 1954.

9. On balance we feel it desirable strengthen Nuri. Following alternatives present themselves to effect this:

a. US adherence Baghdad Pact. While this would not necessarily still criticism of pact cited above it would at least make it clear in Iraq and in area as whole that our concern with Communist danger in ME is in earnest and would help focus attention on gravity this problem.

b. Support efforts strengthen pro-Iraqi elements in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and conversely use whatever influence we may have curb Egyptian and Saudi intrigue against Iraq. Persistent irresponsible Egyptian press and radio propaganda and Saudi use funds interfering in internal affairs other Arab States bound play into hands Communists and be detrimental to stability of area as whole.

c. As soon as circumstances may allow support Jordanian and/or Lebanon adherence Baghdad Pact with view to counter suggestion Iraq has abandoned Arab camp by concluding pact.

d. Effect prompt deliveries US military assistance in order expedite Iraqi army build up. If existing deficiencies Iraqi army equipment can soon be filled this will give tangible proof to critics that Nuri’s pro-Western policy has brought benefits. Occasional talk that Iraqi army buildup needed to fight Israel meaningless unless of course Israel attacks Arabs.

e. Support efforts implement internal reform program by supplying promptly when requested need for competent experts. Should be noted here that while US technical assistance to Iraq cannot be ignored generally speaking it has no great political potential. Question is not therefore one of broadening technical assistance program but rather of concentrating efforts on essential elements such as land tax and on sensitive areas such as Kurdistan to assist government to carry out soonest meaningful internal reform program.

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/1–1556. Secret. Repeated to London.
2. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden visited Washington January 30–February 3 for a series of talks with President Eisenhower. Regarding the Middle Eastern aspects of these talks, including material relating to Iraq, see Documents 94 and 95 and volume xv, pp. 101 ff.
3. Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Bashayan.
4. Salih Jabr, former Prime Minister of Iraq and leader of the Umma Party.
5. Muhammad Fadil Jamali, former Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister of Iraq.