Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

427. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, December 14, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ AND RECOMMENDED ACTION

(Pursuant to NSC Action 1290–d, December 22, 1954)²

I. Nature of Security Threat

1. Communist party activity has been illegal since 1927 and for the past six months particularly communist-front and left-wing elements have been subjected to severe repression. Diplomatic relations with the USSR were suspended in January 1955.

2. Despite these measures, the communist organization carries on limited underground activity in an effort to continue to exert influence upon left-wing groupings, to infiltrate government and army and to keep open its channels of communications.

3. Communist party strength is estimated at 2,000 with a cadre of 400 in a total population of about 5,000,000. The total number of communists and front group sympathizers may approximate 10,000. These persons are found chiefly in urban centers and are drawn principally from professional groups, as well as students, clerks and laborers, many of whom feel thwarted by lack of professional and economic opportunities. The Kurdish minority (about 800,000) in the north, a group subjected to severe repression in the past, is a source of communist recruits.

4. The Communist Party does not under present restrictive measures seriously jeopardize the present political organization of the country. The threat is principally one of limited infiltration of professional groups and lower and middle levels of government. Such penetration, together with limited communist membership in rail and port worker unions (and a proven capability to maintain clandestine internal communications, to provide safe haven for fugitives and to communicate abroad) gives the Party a capability to conduct agent operations and to improve its own organization.

5. If present restrictions on political activities were to be relaxed in Iraq, the Party and its front-group sympathizers could be expected to carry out considerable disruptive activity in the form of propaganda, demonstrations, strikes, etc. However, even under these conditions it is unlikely that the communists could infiltrate key government positions on a large scale or would be able to control any government that might emerge.

6. Under war conditions the Party would provide a significant espionage and clandestine support potential (communications, safe haven, etc.) for Soviet agent activity. In northern Iraq the Kurdish element would probably provide a limited para-military potential for Soviet use, particularly if incited and led by Soviet-trained Kurdish elements such as the Barzani Kurds in the Azerbaijan SSR.

7. Attached is an appendix giving more detailed information regarding Communist Party activity in Iraq.³

II. Existing Internal Security Forces and National Military Forces

A. Primary Internal Security Forces

8. The Iraqi Police force is by area standards a fair force. It was organized by the British along British Colonial Police lines and continues to use British consultants. The British maintain close liaison with its Criminal Investigation Division (CID) component through their local intelligence service, and provide unknown amounts of technical equipment and assistance.

9. The Iraqi police force numbers approximately 12,500–14,000 and consists of a small traffic police department, a mobile police force component, and a CID, as well as garrison forces, all under the control of the Minister of the Interior. 3,000–4,000 of this number constitute the “mobile police force,” the military or striking arm of the police which is armed and which constitutes one of the most effective elements of the police. Each of the fourteen provinces (Liwas) has elements of the mobile police, as well as garrison forces. British weapons are used. The force is deficient in transportation and communications. The Police School in Baghdad trains officer and CID personnel.

10. Except for the CID the quality of police personnel is not high. The police are poorly paid, a fact which encourages the acceptance of bribes. In general, police work is made difficult by a widespread public antipathy against the police.

11. The CID, the key agency in the maintenance of internal security and the suppression of subversive activities, is a fairly competent and effective organization. Its personnel are moderately well trained and, at the higher levels, relatively honest. Its present director is a competent and experienced officer who has attempted to establish working relationships with the police in neighboring countries.

12. The police are probably sufficiently well organized to counter quickly any significant subversive activity. Police intelligence forces appear to have penetrated the Communist Party and seem to be well informed in advance of any planned demonstrations. Military intervention might be required, however, to meet simultaneous demonstrations in any one city.

B. Judicial Procedures

13. Since the emergence of the Nuri Government and its promulgation of various restrictive ordinances, the Iraqi courts have been busy trying political offenders. In two important respects the courts have recently changed their procedures: by citing Peace Partisan and Democratic Youth “front” activities as criminal political offenses, and by an unpublicized but nevertheless obvious relaxation of the laws of evidence in Iraqi courts. The courts are almost daily handing down convictions for communist or communist front activities and meting out sentences ranging from three months to three years. During the past eight months at least 200 individuals have been sentenced for proscribed political offenses. Instances still arise, however, where communist offenders go free, ostensibly for lack of evidence but actually due to intervention by ranking political leaders.

C. Military Forces

14. The Army (53,000) under the Minister of Defense is organized into a headquarters establishment, one infantry division, one mountain division, an independent brigade and cadre units of an additional infantry division. The First Division is located in the southeastern part of Iraq along the lower river plain and near the Persian Gulf. The Second Mountain Division is stationed in the northeastern region. It is concentrated in the oil region, but has battalion size units near the Iranian and Turkish borders. The Third Division in process of formation guards the main route from Iran leading to Baghdad and reinforces the police forces in case of internal disturbances.

15. Top leadership and the state of individual and small unit training are good. The Army is loyal to the Crown. There is little or no communist infiltration. Quantities and qualities of light equipment are sufficient. Weaknesses are lack of combat experience, insufficient technical personnel, and deficiencies in heavy equipment.

16. Air Force personnel totals 1,400 (including 75 pilots) and equipment includes 139 aircraft (25 Jet; 40 P fighters; 13 Transport; 61 Misc.).

III. Evaluation of the Internal Security Situation

17. Under existing political conditions in Iraq the communist apparatus does not have the capacity to overthrow the government by force nor to subvert or influence it significantly. The present repressive measures of the government and its instruments for enforcing those measures are such that communist mass support cannot be expected to increase, but on the other hand the instruments of the government for attacking communism are not sufficiently effective to insure that the organizational integrity and cadre strength of the Communist Party will be effectively and continuously attacked. However, this balance between security forces and the strength of the communists may not be preserved unless steps are taken to improve the effectiveness of the non-military internal security forces through better training and equipping.

18. There are indications that present restrictions on political activities may be relaxed thereby providing greater opportunities for overt activities (disruptive tactics, strikes, demonstrations, etc.) by the communists and their sympathizers and allowing the Communist Party to increase its mass support.

19. While the Army is deficient in important items of equipment for combat against an enemy force, it is fully capable of maintaining security against armed insurrection. The Air Force could make a contribution to the maintenance of internal security.

20. Recently the Iraqi Government has enjoyed better relations with the country’s Kurdish population and there appears to be little likelihood of Kurdish revolt. However, should a major communist insurrection be attempted and in the unlikely event that wide-scale Kurdish participation and support developed, the police would need for its suppression the assistance of at least the Army division located in northeastern Iraq.

21. Under wartime conditions the Communist Party would provide a significant espionage and clandestine support potential for Soviet agent activity. The Kurdish minority in northern Iraq might provide a limited para-military potential for Soviet use.

IV. Inventory of U.S. Programs Bearing on Internal Security

A. Technical Assistance

22. The Iraqi economy has large water and petroleum resources but is poor in human skills. The ICA Technical Assistance Program, initiated in late 1952, is designed to give the Iraqi Government a measure of technical facility in coping with its economic development problems.

23. Emphasis in the Iraqi developmental program has been placed on long-term projects to the virtual exclusion of the short-term immediate impact projects and as a result public criticism of the inadequacy of Government efforts in the economic and welfare fields has been increasing.

24. Program costs from inception through FY 1954 totaled $2.3 million; the Fiscal Year 1955 program scheduled assistance totaling $2.7 million; and it is proposed that $2.3 million be allocated for FY 1956. To date only slightly more than $500 thousand has been spent on supplies and equipment since most of the funds have been used for supplying technicians to the Iraqi Government.

B. Military Defense Assistance

25. Present U.S. plans call for equipping two combat divisions. A small MAAG (six officers and five enlisted men) helps administer this program initiated by the MDAP agreement signed by the Iraqi Government in April 1954. None of this equipment is intended for Iraq’s police forces.

26. Of the $10.9 million in military assistance presently available and for which there is a firm program, $1.5 million in end-items had been delivered by January 31, 1955. New funds in the amounts of $10 million and $12 million for the fiscal years 1956 and 1957 respectively will be required to complete the present MDAP objectives.

27. Since most of the present equipment is of British origin, much of the MDAP financed supplies and equipment will be purchased from the UK through off-shore procurement.

C. Information Service and Exchange of Persons

28. Objectives of this program are: to convince the people of Iraq and their Government of the threat of communism and of U.S. friendship, to encourage, strengthen and support pro-Western leaders and to explain the significance and purpose of U.S. military and technical assistance. The USIS Program operates today in a favorable atmosphere.

29. A small program with a limited budget ($249,729, FY 55; $473,710, FY 56) the USIS operates an Information Center in Baghdad and another in Kirkuk, which is primarily oriented toward the local Kurdish population in its information program.

30. The Educational Exchange Program in Iraq consists primarily of six annual grants to Iraqi leaders and specialists to make short observation visits to the United States under the Smith–Mundt Act (PL 402) and an exchange of American and Iraqi students and professors under the Fulbright Act (PL 584). Amounts involved in FY 1955 total about $150,000.

V. Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security Programs and Feasibility of U.S. Assistance

31. The Government of Iraq is dominated by elements strongly pro-Western and anti-communist. Their attachment to principles of collective security is demonstrated by conclusion of the mutual defense pact last February with Turkey, an important step in implementation of the Northern Tier defense concept. Iraq’s desire for close ties with the U.S. is reflected in the military agreement concluded between the two countries on April 21, 1954.

32. Most responsible political opinion in Iraq is keenly alive to the communist menace both from without and from within. However, the masses of Iraqi people, being miserably poor, depressed and politically apathetic, could be exploited by communist agents if they were able to work without restraint. Thus an effective long range economic development program will continue to be an important element in preventing the expansion of communist influence.

33. Having in mind the fact that a determined minority brought neighboring Iran to the verge of communism during the period 1951–53, the Iraqi Government has been especially sensitive to the danger of internal subversion. The recent drastic anti-communist measures taken by Prime Minister Nuri Said reflect a desire to keep subversive elements under control. It is probable the Iraqi Government would be receptive to U.S. offers of aid for internal security purposes. However, use of a significant portion of available MDAP funds for police equipment or training would be interpreted by the Iraqis as failure on the part of the U.S. to live up to its commitments and would create difficulties in our relations with Iraq. Similar problems will result if U.S. military aid programs do not satisfy Iraqi aspirations.

34. While a union with Syria does not appear imminent, should it ever occur, control of Syrian communist and left wing elements might considerably increase the security problems of the Government.

35. The present Prime Minister, Nuri Said, is by far the strongest and most effective leader in the country. However, he has been in poor health in the past year and is advanced in years by eastern standards. Should he withdraw from the political scene, there would probably be a relaxation of controls, including resumption of political activity which has been kept to a minimum by the dissolution of political parties in September 1954. However, it is doubtful if radical changes in Government policy would occur in view of the fact that power would probably pass to some other figure from the small pro-Western element that dominates the Government.

VI. Recommendations

36. Since it is important that the Iraqi Government continue to appreciate the scope and nature of the communist threat, U.S. agencies should seek increased opportunities, without appearing to interfere in Iraqi domestic affairs, to ensure Iraqi awareness of the communist threat.

• Responsible Agencies: All agencies
• Timing: Continuing

37. Efforts to bring a greater understanding of the communist threat to university undergraduates, graduates and faculty should continue to receive strong emphasis in view of the fact that Baghdad University has been historically the major source of CPI recruitment and a breeding ground of subversive action.

• Responsible Agency: USIA
• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
• Timing: Continuing

38. The Iraqi police force should be strengthened. The actual weaknesses in training, equipment, organization, morale, etc., can only be determined by a survey of the force made by competent Western police officers. Following such survey, which would include determination of the extent of British assistance, realistic recommendations for strengthening could then be made. It is recommended that a survey of the Iraqi Police Force be made in cooperation with the Iraqi Government.

• Responsible Agencies: State, ICA
• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
• Cost: About $10,000 (not presently programmed)
• Timing: As soon as feasible

39. Since at present no segregation of political and criminal offenders exists and prisons often become communist training schools, it is recommended that U.S. assistance in the field of Iraqi penal reform be extended. Promising Iraqi penal officials should be sent to U.S. police schools through exchange of persons program or public administration program of USOM.

• Responsible Agencies: State, ICA
• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
• Cost: About $18,000
• Timing: As soon as feasible

40. Because of the traditional association between the British and Iraqi CID, it would be advisable to inform the British of our plans to offer assistance to the Iraqis before such an offer is made. Such a step should imply no right of veto by the British and should be made in the belief that the U.K. would welcome our offer of assistance and would cooperate fully.

• Responsible Agency: State
• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
• Timing: Within next six weeks

41. While this study is designed to focus directly on increasing the effectiveness of internal security forces and to exclude related and peripheral matters, it is felt that the contribution to the internal security of the present assistance program might be increased by placing greater emphasis on selected projects with short range visible effects.

• Responsible Agency: ICA
• Timing: Continuing

42. Until the role of Iraqi armed forces in the regional defense of the Middle East is determined by the Baghdad Pact powers and accepted by the U.S., priority in the allocation of military aid to Iraq should be given to military units appropriate to the internal security function of the armed forces. Pending the foregoing decision, there should be no change in the present military aid program. Any exceptions from the foregoing should be justified on a case by case basis.

• Responsible Agencies: Defense, State, ICA
• Timing: Continuing consideration

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iraq. Top Secret. A covering note of December 20 by the OCB Secretariat Staff indicates that the analysis and recommendations contained in this report were concurred in by the OCB at its December 14 meeting, and that the Department of State was “negotiating with the British in London in an effort to improve the internal security situation in Iraq by working through and supporting the British effort in that country.”
2. NSC Action No. 1290–d requested the Operations Coordinating Board to present to the National Security Council a report on, among other things, “the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844.
3. Not printed.