Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—7 p.m.

412. When I called on Nuri at his home this morning and discussed the question of arms supplies (Embtel 411)²I also brought up the visit of Prime Minister Menderes who arrives in Baghdad tomorrow. I told Nuri that we were very happy about this further evidence of close neighborly relations. Nuri thanked me for bringing this message on the eve of the visit (Deptel 374, December 31).³

Having mentioned Menderes coming the conversation quite naturally turned to area defense. No reference of any kind was made by Nuri to the Turkish-Pakistan pact⁴ or even the eventual possibility of Iraq signing a bilateral pact with Turkey. Nuri talked at first in general terms and then asked what the US was prepared to do. I reminded him again of what I had said when we were on the subject of army aid. The extent of our aid depended on how much initiative Iraq and her neighbors showed in the interests of regional defense. He had, I recalled, on a previous occasion referred to US NATO commitments and had asked what commitments we were prepared to make in this area. On the same occasion he had also mentioned the desirability of having a regional pact based on Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter.⁵ In the matter of self-defense I commented Article 51 seemed appropriate but how did Article 52 fit into the picture. It was concerned primarily with the pacific settlement of disputes and just where would the US and the UK fit into the defense plan he envisaged.

Nuri replied that his present thinking was that the best plan for regional defense would be a pact made up of Iraq and neighboring countries along with the US and the UK based on Article 51 of the Charter and “in the spirit of Article 52”. In connection with Article 52, he continued, he had the Soviets in mind. As Western Germany rearms, it is conceivable that the Soviets would assume a less belligerent attitude. He was taking the long view that in the long run Article 52 might appeal to the Soviets. These, he said, were his present general thoughts on regional defense. He needed more time, however, to work out a proper formula.

“Would it not be a good thing”, I interjected at this point, “if meanwhile staff talks could be initiated by Iraq with her neighbors. What about such talks with Iranians?” (Deptel 379, January 3)⁶

Nuri said such talks would be a good thing. He could not take the initiative, however. Iran’s frontier is contiguous to the Soviet Union. Iran was in a very delicate position. The initiative and timing of Iraq-Iran staff talks would have to come from Iran. He could not risk embarrassing Iran.

As I was about to leave, Nuri said with obvious relish, “did you see what I did to the Russians?” (Embtel 407, January 4)⁷ I said I had but I observed, running my hand under the surface of the coffee table at which we were seated, “What will be left under ground after the Soviets have pulled out?” Nuri promptly placed both his hands under the table, fingers tip to tip, and laughingly said, “We are in touch with developments”.

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/1–655. Secret. Also sent to Ankara and Cairo and repeated to London, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 374, the Department of State informed Gallman that he could, at his discretion, tell Nuri that the United States welcomed the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Menderes as evidence of close friendly relations in the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8287/12–3154)
4. On April 2, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an “Agreement for Friendly Cooperation,” under which the two nations agreed, among other things, to exchange some types of military information, and study the possibility of joint action in the event of an unprovoked attack on them from the outside. (211 UNTS 263)
5. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter expressly reserved the right of individual and collective self-defense of member nations. Article 52 stated that the Charter did not preclude the existence of regional security arrangements or agencies if those arrangements or agencies and their activities were consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
6. Telegram 379 dealt with several proposals by the Department on the subject of Middle East defense arrangements. One of these proposals was that the Embassy in Baghdad might wish to suggest that it would be appropriate for the Iraqi Government to indicate directly to the Iranians its willingness to engage in staff talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8287/1–355)
7. In telegram 407, the Embassy informed the Department that Nuri had ordered the closure of the Soviet Legation at Baghdad. According to the Embassy, Nuri regarded the Soviet mission as a focal center of subversive activities. (Ibid., 661.87/1–455)