406. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Ardalan, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 17, 1957,6 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Middle East Situation
The Secretary said that the situation in the Middle East was particularly dangerous at this time. There was an increased recklessness evident in present Soviet policy which was difficult to explain. Perhaps this recklessness reflected the personal temperament of Khrushchev who was known to be unpredictable. About two weeks ago, we had received a note from the Soviet government dealing with the Middle East,2 which was the most violent diplomatic note that the Secretary had ever seen. In fact, we had debated whether to return the [Page 942] note. Moreover, the statements of Foreign Minister Gromyko in his recent press conference had been very violent in tone. His reference to the Soviet intercontinental missiles had been unnecessarily belligerent. The Soviets had been extremely active in Syria. They almost had Syria in their hands.
Foreign Minister Ardalan said that he would like to refer to what his government considered to be the two most dangerous recent developments. One of these was the increasing infiltration of Russia in the Middle East. This problem was a very delicate one and it was important not to take any action which might have the effect of increasing Soviet penetration. The other main danger was the aggressive nationalism of Nasser. This policy created complications throughout the Near East. For example, Nasser sent Egyptian teachers to work in the Persian Gulf area and his only purpose in doing so was to enable them to propagandize for Egypt.
In response to the Secretary’s question, the Foreign Minister said that the Iranians were “closing their eyes” to Saudi actions in connection with the disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. The Iranians had suggested to the Saudis that a mixed commission be established to which each country could present its case. He could not anticipate any great difficulty in connection with this problem as the Iranians had been able to establish very good relations with the Saudis.
The Director General of the Iranian Foreign Office had recently been sent to Saudi Arabia to hold talks with King Saud. The King had said that nothing should be done which might provoke drastic action in Syria. He was in touch with moderate elements in the Country. The Secretary said that we were not so optimistic regarding the Syrian situation as was King Saud. We feared that his influence in Syria was not so great as he thought. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]
The Foreign Minister said that the Iranians had again proposed to King Saud that a conference of all Moslem countries be held. The King had replied that he favored such a conference in principle but thought that its convocation should be delayed until it appeared probable that all Moslem states would attend.
The Secretary commented that we had done a great deal to build up King Saud in the Arab nations. We thought that he was sincerely anti-Communist in contrast to certain other leaders in the Arab area.
[Page 943]The Foreign Minister said that the Iranians were also concerned about the Afghanistan situation. During the recent visit of the Afghanistan King to Turkey, the President of Turkey had attempted to impress upon him the dangers of too close an association with the Soviets. As the U.S. knew, the policy of Iran towards the Soviet Union was to “smile” and to try to be friends with them. However, the Iranians, as a result of their long association with the Russians, were fully aware of Soviet objectives in the area.
The Foreign Minister would like to convey a message from His Majesty, the Shah, to the Secretary. Recently, a high Soviet military official had said that the Soviet Union would have no difficulty destroying bases in countries unfriendly to the Soviet Union and that even ordinary bombs would be sufficient to destroy the foreign bases in Turkey and Iran.3 The Iranian Government had instructed its Ambassador to protest this statement. No reply to the Iranian representations had as yet been received, however. It was the firm conviction of the Shah that Iran had not received the tangible military aid which it deserved. Nothing had been done which would enable Iran to defend itself “even for a couple of days.” The U.S. Ambassador to Teheran had been told about this but nothing concrete had been done. He would be grateful if the Secretary would consider the question.
The Secretary said that we of course wanted to be helpful. He was concerned, however, at the extent of the requests of friendly countries for more and more arms. When King Saud made his recent visit to Washington,4 he asked for increased military assistance, pointing out that the Soviet Union was furnishing Egypt with tremendous quantities of arms. In commenting upon the King’s request, the Secretary had asked what good these arms had done for Egypt. Actually most of the arms were now reposing on Abraham’s bosom. What had gotten the Israelis out of Egypt? Neither the Arabs nor Soviet arms but the position which the United States had taken. What kept the Soviets from committing aggression against free world countries was their knowledge that they could not aggress against one country without becoming involved with the United States. As the Foreign Minister was aware, the U.S. Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the United States to defend Middle East countries against Soviet aggression. Pursuant to the resolution, the U.S. had joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact. The Secretary understood that the Pact countries were now engaged in preparing military plans. Additional military strength would be needed and we understood that the Chief of our MAAG Mission in Iran was returning to the United States to discuss the Iranian needs.
The Secretary said that it was clear that Iran could not defend itself from aggression through its efforts alone. If the free countries joined together, they could help each other. This was the principle of collective defense. We of course recognize the need to have enough strength in forward areas to carry on delaying actions until other forces could be brought into action. We were familiar with Iranian problems, and were committed to stand with Iran.
[Page 944]The Foreign Minister said that he would like to bring up another question: the need for a military airfield south of Teheran, Now there was only one airport and both commercial planes and military jet planes used it. This was undesirable and the Iranian Government therefore hoped it would be possible to receive U.S. assistance for an airport at Kum.
The Secretary commented that the U.S. was confronted with a very difficult problem. All our free world allies desired to build up their military forces and sought U.S. support to do so. A complication to the problem was congressional action in cutting down on the funds for military assistance. We had to plan the utilization of our funds for defense in such a way that we could obtain the most effective defense for the least expenditure of money. We were very mindful of Iran’s problem, however. It now seemed that the Soviet activities were most intense in relation to the Middle East area and this factor would also be taken into account in considering Iran’s needs.
The Foreign Minister stated that the Government of Iran wanted help to continue its present policy.
The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to tell His Majesty, the Shah, that he had received His Majesty’s message with great consideration. The Secretary well remembered the last talk he had had with the Shah when the latter was in Karachi en route to Iran for [from] India.5 He had great respect for the courage which the Shah had shown. The Shah had not bargained before taking action which might have had the effect of exposing the country to Communist reprisals. This constituted courage.
The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary and said that he would be very grateful for the Secretary’s consideration of the questions he had raised.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1957. Secret. Drafted by J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the 12th U.N. General Assembly.↩
- For text of the Soviet note, September 3, and the U.S. reply, September 24, see Department of State Bulletin, October 4, 1957, pp. 602–603.↩
- The statement was made by Soviet Air Marshal Vershinin in Pravda, September 7, 1957.↩
- Regarding the official visit of King Saud to Washington, January 19–February 1, see vol. XIII, pp. 414 ff.↩
- See Document 352.↩