Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 334th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 8, 1957¹

Washington, August 8, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” 2.“U.S. Policy Toward South Asia: Ceylon,” 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” and 4. “U.S. Policy on Hong Kong.”]

U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5504; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1624–c, 1667 and 1753;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” dated December 5, 1956;³ NIE34–57;⁴ NSC 5703;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” dated February 6, 1957;⁶ NSC 5703/1;⁷ Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” dated June 27 [261, 1957;⁸ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” dated July 16, 1957;⁹ Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” dated August 5 and 7, 1957¹⁰)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, going into particular detail on the new Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1 and on the construction costs to the United States for new military facilities in Iran. He then read the Planning Board’s recommendations for Council action on the Iranian policy and noted the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the actions proposed by the Planning Board. (Copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.)¹¹

After Mr. Cutler had called for comment, the President inquired whether the Iranians really had a military capability of manning the Elburz and Zagros lines and of effectively resisting aggression. Or were we going to adopt this policy primarily as a sop to Iranian national pride?

Admiral Radford pointed out that the Council had already discussed at some length the military concept of the defense of Iran along the Zagros Mountain line. He insisted that the Elburz line was a much better defensive line than the Zagros, that the Elburz line had been accepted by the Baghdad Pact planners, and that the completion of the construction work would assure that this line provided more effective defense than the line of the Zagros. The President then said that the proposed new policy seemed perfectly proper to him.

Mr. Brundage said that he was concerned by the figures in the Financial Appendix, which showed an increase year after year. Would it not be better to try to hold down the rate of expenditures in Iran to the level of FY 1958 and FY 1959, at least until such time as the worldwide review of our military assistance programs had been completed by the Defense Department? Mr. Brundage warned that once such expenditures as these begin to grow, it is very difficult to reverse the direction.

Secretary Wilson disagreed with Mr. Brundage, and expressed the view that it would be sound to go ahead and adopt the proposed new policy with respect to Iran, trying to find the additional money somewhere else. After all, Iran was pretty important to the United States.

Mr. Cutler turned to Mr. Brundage and pointed out that the presently-estimated expenditures over a four-year period were less than we had estimated when this policy paper was first considered by the National Security Council in February. The President added his view that we really couldn’t kick about these expenditure figures. We had been too worried about this country ever since the Administration came into office. Apropos of Mr. Brundage’s remark, the President inquired as to when we could expect to see the great study of U.S. military assistance programs world-wide. Mr. Cutler replied that he wished to talk about this matter with the President at another time.

The National Security Council:¹²

a. Canceled NSC Action No. 1667–b and -c, in view of Council discussion of the report by the Department of Defense on “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 27, 1957.

b. Noted the revised Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1 transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 5, 1957, and authorized its insertion in all copies of NSC 5703/1.

c. In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (enclosure to reference memorandum of August 7, 1957), authorized the deletion of subparagraph 18–a of NSC 5703/1 and the relettering of the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 18 accordingly.

d. Agreed that U.S. policy toward Iran would continue to be governed by the statement of policy contained in NSC 5703/1 (February 8, 1957), pending a review of world-wide military assistance programs, which will include a review of military assistance to Iran.

Note: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC Action No. 1667–b and –c.

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5703/1.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

[Here follow items 6. “U.S. Military Capabilities To Meet Situations Arising in the Middle East,” 7. “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” and 8. “Retirement of Admiral Radford as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on August 9.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1624, see footnote 3, Document 391. Regarding NSC Action No. 1667, see footnote 14, Document 391. Regarding NSC Action No. 1753, see Document 256.
3. This memorandum transmitted Document 372 to the NSC.
4. Document 381.
5. See footnote 2, Document 378.
6. See footnote 6, Document 391.
7. Document 392.
8. This memorandum transmitted a JCS paper on the “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East” to the NSC; neither was declassified [4 pages of source text]. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385)
9. This memorandum transmitted a series of questions concerning the implications of Joint Resolution 117. (Ibid.)
10. In the August 5 memorandum, Gleason submitted to the NSC the Planning Board’s proposed draft of NSC Action No. 1667 revised in light of the previous discussion of the military implications of Joint Resolution 117 at the 331st NSC meeting. This revision authorized the inclusion of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1. (Ibid., S/ S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series)

    In the August 7 memorandum, Gleason transmitted to the NSC the views of the JCS, in the form of a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated August 6, which stated that the revised NSC Action No. 1667, as outlined in Gleason’s memorandum of August 5, was “acceptable from a military point of view.” (Ibid.)

11. Not printed.
12. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1770, approved by the President on August 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)