Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

• The Question of Discouraging Adherence by Jordan or other Arab States to the Turk-Iraqi Pact; Memorandum from Eden

I have been giving considerable thought to our discussion of the problems which will confront us if Jordan, responding to an urge to follow Iraq’s example, should seek to revise its military relationship with the UK by joining the Turk-Iraqi Pact, with the possible result that Lebanon and even Syria might later swing in the same direction. After our first meeting with you on this question, I discussed with the Counselor of the British Embassy our apprehension that such moves would greatly complicate Alpha by tending to isolate Egypt and thereby weaken Nasser, and would intensify Israel’s agitation. I indicated to him that we were considering steps to quietly discourage Jordan from adherence.

The attached instruction (Tab A)² from Sir Anthony Eden to the British Embassy is in response to this discussion and urges strongly that we not weaken in our support for the Turk-Iraqi Pact as “the foundation for an effective defense system for the Middle East”. [2 lines of source text not declassified] A policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging adherence to the Pact is consistent with our NSC 5428, paragraph 17d, which states that the U.S. should: “Neither encourage nor discourage other Arab states from asking to participate in regional security arrangements.”

I would agree with Sir Anthony that there are real dangers involved in our taking positive steps to discourage Jordan’s adherence to the pact since any such steps, however quietly made, would rapidly become known in all Arab states as well as in Turkey, and be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as a change in what is believed to be our basic position: support for the Turk-Iraqi Pact as a nucleus of an area defense system. Because such a change would be regarded as a victory for Egypt over Iraq, deep resentment and disillusionment would ensue in Baghdad and Ankara. Iraq took its courage in its hands in concluding this Pact and successfully rode out a tidal wave of Egyptian-Saudi pressures. Iraq’s corollary efforts to promote adherence of Syria and other states to the Pact have their basis in the long-standing “fertile crescent” concept as well as in a desire not to be the only Arab state linked with the West in a defense arrangement. There is no doubt that Iraq both challenges Egypt’s leadership and fears to be alone. In this connection, Jamali may have some reason to believe since he talked with you last July that you would not vigorously oppose the “fertile crescent” concept, provided Iraq first joined the Northern Tier (Tab).³

While Iraq has a concept of her own for Arab unity and ambitions to play a leading role therein, resentment over Egypt’s long-standing pretensions to hegemony in the Arab world are by no means limited to Iraq. The failure of Salah Salem’s recent heavy-handed attempts to scold and threaten the Arab states into action against Iraq was certainly regarded with some satisfaction in much of the northern Arab community.

[1 paragraph (41/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

At the same time, with respect to our Alpha telegram 1643 to Cairo (Tab C),⁴ I think it important to avoid giving Nasser the impression that we are underwriting his attainment of undisputed leadership over other Arab states. It was for this reason we used advisedly the expression “permit him to get new prestige and influence in the Middle East” in paragraph 1. His influence in the Arab world will be a natural by-product of substantial U.S. aid, but we would not wish him to be in a position to demand our unswerving support in the vagaries of intra-Arab politics.

Recommendations:

1. That we continue adherence to the excerpt of NSC policy above cited.

2. That we try to work out with the British a compromise arrangement [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with Jordan involving the latter’s adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; and that we continue to take the position with respect to other Arab neighbors of Israel that because we are opposed to an arms race, U.S. grant military aid must depend primarily upon, “substantial improvement” in Arab-Israel relations.

3. That after receipt of comments from Cairo and London (Tab C), you call another meeting to discuss this general problem.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4–155. Top Secret.
2. Not printed. Tab A is the text of an instruction from Prime Minister Eden to the British Embassy in Washington.
3. Not attached.
4. Vol. XIV, p. 127.
5. Dulles initialed his approval of all three recommendations. Tab D, a copy of a telegram from London was also attached to the source text. A summary of the telegram was not declassified.