Office of the Historian

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Acting Secretary of State1

Washington, September 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • The Analysis of the Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action Pursuant to NSC Action 1290–d2

The attached paper on the internal security situation in Iran is scheduled for consideration by the OCB on September 14.3

1.
Surveys of the subversive potential in Iran and of the Iranian security forces indicate that:
a)
While the Tudeh Party is now incapable of seizing power, it could rebuild itself rapidly if present Iranian security programs were relaxed or if lack of effective national leadership resulted in further political disunity.
b)
Iranian security forces are capable of repressing internal disturbances provided the Army remains loyal to the Shah and provided he is able to supply the necessary leadership.
c)
Lack of effective coordination of the various rival Iranian anti-subversive agencies (among other factors) prevents the security forces from destroying the remaining vestiges of Tudeh organization.
2.
Consideration of U.S. assistance for improving the anti-subversive potential of Iran must take account of two prime political factors:
a)
In view of the relationship between U.S. aid and the Shah’s attitude toward Iranian participation in Middle East defense, it would be dangerous to inform him that the development of defensive delaying capacities is to be subordinated to internal security.
b)
If U.S. advice and assistance in the internal security field were to operate to reduce the value of the Army as the prime guarantor of the Shah’s political strength, it would be met with royal and military resistance and, even if accepted, would tend to weaken the most important elements of stability in Iran.
3.
Within the framework of these political limiting factors, two specific recommendations in the paper require special mention:
  • [Subparagraph a (10 lines of source text) not declassified]
  • b) The Shah expects Iranian entry into the Baghdad Pact to be followed by U.S. action to build up his forces for participation in Middle East defense. Efforts to urge the Shah to join have elicited Iranian requests for increased assistance which the U.S. does not intend to give. Therefore, because of the political repercussions which will result when the Shah learns that Iranian entry into the Baghdad Pact will not be followed by substantially increased U.S. aid, it is recommended the United States not press Iran to join the Pact now. The urgency and dangers implicit in this situation are emphasized by recent Tehran telegrams, reporting new efforts by the Iranians to extract specific commitments from the United States prior to Iranian entry into the Pact.

Recommendation

That you approve the paper.4

  1. Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, NSC 155. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah.↩
  2. See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 308.↩
  3. The paper is not attached. See the editorial note, infra.↩
  4. The final text of this paper, as approved by the OCB on December 14, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iran 1954–1955.↩