Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, July 11, 1955—7:21 p.m.

55. For Ambassador. In your first conversation with Shah you may make following statements referring US plans for military assistance to Iran:

1. President sends personal regards, recalling highly useful conversations Washington last year. President wants Shah to know he and US Government are keenly alerted to initiative and efforts made by Shah and Iranian Government in improving defense situation in Middle East.

2. US Government has ascribed very high importance indeed to position and contribution of Iran to defense of Free World, and prizes highly friendship between Iran and US. In connection with Iranian defense efforts, US has noted with warm approval fact Shah has taken steps to begin process of creating a sense of regional solidarity and, as Shah knows, US is prepared send an observer to forthcoming Four-Power Military Staff Talks. It remains hope of US that Iran will see its way clear to adherence to Baghdad Pact at relatively early date, thus completing and closing line of resolute opposition to Communist menace. In this line of opposition it is anticipated Iran can play significant role.

3. As far as US military assistance programs for Iran are concerned, US counting heavily on results from US training teams now working with Armed Forces in Iran, and will give much weight to their findings. On specific question of US aid in support Iranian defense programs it is anticipated deliveries based upon current programs will be maintained during FY 1956 at same general rate that has been accomplished to date. These deliveries, as Shah knows, are calculated in relation to gradual buildup of Iranian manpower, availability of facilities, and other factors entering into capabilities of forces to absorb equipment.

4. Shah undoubtedly recognizes US Mutual Security Program is carried out in collaboration with other free nations and is worldwide in its perspective. US has global objective of developing defensive strength of free world, and as matter of first priority, developing defensive capabilities of those free nations participating in collective security arrangements.

5. In addition, US must take into account limited availability of funds provided by US Congress, and presently incomplete evaluation of Iranian Armed Forces.

6. However, in view Iran’s temporary lack of funds during period necessary for return of revenue from its oil resources, US recognizes special need for timely assistance to assure continued progress of its defensive capabilities in preparation for its rightful participation in plans for collective defense of Middle East area.

7. Therefore, in spite current shortage US funds available worldwide assistance, US is making budgetary arrangements, subject approval funds by Congress and increased capability Iranian forces absorb equipment,² to provide additional military assistance funds which will assure an increase in military assistance during FY 1957 and FY 1958 above average rate prevailing during recent years. Anticipated thereby make possible for Shah proceed with early arrangements for development of a Middle East collective defense organization.

FYI Statements Paragraphs 3 and 7 re future deliveries imply deliveries against remaining $34 million (as of 31 March 55) in existing programs and additional $25 million each FY 57 and 58. This aid not necessarily limited exclusively end-items since we prepared include some forms military assistance other than end-items and training if necessary for balanced program. Dollar figure should not be communicated GOI.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1155. Secret. Drafted by Crowl and cleared in NEA and S/MSA; cleared in draft with Hoover and Ohly of ICA; and approved by Allen. Effective July 1, 1955, FOA was abolished and its functions and personnel were transferred to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA).
2. Telegram 68 to Tehran, July 12, reiterated the condition of Congressional approval for the increased future military program. The telegram concluded: “In other words, we wish avoid implication of binding commitment to Iran for additional two year period even though Iran might swing towards neutralist bloc or otherwise show unsatisfactory performance.” (Ibid., 788.5–MSP/7–1255)