315. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1
Dear Mr. Hoover: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has recently returned here on leave and has reported to us fully on the local situation. He has emphasized particularly his view, based on close personal contact with the Shah, that the latter will be anxious to receive some clarification of the U.S. attitude toward military aid and that the position of our new Ambassador may be seriously prejudiced from the outset if he is unable to provide satisfactory assurances of U.S. interest in strengthening Iran militarily.
We recognize that the aid issue is a complicated one. Iran’s ability to absorb and effectively utilize large quantities of aid is still uncertain, and it may be impossible to firm up a realistic long–range aid program at any early date. Nevertheless, the Shah is a sensitive and mercurial individual who occupies a critical role in maintenance of Iran’s stability. It is not within my competence to pass judgments on the diplomatic and military considerations involved in the aid issue. However, it is our intelligence appraisal, based [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on an analysis of the over–all situation in Iran, that failure to provide the Shah with a reasonably precise statement of the role we hope Iran will play in regional defense preparations and of our own intentions may have the following adverse consequences:
- (a)
- The Shah may conclude that the U.S. has no serious intention of developing Iran’s capabilities for defense against possible Soviet attack. This would be a serious blow to the Shah’s morale, adversely affecting not only his interest in participation in regional defense activities but also his determination to strengthen his country internally.
- (b)
- Iranian political and popular opinion would tend to interpret the Shah’s failure to obtain satisfaction from the U.S. on the military aid issue as an indication that U.S. interest in the future of Iran and U.S. support for the Shah himself were diminishing. This would encourage the revival of anti–regime extremist elements and might facilitate the eventual reemergence of another Mossadeq–type government backed by fanatical nationalist elements and the Communists.
This matter was discussed briefly in the OCB meeting2 somewhat along the above lines and as Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson was not present at that meeting, I am sending him a copy of this letter.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–155. Secret.↩
- Apparent reference to the June 22 meeting of the OCB; see Document 312.↩