276. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 19, 19571
SUBJECT
- Meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ambassadors
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- Ambassador of Pakistan (Mohammed Ali)
- Ambassador of Iran (Ali Amini)
- Ambassador of Great Britain (Caccia)
- Ambassador of Turkey (Urguplu)
The Pakistani Ambassador said he regretted that the Ambassador of Iraq was not present since he had hoped that all of the Baghdad Pact Ambassadors might meet with the Secretary. Mr. Al–Shabandar, however, was entertaining at a luncheon and had asked the group to go ahead in his absence.
The Pakistani Ambassador gave the Secretary background with respect to the present meeting. He said that when Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik was in Washington, Ambassador Ali had had an opportunity to talk with him at dinner, along with the Iranian Ambassador and Ambassador Richards, about the situation in the Middle East. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Dr. Malik had felt strongly that the situation was critical and the United States must do something dramatic to offset the substantial Soviet gains. [7 lines of source text not declassified] There had, however, emerged in the discussion several other points which the group felt should be put to the Secretary. First, Ambassador Ali said, was a feeling that the United States should adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Nothing would give the people of the Middle East greater confidence in the determination of the United States. While this involved certain problems with respect to the attitude of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, it was felt that these problems could be overcome. Secondly, the Ambassador continued, it was essential to appease Arab sentiment in the area and establish a better psychological basis upon which to oppose Soviet penetration. This might be done by persuading France to make concessions on Algeria and thus remove an important propaganda instrument now in the hands of the Soviet Union and those unfriendly to the West in the Middle East. Also, the atmosphere could be substantially improved by a settlement of the [Page 658] Palestine refugee question through insisting that Israel repatriate a substantial number with arrangements for the remainder to be compensated for the loss of their property in Israel.
The Pakistani Ambassador emphasized that the group was not putting these matters up to the Secretary on behalf of their respective governments. They wished to discuss the matters on an entirely informal basis in order to get the benefit of an exchange of views. He underlined his own concern at the critical situation in the area. He felt that Lebanon was extremely weak and the psychological effect of any “back–tracking” on the part of the Lebanese Government would be very grave.
The Secretary thought it was very useful to have talks of this kind. He had been impressed in recent weeks with the fact that the machinery of various collective security organizations was perhaps too rigid and did not permit enough consultation at whatever point it might be most desirable to consult—in Washington, Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad or London insofar as the Baghdad Pact was concerned, or in Paris, London or Washington insofar as NATO was involved.
He was very glad that the Ambassadors had come to discuss these matters to which we, of course, attached the greatest importance. Regarding the general Middle Eastern situation, the United States took a serious view. We were determined and confident that given the good will and help of surrounding countries, the Soviet Union would not be able to maintain indefinitely a satellite position in Syria. The Secretary had long felt that it would not be possible for the Soviet Union to do so in a country not connected geographically with Russia so as to be under the direct menace of Soviet forces (he mentioned as an apparent exception Albania, and discussed the special considerations which rendered it perhaps undesirable to attempt to bring about a change in that country). The Syrian situation could not be changed overnight. He felt that the establishment of a free government of Syria was premature at this time but that the time might come when this approach would be useful. We must have plans to deal with the problem; indeed, we did have certain plans which we felt should be discussed only on a need to know basis.
Continuing, the Secretary said that the situation had not developed in a way entirely adverse to the interests of the free world. It was true that the USSR had made gains in Syria and to a lesser extent in Egypt. It was also true that Egypt and Syria had been isolated to a considerable extent and that all of the governments represented in the present meeting had good relations with all of the other Arab nations. There were some indications, although perhaps slight, that Nasser was not happy with his present situation and wanted to improve it by bringing about better relations with the West. In this connection, the Secretary thought it important that we not forget a “keystone” of our [Page 659] policy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the leadership of King Saud as against that of Nasser. It was important that we not take action which would be regarded by King Saud as a blow to his leadership. The United States felt that from an international standpoint any moves such as our joining the Baghdad Pact would be premature and would not help the over–all situation unless such action could be based upon the acquiescence of King Saud. The Secretary also perceived difficulties on the domestic front to our adherence to the Baghdad Pact. We had already come as close as possible to joining the Pact without going to the United States Senate. It was difficult to see how we could get Senate approval for adherence to the Pact unless we were in a position to give assurances to Israel. Any good which might be achieved by our joining the Pact would thus be jeopardized in the area by the necessity of engaging in some formal undertaking with Israel, which would create widespread resentment among the Arab states.
The Pakistani Ambassador observed that in the Eisenhower–Macmillan communiqué2 no reference had been made to the Baghdad Pact. The absence of such reference had, he thought, undermined the prestige of the Pact which would have been helped greatly if it had been mentioned and supported. The Iranian Ambassador agreed that this omission was unfortunate. The Secretary said the omission was “unconsidered”. Even if the Pact had been mentioned, however, that would not affect the validity of what he had said about the disadvantage at this juncture of our adhering to it.
Turning to the Palestine refugees, the Secretary said he earnestly hoped that the time soon would come when this problem could be tackled. He thought the best approach at the present time would not involve open efforts by the United States, United Kingdom and others represented at the meeting. However, if a nation not itself involved in the problem or in the area should agree to feel out the situation quietly, this might be well worth exploring. The United States would be prepared at the proper time and in the proper circumstances to endeavor to persuade Israel to accept a number of refugees, and it would be prepared otherwise to act along the lines set forth in the Secretary’s August 26, 1955 speech. We were watching the situation closely and reviewing it almost daily to see if an opening could be found to solve the problem. However, we must act cautiously. The Secretary recalled the damaging accusations against King Hussein to the effect that he had been negotiating with Israel. Indicative of the explosive nature of the problem was that the Arabs generally felt compelled to insist that no solution to the refugee problem or other [Page 660] elements of the Israeli question could be sought in the context of the existence of Israel. King Saud himself had said only recently that the one solution to the problem was to turn Palestine back to the Arabs.
The Iranian Ambassador said he had recently learned from an Israeli representative that Israel would be prepared to take some of the refugees back, if the Arabs agreed to take some. He thought it possible that Iran would be willing to do something itself with respect to the resettlement of Arab refugees. The Secretary said this latter suggestion might be very useful. It was difficult at the moment, however, to visualize a quick change in the Arab attitude so that the leaders would not publicly insist that all the refugees must go back to Israel. While some Arabs might take a constructive position privately, uniformly they took unhelpful public positions.
Responding to the Pakistan Ambassador’s statement that the situation was extremely dangerous and was cause for great alarm (commenting that it was much better to err on the side of being too alarmed rather than being not sufficiently alarmed), the Secretary said he was willing to be alarmed if that would help him to do the right thing. We were anxious to undertake any reasonable program that was apt to work. He thought, however, that United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact would not work for the reasons which he had set forth. If, however, the group felt that his estimate in this regard was wrong, that opinion would carry great weight with him. If the Ambassadors’ Governments felt that the United States should nevertheless adhere to the Baghdad Pact, he would be willing to consider the matter although he felt that we should take heavily into account King Saud’s attitude. The Pakistan Ambassador said that King Saud was an absolutely key figure, and expressed the view that we must keep King Saud on our side at all costs. The Turkish Ambassador expressed some doubt that the Arab states would in fact strongly object to United States security arrangements with Israel if the United States felt it necessary to extend a security commitment to balance its joining the Baghdad Pact. The Iranian Ambassador tended to disagree with the Turkish Ambassador in this regard.
The Iranian Ambassador said that he planned himself to talk with Arab representatives about the refugee problem to see what he might do in a quiet way. The Secretary thought that a good idea and said we would be glad to help in any way we could. He thought it much better to undertake this on a basis of quiet diplomacy rather than as part of any formal plan.
The Pakistan Ambassador said he had recently suggested that the Baghdad Pact be represented by an observer at the NATO Council meeting in Paris. He thought it highly desirable that the various Pact organizations have a proper degree of coordination and liaison. The Secretary took note of his suggestion but made no commitment.
[Page 661]Regarding Algeria, the Iranian Ambassador said he hoped that the matter could be handled in the United Nations in a way which would not give the Soviet Union an opportunity to pose as “protector of the Arabs”. The Pakistan Ambassador emphasized his belief that something should be done to “take the heat off this issue”. None of the Ambassadors present had any specific proposals to make, although the Iranian Ambassador said he had suggested to Mr. Pineau the previous evening that the French might agree to talk with representatives of Morocco and Tunisia in the presence of observers from Algeria. Responding to the Secretary’s question, Ambassador Amini stated that the Foreign Minister had not said “no” to the proposal, but had given no indication of acquiescence. The Ambassador thought Mr. Pineau wanted to find some formula that would relieve the tension. The Secretary commented that if the French could be persuaded to engage in such discussions that would be fine, but his impression was that they could not be so persuaded. The British Ambassador expressed a similar view.