Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 13, 1957¹

Washington, November 13, 1957

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abdel Khalek Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League
• Mr. Kemal Abdel Rahim, Head of the Arab States Delegations Office and the Arab
• Information Office The Secretary
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Wells Stabler

Messrs. Hassouna and Rahim called on the Secretary at their request. Mr. Hassouna expressed appreciation for being received by the Secretary and said he was sorry that his commitments at the General Assembly had prevented him from keeping a previous appointment with the Secretary. He said he welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary since it had been some little time since he had seen him.

Mr. Hassouna stated that both he and Ambassador Rahim were working for the common objective of improving relationships between the US and the Arab world, particularly Egypt and Syria. He said he had an opportunity to talk with Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar before the latter returned to Damascus and had found Mr. Bitar pleased with his meeting with Mr. Rountree. Mr. Hassouna expressed the view that in recent weeks there had been generally a better atmosphere in the area and said it was important to maintain this improvement and continue along this road.

The Secretary said that he, too, was glad to have the opportunity to see Messrs. Hassouna and Rahim and to exchange views with them. He said he thought that in general the atmosphere in the area was improved, especially with regard to US–Arab relations in a number of the Arab states. However, he regretted that this did not seem to be the case with respect to Egypt and Syria. He thought that if the leaders of Egypt and Syria really believed what their press and radio were saying with regard to the US and the Soviet Union, then it would be extremely difficult to find a basis for improved relations. If the leaders thought that the US represented a threat to their independence and integrity, while the Soviet Union was their great friend, we would find it very hard to establish a constructive relationship.

The Secretary went on that what greatly concerned us was the degree of dependence on the Soviet Union which was growing up in Egypt and Syria and the belief of the leaders of these countries that they had nothing to fear from such close association. Mr. Hassouna remarked that in his view there was no growth of communist strength or of the appeal of communism to the peoples of Egypt and Syria and that in any event it was a mistake for the US to be overly concerned by what press and radio had to say. The Secretary replied that it was not a question of how many communists there might be in Egypt or Syria and he did not for one believe that Egypt and Syria were going communist in as far as the people were concerned. He pointed out that in the Soviet Union only about 3% of the total population was communist while in countries such as Hungary and Poland, the percentage was probably even less. He remarked that it was a strange phenomenon that there were less communists in the so–called communist countries than there were communists in free world countries such as France and Italy. He said that what he had in mind was the development of a dependence on the Soviet Union which enabled that country to establish the policies of the other country. Thus, it was that dependence on the Soviet Union which obliged Czechoslovakia and Poland to refuse the Marshall Plan at Soviet insistence. He feared that possible Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union had been responsible for the Syrian about–face in rejecting King Saud’s mediation offer. The Secretary went on that while he did not expect Mr. Hassouna to reply or to comment, it was our analysis that the Soviets had demanded that the Syrians reject Saud’s mediation offer and that the dependence of the Syrian army and of the Syrian economy on the Soviet Union had made it possible for the Soviet Union to have its way.

The Secretary continued that he had made clear to Ambassador Hussein that, for example, we had no objection to Egypt’s dealing with the Soviet Union and that our attitude toward a given country would not be based on whether the country did or did not have dealings with the Soviet Union. In fact, we have relations with both Yugoslavia and Finland which have considerable dealings with the Soviet Union. However, both Finland and Yugoslavia have had very intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union and of its rapacious nature and are thus fully aware of the dangers of too close an association. The Secretary mentioned that while President Tito had taken a happier view of the Soviet Union in the recent past because of the denigration of Stalin and the exile of Molotov, his two principal enemies in the Soviet Union, the recent removal of Zhukov had perhaps made President Tito think twice about Khrushchev.

We believed that it was essential that Syria and Egypt have a more acute awareness of the dangers of a close association with the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that if Syria and Egypt believed that the US threatened their independence and that the Soviet Union did not, then there was little basis on which to do business with the US. It would be just as well under those circumstances for those states not to have any dealings with us. However, he would prophesy that if that were the case, history would write an epitaph on the loss of the independence of those countries.

The Secretary stressed that while the US had had ample opportunity to grab territory following World Wars I and II, when we had troops all over the world, the fact was that we had not. On the contrary, we had withdrawn our troops as quickly as possible. Similarly, although we had inherited a colonial establishment following the Spanish–American War, we had given independence to Cuba and the Philippines as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had given up nothing on which it had laid its hands, with the one possible exception of Austria where the Soviets had finally withdrawn, but only after long negotiation and heavy pressure. The record was clear and it was difficult to understand how Syria and Egypt could believe otherwise. The Secretary went on that the position which we had adopted in the fall of 1956 in opposing our two closest allies had been a clear demonstration of our adherence to principle and had been an act of great political courage by this administration, involving also as it did the problem of Israel.

The Secretary said that the US would be glad to do whatever it could to assist the Arab states in maintaining their independence and integrity but that there had to be mutual trust and confidence between us or otherwise there was nothing that could be done.

Mr. Hassouna said that he thought there could be mutual trust and confidence but that, of course, Arab confidence in the US would be more secure if specific actions were taken which in themselves would dispel the atmosphere which has been created by the press and radio attacks against the US. Mr. Hassouna said that specifically the question of Israel and our support for colonialism were the two most difficult aspects of Arab–US relations. He was certain that if the Arabs felt that the US would not always side with Israel in connection with any dispute which might arise between Israel and an Arab state, and that the US would always stand against aggression from whatever quarter, the Arabs would have great confidence in us. He said that many Arabs considered that the Eisenhower Doctrine had purposely left out any reference to aggression from whatever quarter in order not to tie Israel’s hands. He appealed to us to consider a declaration in which the US would take a stand against any aggression, not just aggression by international communism.

Mr. Hassouna went on that the other great problem in Arab–US relations was our support of colonialism, which in turn meant our continued support for the French in Algeria. The Algerian question was not the principal problem before the Arabs and they were certain that if we would support the independence of Algeria, the last trace of colonialism would disappear and this thorn in the side of US–Arab relations would be removed. He hoped that the US would be able to support the Arab position in the debate on Algeria in the General Assembly.

The Secretary replied that with respect to the colonial question, he did not see how the Arabs could continue to associate the US with colonialism after what we had done last year. He did not believe that this should remain an issue between us. He said we had been concerned by the failure of the French to find a solution to the Algerian question. While he did not know exactly the manner in which the Algerian item would be discussed at the General Assembly, he could say that the public position we might find it necessary to take would probably not reflect exactly our private position. He believed that we could do more effective work privately and quietly rather than having the issue become even more involved and complex through public debate. Mr. Hassouna agreed with this view.

The Secretary then went on that the problem of Israel was a more difficult one. Although the previous administration had been identified with Israel, this administration was not. We did much to restrain Israel and we had been particularly active during the Syrian crisis to keep the Israelis from doing anything rash. We also did many things with regard to Israel about which the Arabs did not know.

On the other hand, we were not like the Soviets who gave their support for the creation of Israel and now called for its destruction. We had supported the creation of Israel and we adhered to that policy. Because of the position of strict impartiality between Israel and the Arab states which this administration has adopted, it was in a good position to assist towards a settlement of some of the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab states, such as refugees and other outstanding questions. The Secretary stated that he doubted very much whether a future administration would be in such a good position to help the parties move toward a solution of the Palestine problem. He implied to Mr. Hassouna that the Arabs would do well to take advantage of this situation.

The Secretary continued that the problem of guaranteeing states of the area against aggression from whatever quarter was complicated by the fact that we did not wish to take any step which either directly or indirectly recognized Israel’s present borders. We considered those borders to be temporary ones and if we guaranteed the Arabs against aggression, we should also have to guarantee Israel which would implicitly recognize the present Israel borders. It had been relatively simple to obtain congressional approval with regard to the Eisenhower Doctrine which related to aggression by international communism. However, it would be most difficult to go back to Congress again with regard to a guarantee for the Arab states without offering a similar guarantee to Israel which, as he had just explained, would involve the problem of Israel’s boundaries.

Mr. Hassouna and Mr. Rahim thanked the Secretary for receiving them and Mr. Hassouna emphasized the usefulness of such exchanges.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler.