Office of the Historian

272. Memorandum Presented to the National Security Council Planning Board1

Washington, November 4, 1957.
1.
The Middle East Staff Study2 admits that the U.S. must learn to live with the problem for a long time ahead. It treats the problem as hopeless of solution in the near future. It offers nothing new or initiative, just more of the same, and working on the “fringes”.
2.
It seems to me the Planning Board ought to explore some major alternatives which differ from restating our existing policy and courses of action.
3.
In the interesting paragraphs 4–21 which state the “obstacles to U.S. objectives”, there are set forth the following Arab beliefs which cut across our existing policy guidance:
a.
The Arab interest will be best served by a competition in the Mideast between the Communist world and the Free World, not by the exclusion of either.
b.
“Neutralism” is really a better course for small Arab states than taking sides with either big power.
c.
Communism is not an important threat to Arab countries; far less important than Israel. There are certain exceptions to this viewpoint.
d.
As a matter of fact, Communism may be religiously wrong, but [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. Communist police state methods are no worse than methods employed by Near East regimes (including those supported by U.S.).
e.
In the long run, Israel should “disappear”; it is the common enemy on which all can agree.
g.
Also the U.S. befriends the ex–“colonial” powers (Baghdad Pact—U.K. interest in sheikdoms—French aid to Israel). Algerian “freedom” is a must for the Arabs.
f.
While the Soviets oppose Israel, the U.S. has supported Israel and has helped it economically more than the Arabs.
h.
There is a mystique that ties all Arabs together—not only common religious belief. The U.S. wants to keep the Arab world disunited and thus get Arab oil for itself and allies—U.S. helps only some Arab states.
i.
The U.S. is identified only with archaic, status–quo, and reactionary regimes.
j.
The Arab place in the sun can never be reached through national independences of 11 weak nations.
k.
The U.S. has resources to perform economic miracles in Arab countries if really interested in doing so, instead of keeping them just as sources of raw materials.
4.

How are any of these obstacles to be overcome or dealt with effectively under the proposed objectives and policy guidance?

Objective 2.a. really states the primary U.S. objective. 2.b.–f. seem subsidiary thereto and explanatory thereof.

Paragraphs 2.b. and 2.e. are unrealistic. Whether or not 2.b. relates to all of the existing Arab countries or only to some of them, it is an unrealistic goal for the U.S. to think of “stable, viable, friendly, and progressive governments” in this area. It seems also unrealistic to have a goal of rolling back existing Soviet presence and influence.

This kind of objective does not really contribute anything toward the solution of the Middle East problem in the present or in the near future. It is merely a restatement of the old policy which has been followed, with the results shown at the present time.

The Russian presence in the Middle East is a fact. It is there not by force of arms but by trade, supply of arms, influence, subversion, propaganda.

We need to have a new look and a new posture, a new kind of approach, which may take a long time to materialize but toward which all our efforts should be addressed.

a.
We should be working toward a sensible plan of Arab unity and unification in the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps a few countries coming together at first, but with a goal of a sufficiently strong Arabian Peninsula state to survive independently.
b.
We should work for Israel [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] its borders guaranteed, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
c.
We should play down armament and play up a regional economic body. (Perhaps this position to be workable should be coupled with some kind of international agreement to limit armament sales and be coupled with increased security guarantees.—?) The regional body would be composed of all Arab nations in the Near East (as defined), using U.S. technical advice, financed by Arab, U.S., and other Free World country contributions, prepared to give economic assistance to all Arab countries, regional in organization but not necessarily regional in projects.

5.
Possible Other Objectives
1.
Palestine refugees.
2.
Israel status [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
3.
Eisenhower Doctrine.
4.
Truly “neutral” countries fully acceptable.
5.
Economic development.
6.
Interest of other Free World countries.
7.
Training of leaders.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret. A November 8 transmittal memorandum from Boggs to the National Security Council Planning Board is not printed. It indicates the memorandum was presented to the Planning Board at its November 5 meeting; see infra.↩
  2. Document 270.↩