251. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1957, 4 p.m.1
He spoke of the US–UK in the Middle East. He said he thought it was important to re-establish the prestige and the influence of the UK in the Middle East, and that he assumed that this was in accord with US policy and that we had no desire to push out the British. I assured him that this was the case, that we had constantly refrained from making our presence felt in the Middle East under circumstances which could be interpreted as indicating a rivalry with the UK. Suhrawardy spoke in very high terms of our Middle East policy and felt that the situation had as a result of it very much improved. He was glad to know that we were sympathetic to reinstating the UK as far as was practical.
The Prime Minister stated his policy to be to try to bring about a unity of the Moslem states distinguished from the purely Arab states, and this would bring together the four Baghdad Pact countries plus Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and such African countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Sudan. He spoke also of Ethiopia, although it is not distinctively a Moslem country. He spoke of bringing Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon into association with the Baghdad Pact. He said this could already be done with reference to Lebanon, but that it was unwise for Lebanon to move alone. He thought in such ways it [Page 557] could be demonstrated that Egypt and Syria were isolating themselves from the Moslem world as a result of their community with the Communists.
The Prime Minister spoke of the concern of King Saud with respect to Aqaba and said that King Saud had asked him to explore this topic with us. King Saud had said that unless some solution could be found he might have to “sever” his new connections with the US.
The Prime Minister then spoke of the Moslem Baghdad Pact countries and said he particularly sought closer communication as between them. This related not only to radio and the like but communication by air travel, rail travel and shipping. He spoke particularly of the importance of shipping to Saudi Arabia and spoke of the possibility of organizing a shipping company with capital from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the US. He said that King Saud had asked him to send various technicians to Saudi Arabia, particularly to equip munitions plants and to replace the Egyptians in this respect.
The Prime Minister said he expected to stop over in Jordan on his way back and would like to bring some kind of message from us to King Hussein.
The Prime Minister felt that in all these matters Pakistan and he personally could play a major role, leading a sort of counter-offensive against the narrow nationalism of Nasser. He spoke of the importance of North Africa and the important role that Bourguiba could play. He also spoke of the importance of Ghana.
The Prime Minister then spoke of Israel and the problem of the refugees. He felt that something might be done about this, particularly in relation to Jordan and Iraq. He said, however, it was very difficult to get the refugees to give up their status as such. He said he had been told that in the case of Iraq some 6,000 came there to work but always insisted upon going back for a short time so as to maintain their status as “refugees” and their theoretical right to return to Israel.
The Prime Minister said that his most immediate concern was the situation to the west of Pakistan in relation to the Moslem and Arab world. However he was not unmindful of the problems of SEATO and of China. He said there was danger that the free countries there might “fall into the clutches of China.” He felt that Burma was a key factor and that they might turn to the US for help. He hoped that if so we could give them some help. If Burma were to take an anti-Chinese Communist line, this would have immense psychological value throughout the area. He expressed the opinion that the Pibulsong Government in Thailand would probably hold on, but that in the main the free countries of the area were rather feeble.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.↩