224. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State1
63. Have reached point on mission where remaining visits and schedule should be firmed up. Not compatible with dignity of this mission to loiter doubtfully and undecidedly awaiting invitations from hesitating Syrian and Egyptian Governments. They should be so informed.
Mission leaving for Khartoum tomorrow and returning here April 22. Expect remain here until 25 or 26. Consider absolutely essential have decision re Egypt and Syria by April 25. Would like by that time fix dates all remaining visits but realize this may not be possible if Jordan situation still confused.
My present feeling is that visit Cairo unlikely produce any positive results in furtherance new Middle East policy, especially since Nasser obviously pre-occupied with Suez and Israeli issues outside scope my authority. Failure of mission in Egypt could be something anti-climax to success of mission thus far. Nevertheless, there is something to be said in favor of going there if definite clear invitation received in next few days. We should be in position say either that Nasser himself chose not to hear our story or that we told our story and gave him same opportunity as other Middle East states to understand and accept doctrine. Otherwise we might give anti-West elements in all Arab states excuse to say we deliberately bypassed Egypt in order split Arab world. This might be especially embarrassing to King Saud.
I reiterate my previous request for specific up to date guidance as to how we should proceed with discussions from policy standpoint, if we do visit Egypt. It would not be my intention to commit funds unless there is extraordinary change for better in situation.
I gather there is general agreement between Embassy Damascus, Department and this mission that visit to Syria is undesirable on basis present attitude Syrian Government. In absence new developments I plan eliminate Damascus from schedule.
If King Hussein can maintain his position and new cabinet shows sympathetic attitude, it seems to me very important that mission should visit Jordan and that we should be prepared commit fairly substantial funds. On reasonable assumption that new government favorable to West in Jordan would cause Egypt and Syria renege on [Page 519] promised military assistance, Washington guidance on categories, general magnitude of aid that may be considered will be helpful; namely, budget support, straight economic aid and military aid.
Hope for early answers all foregoing points.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1957. Confidential; Niact. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Damascus.↩