Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

214. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Richards Mission—Iran, March 23–27²

Discussions

Meetings with the Prime Minister and the Shah were highly satisfactory in terms of the Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. The Shah was chiefly interested in military problems, is worried by his military weakness as an obvious target. The Prime Minister presented a shopping list [for a] four-year program costing $102 million and expressed particular interest in the Turk-Pakistan rail link. Both Shah and Prime Minister commented freely on other countries. This seems to be a successful Richards gambit.

Richards gave assurances if Iran attacked U.S. would be at its side; we had put hand to plow and would not turn back. He stressed military planning on regional basis and said economic aid would be small because funds are limited, but there is some possibility for regional projects. Our economic strength is spread thin and future aid will emphasize loans.

Findings

Richards quite critical in his appraisal of Iran—economic plan bogged down, feudal outlook, tendency play both sides, Shah over-ambitious, general apathy and inefficiency. Cash resources are sufficient but Richards hopes aid may stimulate initiative and concludes that the political impact will help to align Iran with the West.

Commitments

(1) U.S. membership in Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

(2) Increased military construction, $6 million in grant aid and $5 million in local currency from FY 1957 economic development funds—$11 million.

(3) Military grant aid, small arms, trucks—$2 million.

(4) Grant aid, rail and telecommunications surveys for regional projects—$6 million to be finalized in Baghdad.

Comments

Iranians professed profound disappointment but this was for bargaining purposes and Embassy believes they were quite happy. The Shah was particularly pleased by the military aid. The Iranians showed little gratitude and seemed to assume that U.S. aid would be forthcoming.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.
2. Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Iran, see Documents 396–399.