207. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State1

2628. From Richards. Trip so far has shown virtually universal dislike and distrust of present Syrian and Egyptian Governments on part of top officials in countries visited. They all counsel avoidance of any aid to those governments and indicate little if any hope that anything mission or USG could do would change attitude current leaders.

On other hand there seems to be fairly general feeling that both governments becoming politically isolated within region and that this isolation, if carried far enough, will either cause their fall or force change of policy. If this analysis correct, there would seem to be possibilities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in which this mission could play role by bolstering other Arab countries (such as Libya and Sudan) while remaining cool and unresponsive toward Syria and Egypt.

[Page 478]

We recognize key to success [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might be attitudes Saudi Arabia and to some extent Jordan. We would have to count upon King Saud’s maintaining his support for Doctrine. If in addition out of current turmoil in Jordan and evident desire not to be excluded from US assistance, anti-Communist Government ready to support stand of King Hussein should emerge, real progress would have been achieved in isolation Egypt and Syria.

Would appreciate Department’s reaction.2

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2857. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Jidda.
  2. See infra.