Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

203. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/8

Tucker’s Town, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Sen. George
  • Amb. Whitney
  • Mr. Quarles
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Elbrick
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • Gen. Goodpaster
  • Mr. Macomber
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Wilkins
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Mr. P.H. Dean
  • Mr. Harold Beeley
  • Sir Harold Caccia

[Here follow a list of subjects and discussion of the Communist influence in Africa. For text, see volume XVIII, pages 53–56.]

2. Baghdad Pact. Selwyn Lloyd said that they were delighted that the United States had decided to participate in the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. He asked if we had any plans for economic aid for the countries of the Baghdad Pact or for the Pact itself.

Mr. Rountree, at the Secretary’s request, briefly outlined US views with respect to economic aid in relation to the Baghdad Pact. He said that the main purpose of Ambassador Richards’ mission was to explain the objectives of the Joint Resolution which the American Congress had adopted on March 9, 1957. He also wished to determine what countries in the Middle East were willing to cooperate in working for these objectives. During Ambassador Richards’ present visit in the Middle East he would discuss ways and means of cooperating through 1) economic assistance, 2) military assistance and 3) forces which the Congress had authorized the United States to use if it should be necessary. Mr. Rountree said that we wished to avoid the impression that under the new program we planned to give away large sums of money because, in fact, we had no large sums of money for this purpose. Ambassador Richards was authorized to discuss priority projects with the various countries which he visited. At the present time there were already in existence substantial programs in each of the countries of the Baghdad Pact. It was not our intention that the wider authority with respect to the expenditure of $200 million already authorized under existing legislation would be applied primarily in these countries. It was our thought that Ambassador Richards might be able to give some additional military aid rather than economic aid in these countries. In other parts of the Middle East it was our thought that we could resume some programs which had been held up during recent months. During Ambassador Richards’ recent visit to Beirut arrangements had been made to supply Lebanon with $10 million worth of aid. Similar small commitments would be made in other countries of the Middle East.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if we planned to channel any American aid through the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Rountree said that we did not plan to supply any aid through the Baghdad Pact itself, but that in our consideration of economic aid for the Middle East we would take into account regional projects which had been developed by the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said he wished to add a few words to the discussion. He had noted as a result of his experience with NATO and SEATO that these organizations seemed to wish to become dispensers of economic aid for the areas which they covered. He said Lord Home had told him during the SEATO meeting in Canberra recently² that the Asian members wished to create a committee for the handling of economic aid. This development had been discouraged with the exception of one multilateral project in the SEATO area. The Secretary thought it difficult to handle aid through the Economic Committees of a Pact organization because it would require considerable staff, including experts on engineering, finance and economic matters. As a result of our experience, we prefer to deal directly with other governments. The Secretary said that during the SEATO meeting he had told the Pakistani Foreign Minister that the United States would be willing to extend US aid to Pakistan through SEATO if Pakistan so desired, but it would inevitably move more slowly in this way. As a result, Pakistan representatives had shown no interest in this suggestion. In some cases other countries thought that aid through a Pact organization would be a means of increasing assistance, not merely of changing its method of delivery. The Secretary thought that in the future total US aid would decline and that ways should be sought of spending less aid rather than more. This trend could now be observed in NATO, where the US and UK were in agreement to fight down requests for additional assistance. The US and UK were also in agreement regarding the SEATO area. The Secretary said that one reason some countries might desire aid through a Pact organization was because the Pact label made the economic assistance more palatable in this form.

Selwyn Lloyd said he was in agreement regarding aid for the areas covered by NATO and SEATO, but he thought that the Baghdad Pact needed to be made politically viable. At one time emphasis on the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact might have made the Baghdad Pact more desirable. Now, however, it seemed to him that the Baghdad Pact required special consideration. It was not desired to upset Saudi Arabia unduly, although they could hardly object on grounds of their own substantial income. On the other hand, the Baghdad Pact countries had been strong allies and might be rewarded. US participation in the Military Committee had been helpful. The United Kingdom had been extending technical assistance through the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact and [that] would be increased from 250 thousand pounds to one million pounds, but could not be raised above this figure. Selwyn Lloyd added that we had so strongly insisted on bilateral arrangements for aid that they wondered if the United States agreed the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact had any value.

Mr. Rountree said that as indicated in the context of the Secretary’s remarks there was reason [for] the existence of an Economic Committee and the desirability for some multilateral programs in the area. Other functions which the Committee could perform would include promotion of trade, studies of the area and surveys of communications projects. We could provide technical assistance in such matters, but the implementation of projects beyond such assistance should be on a bilateral basis. It was our thought that the Economic Committee had useful coordinating functions.

Selwyn Lloyd said he understood this aspect of the matter, but it meant that there was little money passing through the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact. He mentioned that the UK had set up an Atomic school through the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said that the Pact members wished to point to the aid which they are receiving as a justification for their membership in the Pact. This desire made it necessary for us to recognize and consider how we could meet their wish. We had found in the Far East that multilateral projects were complicated to handle and had developed slowly or not at all. In many cases projects such as proposed plans for Japanese investment in India looked fine on paper, but had proved difficult to implement. Pact relationships did not as a rule conform to economic patterns, although they were acceptable for strategic requirements. We needed to decide at the present time how we could, for example, assist Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq.

Selwyn Lloyd said we also needed to decide how to assist the Shah of Persia. He added that the UK would write a paper analyzing the situation and making recommendations as to what was needed. He said that the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact would meet in May and that pending this meeting the US and UK could develop a common line as to action which should be taken. The Secretary said that this procedure was agreeable.

Selwyn Lloyd said he wished to raise one or two questions with respect to Iraq. He understood that we had had discussions regarding the supply of American military equipment to Iraq. The British Ambassador in Baghdad had recently expressed his concern that Iraq might play the US off against the UK. Selwyn Lloyd asked if we planned to supply Iraq with Sabre Jets. Reuben Robertson said that we had no plans to supply Sabre Jets to Iraq.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if it would not be desirable to link the possible sale of Sabre Jets with British Hunters under the off-shore procurement program, although he was not pressing for Hunters. He believed that there should be agreement on the merits of whether aircraft should be supplied by the UK or US.

Mr. Robertson said that discussion between the United States and Iraq had been cautious because we knew that the UK was considering the supply of Hunters. Selwyn Lloyd observed that Prime Minister Nuri was a shrewd bargainer.

The Secretary said that some months ago there had been agreement that Iraq’s requirements for heavy tanks should be the British Centurions. He noted that we had supplied Iraq with some small tanks or armored cars. He thought that we should work out the same principle with respect to aircraft.

Mr. Robertson noted that we had not promised to supply Iraq with aircraft but had only discussed with the Iraqi representatives the question of number of wings which might be needed. He said this matter could be further discussed between the US and the UK.

The Secretary said he had with him a summary of recent conversations which had taken place between the US and Iraq and wished to read the paragraph relating to the question of aircraft, as follows:

“The United States has given careful consideration to requests for equipment for the Iraqi Air Force. The United States is not at present in a position to meet these requests, but suggests discussions at a later date on the possibility of the sale of aircraft under the existing reimbursable assistance agreement between Iraq and the United States.”³

Mr. Beeley said that in previous years the US and the UK had kept each other informed of developments through representatives of the Department of State and Department of Defense on the one hand and the British Joint Staff and the British Embassy on the other.

The Secretary said that this procedure sounded satisfactory to him and that we would be ready for further talks when they were.

3. Tripartite Declaration of 1950.⁴ Selwyn Lloyd referred to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and asked if we had any comment. The Secretary said that American policy as stated in the Tripartite Declaration had not changed in any way, although it seemed clear that the British had had different views on October 29, 1956.⁵ It might therefore seem desirable for Selwyn Lloyd to make known British attitude at the present time.

Selwyn Lloyd said that since developments on the Suez, the UK considered that the Tripartite Declaration had been in effect except for Egypt. The Secretary said that American policy continued to be as stated in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The White House had on October 29, for example, indicated that the United States would honor its pledge under the Tripartite Declaration.⁶ As a statement of policy we considered the Tripartite Declaration to be in effect. Implementation of the policy on the other hand might require Congressional action. The Joint Resolution which the American Congress adopted on March 9 authorized the United States to take action with respect to countries dominated by the Communists if such action should be necessary. There is no authority, however, under other circumstances, although the Joint Resolution contains the following language which had been introduced in the Senate: “The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East”. It was not clear precisely what this phraseology meant, although it may provide additional authority. The Secretary did not think that it was so intended and had questioned several Senators on this point. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He interpreted the Resolution as meaning that the integrity of the Middle East as a whole was vital and believed it would be so interpreted by the President. The Secretary noted that the British were free to deploy their armed forces, whereas the United States required Congressional sanction.

4. Question of Arms Supply to the Near East—Resolutions of the General Assembly. Selwyn Lloyd said he wished to discuss this question in the light of resolutions of the General Assembly.⁷ He said that the following question might post the issue: If Russia supplied arms to Egypt, would that be a breach of the General Assembly Resolution?

The Secretary said that he wished to consult Mr. Phleger but he thought that once peace was firmly reestablished, the resolution would not apply. He did not think that peace was as yet firmly reestablished. At the same time he did not think that the resolution should continue perpetually in effect. However, there was an area of legal doubt.

Selwyn Lloyd said they had given a practical interpretation to the Resolution of the General Assembly. No arms were being supplied to Israel, not even items which had been loaded for shipment and aircraft engines which had been sent to England from Israel for overhaul. He believed that if this interpretation were correct it would mean that the Soviet Union could not supply arms to Egypt.

Selwyn Lloyd agreed that the resolutions could not continue perpetually in effect. He noted that there were reports that the French were now shipping [arms?] to Israel and asked if NEACC were now active. The Secretary said that it was not.

Mr. Phleger said that General Assembly Resolution might be said to be of doubtful validity after complete withdrawal of the forces which had intervened in Egypt. However, its validity might not depend entirely on the withdrawal of forces since it also referred to the Suez Canal.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if there was any information whether the Russians were sending arms to Egypt. The Secretary said that there was no solid information that heavy arms were being sent to Egypt, although small arms might be moving.

Selwyn Lloyd said he had the same impression. The Secretary observed that if the Soviet Union was challenged on any arms which it was supplying to Egypt it might reply that they were in transit to other countries such as the Yemen.

5. Agreed Positions, including Guarantees re Pipelines,⁸ Palestine,,⁹ Suez,¹⁰ Oil Study,¹¹ Aqaba,¹² and Libya.¹³ Selwyn Lloyd noted that there was a proposal for a document indicating minutes or positions on which agreements had been reached, including guarantees with respect to pipelines, Palestine and Suez. He said he also understood that there were papers on an oil study and Aqaba for inclusion among these documents.

The Secretary said that he had seen some of these documents and had one or two questions and some suggestions. He thought the paper touching on the oil study should not be too broad and that the representatives of the US and the UK should start at once and prepare specific plans such as the Study on Oil Resources. He thought they should not merely engage in a general review. The Secretary said that he did not believe the date of April 15 to commence discussions was realistic but that we would endeavor to meet it.

Selwyn Lloyd said that they had looked at this question in much wider terms and that the President had favored a Joint Planning Group which they had interpreted as a continuing process. The Secretary thought that work might commence at once and exchange of views might begin on or before April 15. It would seem desirable to indicate in the paper that the first subject would be the Study on Oil Resources.

The Secretary said that he thought the paper on Palestine which had been agreed in Washington prior to commencement of the Bermuda Conference was too pessimistic and suggested that phraseology be introduced which would indicate that these views were held as of the present moment only. He thought that if developments should take a favorable turn we should be in a position to move boldly. Selwyn Lloyd agreed.

The Secretary said that we had pressed Israel that the UNEF should be placed on both sides of the Armistice demarcation line between Israel and Egypt.

Selwyn Lloyd said that the British had taken similar action and had suggested that Israel at least agree to the stationing of the UNEF at certain places on its side of the line but that Israel continued obstinate in refusing to consider any possible presence of the UNEF in its country.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd agreed on minor changes of phraseology of the papers on guarantees for pipelines and the Suez. The Secretary remarked, in explanation of the concept of blocking payment of tolls, that if we had to accept passage through the Canal under protest and the payment of tolls to Egypt, we could place a second block on funds which were now held unless there were a settlement. Selwyn Lloyd noted that the United Kingdom had claims and counter claims which made its attitude somewhat different.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also exchanged further views on Aqaba and agreed on the position paper. It was also agreed that it might be desirable to seek an advisory opinion or a decision from the ICJ.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also exchanged further remarks regarding Hammarskjold’s discussions with Nasser during which the Secretary said that our information thus far indicated they seemed to be progressing well.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also noted that further discussions would take place on Libya. Mr. Lloyd thought that the matter was urgent. The Secretary agreed and said that if the British planned to cut down in Libya, it was essential that we be informed.

[Here follows brief discussion relating to Germany and the final communiqué. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, April 8, 1957, pages 561–562.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.
2. Reference is to the Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, held at Canberra, Australia, March 11–13. For documentation, see vol. XXI, pp. 295 ff.
3. Reference is to a U.S. memorandum read to Iraqi Chief of the General Staff on February 15. The memorandum of conversation and the memorandum are in Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–1557.
4. For text of the Tripartite Declaration on Middle East security issued by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on May 25, 1950, see Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For information concerning its formulation, see footnote 3, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, p. 168.
5. At 4:50 p.m. on October 29, Secretary Dulles met with British Chargé J.E. Coulson and French Chargé Lucet to discuss the applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula earlier that day. For text of the memorandum of the conversation, see vol. XVI, p. 829.
6. For text of the statement issued by White House Press Secretary Hagerty, see Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956, p. 749.
7. Reference is to Resolution 997 (ES–I) adopted by the Emergency Session of the General Assembly on November 2, 1956, which recommended “that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities”. For text and additional information, see the editorial note, vol. XVI, p. 932. Resolution 997 (ES–I) was reaffirmed in Resolution 999 (ES–I) of November 4 and Resolution 1002 (ES–I) of November 7.
8. The text is the same as Document 198.
9. Vol. XVI, p. 463.
10. Ibid., p. 464.
11. Infra.
12. Vol. XVI, p. 466.
13. Not printed.