Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

175. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, December 20, 1956¹

Washington, December 20, 1956

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Secretary Hoover
• Secretary Wilson
• Admiral Radford
• Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Dulles said that he had been consulting in the Department and with Defense on what to do next in the Middle East situation. A vacuum has been created in the area with the virtual elimination of British influence and the Soviets are trying to move in. He recalled that our trouble in the area began with the Soviet intervention through sale of arms over a year ago—and reminded the group of the letter to Bulganin the President sent from his sick bed in Denver.² He thought that if we do not act, the Soviets are likely to take over the area, and they could thereby control Europe through the oil on which Europe is dependent and even Africa as well.

He said that he had considered the proposal to join the Baghdad Pact very carefully. State Department does not favor the proposal, because the Pact has become so mixed up in Arab politics. Nasser opposes it, and more importantly King Saud does also. He commented that Saud is the only figure in the area with sufficient present and potential assets to serve as a counterpoise to Nasser. Moreover, adherence to the Baghdad Pact would require Senate approval, and this would be extremely difficult to obtain, especially if the action had to be coupled with a guarantee to Israel also requiring Senate approval.

In light of these facts, Secretary Dulles said he has recommended to the group going to Congress and asking for a resolution authorizing three forms of Presidential action as a means of building our position in the Middle East. A fourth possible element in the proposal would be a Congressional authorization of a sum such as perhaps $400 million for use in the next two years with full flexibility. The Secretary handed a copy of the draft he had prepared on this matter to the President.³

There followed discussion of the desirability of including the provision concerning funds. The discussion brought out that, for fiscal year ’57, there is enough money in the ICA budget already. Inclusion of a provision regarding funds would give substance and weight to the proposal, but might of course raise argument in the Congress. Admiral Radford said that the Chiefs had proposed adherence to the Baghdad Pact simply to take some major action quickly. They support the present proposal. They are, however, afraid that including the provision concerning funds would prolong Congressional consideration. He suggested that it might be preferable for the President simply to state that the Administration will later request funds above those already appropriated for FY ’57. The President suggested he can say something to the effect that sums needed in addition to those already appropriated would be the subject of urgent recommendation.

Mr. Hoover advised the group that in the fiscal year ’58 proposals, there will be included a sum of $200 million for the Middle East. In the past, numerous undesirable restrictions have been placed on such funds, and the present language is intended to give fiscal flexibility— for two further fiscal years, i.e., FY ’58 and FY ’59.

Secretary Dulles suggested it might be best to draft the resolution and the Message to Congress, and then talk to four to six Congressional leaders, for example Senators Johnson and Knowland, Congressman Martin, etc. Admiral Radford reiterated the concern that the money item might hold up the rest, but said it was simply a matter of tactics. Mr. Dulles said the provision would be drafted as an authorization rather than an appropriation, thus avoiding the necessity of having the matter considered by the appropriation committees.

The President asked if it would be desirable to specify that we would intervene only at the request of the countries concerned, since the countries might otherwise now take offense at the statement. Mr. Hoover said the reference to “measures consonant with the Charter of the United Nations” tended to cover this point, and Secretary Dulles cited the need for more flexibility than would be afforded by conditioning action upon a prior request. He pointed out that a sudden coup might result in displacing the government which could make the request. He said he would study this point further.

Secretary Dulles said that this matter must, in his judgment, be given the greatest urgency and momentum. He would like to see the President send up a message and proposal on the day Congress organizes, as his first act. He said that he would plan to work with Admiral Radford on the project over Christmas, and hoped to have something available for the President in ample time for submission as soon as Congress convenes.

(During the meeting the President mentioned recent messages he had received from King Saud,⁴ the President of Syria, and Chiang Kai-shek,⁵ and handed Secretary Dulles a copy of the letter from the President of Syria.)

G
Colonel CE, U S Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Memoranda of Conversations with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.
2. Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin of October 11, 1955; see the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 576.
3. Not found.
4. Dated December 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/12–1756)
5. Neither printed.