Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

171. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 15, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Joint Resolution of Congress Regarding the Middle East

Discussion:

During your absence in Paris we have examined the proposed Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East. Mr. Phleger’s draft incorporating your own ideas has been staffed and, with a few minor changes, is attached as Tab A.² This draft has the general concurrence of Messrs. Henderson, Phleger and Rountree, and myself. We feel, however, that certain questions regarding it should be called to your attention. They are as follows:

1. Should the resolution be tied to Communist imperialism or should it also relate to possible hostilities between the states of the Middle East?

On balance we are of the view that the proposed resolution should be tied only to Communist imperialism. Communist imperialism is the principal danger in the Middle East. Friction and hostilities have existed between the states of the Middle East through past ages and will probably continue in future decades. We do not wish to overlook these frictions and hostilities as a means by which Communist imperialism may spread in the Middle East, but we believe that the proposed joint resolution should direct itself to the main source of difficulty at the present moment. Communist imperialism is a clear and present danger and is so recognized by the American people and their representatives in the Congress. We consider it unlikely that the latter would approve a resolution not aimed specifically at Communist imperialism. The proposed resolution covering the Middle East will make clear that the United States is prepared to move in that area as it is in Europe under NATO and in Asia under SEATO and other Far Eastern arrangements. The Northern Tier countries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan will be heartened by a Congressional resolution which strengthens U.S. support for the area of the Baghdad Pact. The United States in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 has made known its position with respect to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in the area.

It is recognized that certain of the countries of the Middle East such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan cannot be expected in present circumstances to give support, at least public support, to a resolution respecting Communist imperialism. Their reluctance to do so would derive from the facts that these countries do not recognize the Communist dangers with which they are confronted; they are endeavoring to play the Soviet Union off against the United States and would not wish to be counted among anti-Communist countries in a manner which would give the impression that they are “Western oriented”; and they would interpret the unilateral United States resolution as being largely American support for the Baghdad Pact concept. It can be expected that most neutralist nations would describe the resolution as nothing more than a politically inspired cold-war step. What effect recent Hungarian events and other developments may in time have on these attitudes cannot now be predicted.

2. (a) Should a specific sum of money be mentioned in the resolution?

On balance we believe that a specific sum of money should be indicated. The inclusion of a specific figure would round out the resolution by underscoring the importance and magnitude of the military and economic assistance which would be required and by providing general authority under which the appropriate Congressional committees could later approve specific programs and make appropriations therefor.

2. (b) On the assumption that a specific sum of money should be mentioned, should not specific countries of the Middle East be listed?

On balance we believe that specific countries should not be listed. It is our view that the total sum of money mentioned in the proposed resolution should be considered as a reserve on which the President could draw as needed in accordance with programs which would be developed in the light of future circumstances.

2. (c) On the assumption that a specific sum is mentioned in the resolution, should it comprise the total of the presently contemplated programs plus the additional funds considered necessary, or merely the latter?

On balance we believe the sum mentioned in the resolution should not include “regular” programs, particularly those in NATO–Baghdad Pact countries, but should include only additional funds required in implementation of the resolution. It will thus be clear what additional funds are needed in the light of the new situation. Furthermore, it will be possible to move ahead under regular authorizations and appropriations despite Congressional action upon the proposed resolution; otherwise, present activities might be held up on grounds that the Congress was re-examining both present and future programs in the area. Also, by establishing an area-wide figure for presently contemplated programs plus the additional funds, the result would be an identification of the precise countries covered by the resolution, since funds for countries not covered presumably would have to be justified separately.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1556. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Wilkins. According to notations on the source text, the memorandum was cleared with Henderson, Phleger, and Hoover who wrote the following comment: “The economic fund will have to be correlated with our MSA requests before the Bureau of the Budget within the next few days.” Another marginal notation reads: “Sec saw.”
2. Not found attached.
3. There is no indication in the source text of Secretary Dulles’ approval or disapproval of the suggested resolution.