Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

169. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Dillon’s Residence, Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/1/1

Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Macomber
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
  • Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

• Baghdad Pact

During his conversation, Mr. Lloyd turned to the Baghdad Pact and wondered what the US attitude regarding the Pact should be. He said he understood the US was considering joining the Pact. The Secretary confirmed that we were considering this action but no final decision had been reached. He said that the balance of opinion seemed to be against it although a final decision would not be made until he had discussed it with the President after returning to Washington.

The Secretary said that the US had definitely decided that it was necessary to make our presence more felt in the area. He said that we were considering three alternatives. He cautioned Mr. Lloyd not to draw any final conclusions as to our course of action. We had not ourselves reached such conclusions.

He said the first possibility we were considering was to join the Baghdad Pact. However, he said if we did so at this time we would antagonize the Saudis. He said that we could not get them to join the Pact at this time—and probably not as long as the Buraimi issue was outstanding. The Secretary said that he thought Saudi Arabia in time could be built up as the best counter to Nasser. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] If we join the Pact now it would anger the Saudis. Also it would make it more difficult to resolve the Canal status with Nasser. The Secretary said, however, that the main consideration against joining the Pact was the problem it would create for us regarding Israel. He said that last week the four Baghdad Pact Ambassadors had called on him in Washington urging us to join the Pact. He had asked them whether they would still want us to do so if at the same time we had to give similar guarantees to Israel. The Iraq Ambassador said “No”. The Turkish Ambassador said “Yes” and the others were undecided.

The Secretary said that the likelihood was that we could not get the necessary votes in the Senate to join the Baghdad Pact without at the same time proposing a counter arrangement with Israel. Even at that he doubted that we could get either arrangement through the Senate.

For all these reasons the Secretary indicated that it was doubtful that we would decide to join the Pact although he stressed we were interested in seeing the development and strengthening of the northern tier group.

The Secretary said the second possibility we were considering would be to develop another Pact with another name and with somewhat broader Arab participants. He said he was inclined against this suggestion as he did not have much faith in the ability of the Arabs to unite for any constructive purpose. He said that the only thing the Arabs were unified on was their hatred of Israel and, temporarily, their opposition to France and the UK.

The third possibility we were considering was a Congressional resolution somewhat similar to the Formosa resolution which would be passed by both Houses of Congress. This resolution would authorize the President to take stronger action in the area than is now possible. The idea would be to use that authority to support the Baghdad Pact and other activities in the area.

The Secretary again stressed that no final conclusion had been reached and indicated that the Nehru visit would probably delay our reaching a conclusion. Mr. Lloyd thought that Nehru’s influence would be against these proposals. The Secretary said that he had meant that the presence of Nehru in Washington and Gettysburg would postpone the opportunity to settle these matters. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

The Secretary ended this part of the conversation by repeating to Mr. Lloyd what he had told the four Baghdad Pact Ambassadors. He had said to them that he could not tell what the US would do but that they could tell their Governments “to be of good courage” because we are going to do something. We are not going to let a vacuum exist in their area.

The Secretary then said that he had reviewed his current thinking on the Middle East in greater intimacy with Mr. Lloyd than he had with all but three or four members of the State Department. He asked Mr. Lloyd to hold this information to as limited a number of his colleagues as possible. He went on to say that we would have to reach a decision before the first of January, as a bipartisan Congressional meeting was being held on that date.

Mr. Lloyd, in commenting on the proposed resolution, said he gathered that as a result of this resolution we would be likely to put observers on the military committee as well as the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact and “that sort of thing”.

Other Matters to be Raised by Mr. Lloyd

Mr. Lloyd said there were a number of other subjects he had wished to raise with the Secretary. The Secretary said they would have to arrange to meet again this week. Mr. Lloyd mentioned that the other matters he wished to take up were:

1. The whole question of arms to the Middle East.

2. Libya.

3. [1 line of source text not declassified]

4. Persian Gulf and possible military action there.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814. Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting. The source text bears the following marginal notation by Macomber: “OK WM.” Secretary Dulles was in Paris December 9–14 to attend the 18th Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. For additional documentation on discussions at the Ministerial Meeting pertaining to the Middle East, see vol. XVI, pp. 1278–1306.