Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII
145. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact
Discussion:
We understand Defense will raise the problem of our immediate adherence to the Baghdad Pact at the November 19 meeting of the NSC Planning Board.
We have prepared the attached position paper (Tab A) upon which Mr. Bowie could base his remarks if the matter is discussed. This paper also addresses itself to the letter from the Secretary of Defense of November 14 on this subject (Tab B).2
[Page 332]Recommendation:
That you approve the attached position paper on the Baghdad Pact.
[Tab A]
POSITION PAPER3
THE BAGHDAD PACT
Present Status
The Baghdad Pact grew out of the Turk-Iraqi Treaty of Mutual Cooperation of February 1955, following British, Iranian and Pakistani adherence to the latter. The Asian members joined because of a combination of national political reasons, different in each case, and a recognition, at least on the part of their leaders, of the need to cooperate to meet the Soviet military-subversive threat to their area.
A Ministerial Council has been set up and has held two meetings. It will meet next on January 28, 1957 at Karachi. In the intervals between Council sessions, normally semi-annual, the Council of Deputies, consisting of the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the member states in Baghdad, have been meeting regularly. A Military Committee has been established to prepare plans for the military defense of the area against possible Soviet attack and has entrusted to deputies the staff work involved in such planning. An Economic Committee was organized in January 1956 to seek to coordinate economic planning among the member states. Working through a series of sub-committees and working parties, it is examining the possibility of cooperation in the fields of trade, communications, health and sanitation, insect control, agricultural improvement, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, etc. The Economic Committee will meet next on January 6, 1957 at Karachi to examine the reports of its various sub-groups. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
A Pact Secretariat has been organized to service the various Committees and push forward their work. Headed by an Iraqi Secretary General, it also includes a British Deputy Secretary General for Political-Administrative affairs, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a Turk for economic affairs and a Pakistani for Public Relations. The necessary supporting staff is being assembled from the various member states. An international administrative budget, totalling $459,746, has been agreed upon to finance the organization.
[Page 333]The United States is not now a signatory of the Pact. We have, however, frequently stated publicly our continuing support for it. Moreover, since its inception we have maintained liaison with the several Pact committees through observers. In April of this year we joined the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees of the Pact and have since participated actively in both of these bodies and their sub-organizations. On November 1 we expanded our military liaison with the Pact by establishing in Baghdad a Baghdad Pact Military Liaison Group, consisting of a group of officers and administrative personnel. We have agreed to provide eight persons for the Pact Secretariat ranging from senior staff to clerical personnel. Finally, we have agreed to pay a one-sixth share of the Pact annual budget, amounting to $76,350 and have paid a half installment to date.
Letter From the Secretary of Defense
On November 14, 1956, the Secretary of Defense addressed a letter to the Secretary of State (Tab B) stating, that, while the President had determined that the problem of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact should be reviewed during the latter part of 1956, he, Mr. Wilson, believed the present circumstances in the Middle East made it necessary for the National Security Council to review the matter more immediately.
Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion that developments in the Middle East have created a most favorable opportunity for Congressional approval of U.S. adherence to the Pact.
Governments of Pact States Urge US. Adherence
Without exception the Chiefs of State and leaders of governments of the Baghdad Pact nations have long and consistently pled for U.S. adherence to the Pact. The Shah of Iran told our Ambassador that his country enjoyed no real security against the Russian threat as long as the U.S. remained out of the Baghdad Pact. The Prime Minister of Turkey confided to Ambassador Warren that the four Moslem Prime Ministers at the recent meeting in Tehran agreed that the time was right for U.S. adherence to the Pact. In his own view he considered it urgent that the U.S. become a full Pact member. Prime Minister Menderes concluded that there was no other means of ameliorating the dangerous situation in the Middle East. The President of Pakistan and the Chief of the Pakistani General Staff have strongly pressed for U.S. adherence to the Pact, with General Ayub going so far as to assert that had the U.S. joined the Pact when Pakistan did (September 23, 1955) other Moslem states would have adhered and no troubles would have arisen in the Middle East. The Prime Minister of Iraq has expressed his desire for U.S. adherence to the Pact so often and so forcefully as not [Page 334] to bear repetition here. Recent Soviet activities with regard to the Near East in connection with the hostilities there have increased the feeling of lack of security on the part of the Asian Pact members and caused them to renew pressure for U.S. adherence.
Views of U.S. Ambassadors to Baghdad Pact Countries
Our Ambassadors to the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact have been most emphatic in their recommendations that the U.S. adhere to the Pact. For example, our Ambassador to Turkey states: “ … convinced …4 that prompt and full U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact will have tonic effect on the Middle East situation.” He continues: “… considerations (1) U.S. no longer beholden to Israel; (2) U.S. adherence would (A) fortify Anglo-American alliance, (B) strengthen U.K. position in the Middle East, (C) stiffen backs of Arab countries in firmer posture vis-à-vis Soviets, and (D) make clear U.S. serious support of security of area against Soviet encroachment.”
The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq reports: “As I informed Department prior to Council formation and prior to April Pact meeting at Tehran, I believed half measures not enough and that formal adherence by U.S. to Pact needed more than anything else to transform Pact into going concern. Today (November 15, 1956) the reasons for this view exist in even greater force.”
Ambassador Chapin telegraphs from Tehran “… now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid to consolidate U.S. position by early adherence to Baghdad Pact … If U.S. remains unwilling to join the Pact when previously-stated reasons appear no longer valid, members likely to conclude real reason for U.S. refusal is unreadiness commit itself in defense Middle East. This interpretation would have shattering effect on morale Baghdad Pact countries.”
Reasons Favoring U.S. Adherence
The following appear to be the basic reasons why U.S. adherence would be desirable:
- 1.
- Adherence would strengthen the general stability of the governments of the Asian Pact members, all of whom are staunch U.S. friends.
- 2.
- Adherence would give convincing evidence to the USSR of the deep U.S. interest in the security of the area. It might deter the USSR from maneuvers against the independence of the Pact members.
- 3.
- Adherence might strengthen U.S. leadership in the Middle East, thus lessening the damage to the Western position resulting from the UK-French action in Egypt.
- 4.
- U.S. adherence would strengthen the Pact itself and make its operation more efficient.
- 5.
- Adherence would formally close the last major link in security arrangements on the peripheries of Russia.
Reasons Against U.S. Adherence
- 1.
- The U.S. has given its full support to the United Nations effort to stabilize the delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French and Israeli military actions. Any change in the current U.S. relationship with the powers in the area might seriously jeopardize these efforts.
- 2.
- The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. U.S. adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against the West in the Near East. U.S.-USSR relations would be further exacerbated.
- 3.
- There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalizing on existing tensions in the area and using psychological, economic and covert military measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing, they are, in effect, hopping over the “northern tier” line.
- 4.
- The U.S. must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve the U.S. more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian disputes.
- 5.
- While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the U.S. adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support in two of its important members.
- 6.
- Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guarantee.
- 7.
- While the U.S. might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step might well be followed by strong demands for further U.S. aid to member countries on grounds that, as a member, we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support for these nations.
- 8.
- Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. has important interests.
- 9.
- The original concept of the “northern tier” was one of an indigenous organization. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states of the area as in large part UK [Page 336] dominated. The decline of UK prestige in the Middle East will probably be so serious that some other vehicle must be found for exerting U.S. leadership if we are to maintain our position. We must at least wait until we know what changes in UK personnel and policy will take place in Her Majesty’s Government.
- 10.
- We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present relationship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to the Pact itself.
- 11.
- The immediate pressure upon the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the Israel-UK-French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means.
- 12.
- The problem of obtaining Senate ratification of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, discussed in the Secretary of State’s letter of April 23, 1956, to the Secretary of Defense, is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the Pact.
Alternatives to U.S. Adherence
There are several alternatives to U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact as follows:
- 1.
- Arrange for Iran to join SEATO. This would have the advantage of affording that isolated country some assurance of U.S. armed support in the event of Russian aggression. Such assurance is keenly desired by the Shah. On the other hand this move might have a deleterious effect on the Baghdad Pact and would isolate Iraq from any collective security arrangement with the U.S. Furthermore, it is questionable that the SEATO Powers would welcome such a proposal.
- 2.
- The U.S. might join the Pact’s Military Committee. This would have the advantage of enabling our Military Liaison Group to exert badly-needed leadership. This move would not satisfy the Asian members, who would still push for full U.S. adherence.
- 3.
-
At the January meeting of the Pact’s Economic Committee, the U.S. might announce its willingness to assume major financial responsibility for some dramatic Pact project such as the projected Pact Highway from Istanbul to Karachi. A food reserve plan, the construction of pipelines and the connection of various railway links in the area are other economic projects which have been discussed by the Pact’s Economic Subcommittee.
[Page 337]As a corollary to the above, the U.S. might announce its willingness to provide the Pact’s countries with some badly-needed defensive military equipment such as a radar network.
- 4.
- The U.S. might seek a fundamental redirection of the Baghdad Pact to capture indigenous support and to further our long range objective of closer cooperation between the Afro-Asian nations and the West.
Conclusion
The disadvantages of U.S. adherence to the Pact are of such a nature that it is concluded that our joining now would not serve the U.S. national interest. This is without prejudice to possible future adherence. We believe that the present situation in the Middle East should continue to be handled primarily through the UN. We should do nothing to divert attention from the UN or provide a pretext for other powers to take unilateral action. The immediate need to respond to the demands of the area Pact members for U.S. action can best be met on a bilateral basis.
In this connection, we are proposing immediately, in accordance with the attached memorandum (Tab C):5
- 1.
- The immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar, with training crews. This equipment would serve, also, southeastern Turkey and parts of Iran.
- 2.
- An offer to survey air raid warning requirements in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This might be accompanied by a visit from a high ranking U.S. Air Force officer. Turkey’s needs are presumably being met through NATO.
- 3.
- Immediate implementation of the U.S. program to train Iraqi pilots.
- 4.
- A public reaffirmation of support for collective security through the Baghdad Pact.