119. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
1602. From Henderson. Baghdad Pact. Yesterday Chapin and I had long talk with Monckton, British Ambassador Stevens and Michael Wright, British Ambassador Iraq. Wright dominated conversation on British side. His principal point was that 5 years ago no one would conceivably have predicted that 4 of the most important Moslem countries would voluntarily associate themselves in an effort, allied with the West, to combat communism, to seek regional economic development and to ask for the collaboration of US and UK. He said that any hesitation on the part of US and UK to extend such collaboration would automatically raise doubts in minds these 4 Moslem countries. Unless there was prompt strengthening of BP through US and UK the impulse so far generated would gradually fritter away [Page 281] even if the pact itself did not break up. This would be most unfortunate since occasion when 4 such states would be in harmony and seeking Western collaboration certainly would not arise again in foreseeable future. Wright said that in our own interest, we cannot afford to withhold our support.
Sir Walter Monckton stressed British interest in economic side BP, particularly the desirability of supporting regional economic plans. Talk here became somewhat vague as to exact type of support envisaged. When I asked point blank whether British felt that US aid should be continued on bilateral basis or whether portion of aid go through BP, Monckton replied that after all it was perhaps best to continue on the bilateral basis although aid could be coordinated with plans of economic committee for regional economic development.
In our conversation later with Prime Minister, Ala stressed now familiar theme that Iran grateful for past US budgetary aid, that he hoped US would continue offer such aid on decreasing scale over next 2 and one-half or 3 years during which time Iran would firmly establish itself economically. Ala added that Iran would continue need military aid both in matériel and in regard to military budget especially since he understood that it was view of military committee of BP that Iran staff should be planned on Elburz rather than Zagros line. Ala indicated that Iran strongly preferred that any US aid should continue on bilateral basis; but not through BP organ.
Ala raised question of Bahrein as one “troubling” Iran Government. We strongly urged him that Iranian government would make great mistake if it were to harp on this issue at this time. I said that if Iran wishes to maintain its legal claim it can, of course, do so but I thought this should be done by private representations through the Iranian Ambassador in London or through the Foreign Minister to British Ambassador here. I said it is important that this subject should not become one upon which demagogues can capitalize since, as the Prime Minister should know, there is no indication that Britain is prepared to yield on this point.
There was danger that if this issue should be stressed extreme nationalists supported by Communists would take it up and Iran Government might eventually find itself in position similar Greek Government re Cyprus.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret.↩