108. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 3, 19561
SUBJECT
- April 14 Baghdad Pact Council Meeting in Tehran
PARTICIPANTS
- C—Mr. MacArthur
- NEA—Mr. Rountree
- NE—Mr. Wilkins
- NE—Mr. Shaw
- ICA—Mr. Ohly
- S/S–RO—Mr. Kirk
Mr. MacArthur opened the meeting by stating that we are under great pressure from all the Baghdad Pact members to join the Pact. We could not do this at this time for several reasons, but we are trying to develop other ways to demonstrate our support for the Pact; therefore, Mr. Henderson and Admiral Cassady were going to Tehran as the U.S. observers to the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting on April 16.
Mr. Rountree stated that we intended to send messages to all the Baghdad Pact capitals affirming our support for the Pact and explaining why we could not join at this time. We were also providing high-level U.S. representation at the April Baghdad Pact Council Meeting. [Page 266] The third element is economic. We see compelling reasons for increasing the quantity of U.S. aid to the area and improving our performance in fulfilling promises of aid already made.
Mr. Ohly asked what we were trying to accomplish and whether we were trying to step up aid to all the Baghdad Pact countries or just one or two of them.
Mr. Rountree said that we were really trying to prevent the threatened collapse of the Baghdad Pact, which would be a disaster to the free world. It was difficult to say which Pact countries needed bolstering the most, but there is a critical need of supplying added material benefits to Iraq and Iran.
Mr. Rountree said the UK, recognizing our reluctance to adhere to the Pact, has been searching for other ways to improve the situation. They propose to deemphasize the military aspects of the Pact and emphasize its economic side. They have proposed to us the establishment of a technical assistance board under the Pact to which member countries could come for help with their development problems. This board would have a working fund of 1–2 million dollars for use over a period of years. The British would like to know if we favored such a board and would be willing to contribute to its working fund.
After some discussion, there was general agreement that our approach in replying to the British should be that we wanted to be helpful but that their particular proposal was not in sufficient detail for us to pass judgment on it at this time; that Mr. Henderson, Admiral Cassady, and a senior economic officer from Washington would represent the U.S. at the forthcoming Council meeting; and that they could discuss in Baghdad the degree to which our bilateral assistance could be related to the Baghdad Pact and what contribution we might make to an economic organization of the Pact. Mr. Mac Arthur asked NEA to have a message along these lines ready for clearance with ICA on the morning of April 4.
Mr. MacArthur asked Mr. Ohly to appoint a senior officer from the ICA Washington establishment to represent the U.S. at the April 12 meeting of the Baghdad Pact economic committee and serve with Mr. Henderson at the Council meeting. Mr. Ohly pointed out that the economic representative’s terms of reference should be very carefully spelled out, and Messrs. Rountree and Wilkins were asked to prepare these.
Mr. MacArthur asked NEA to prepare an introductory statement for Mr. Henderson to make at the Council meeting, a statement on military matters, and a statement on the economic aspects of the meeting. He suggested that a paper drafted for the SEATO meeting [Page 267] (KAR D–5/15)2 might be a useful guide in preparing the latter paper, which we should be prepared to make public if necessary.