105. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
4228. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd called me to his office in House of Commons 3 pm today and few minutes later Prime Minister joined us. Before Eden’s arrival Lloyd said they wished discuss further Foreign Secretary’s message of March 21 re the Middle East,2 and that while Eden would wish to make specific points purpose conversation was to emphasize urgency UK attaches to situation. He also said he hoped that pending the outcome of the consideration the UK and the US are giving the situation in general, the US would not take further steps in connection with Aswan Dam project. Lloyd further mentioned seriousness position in Jordan and a report he has received from Baghdad that at a meeting just held there of elder Iraqi statesmen, Nuri’s position was challenged, suggesting the precarious-ness if not of Iraq’s Western orientation, at least of Nuri’s ability to maintain firm control of country.
[1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]
Lloyd said Eden would wish to discuss principally the Baghdad Pact and the urgency and importance of US taking some dramatic action at this time to demonstrate further its support for the Pact.
Eden produced paper headed “Note”, which he said he had drafted hurriedly following lunch conversation with Lloyd, and after latter read it and approved, gave it to me for transmission. Text is as follows:
- “1. The position in Jordan is very shaky and if Jordan fell the reaction in Iraq would be immediate.
- 2. Nuri’s position there is not too strong. If he were to go, the effect on the Baghdad Pact would be disastrous. Our joint oil interests would be in the gravest danger.
- 3. We have to consider the effect of possible events in Jordan and Iraq on Persia. The Shah’s regime would be threatened.
- 4. The French are attacking the Baghdad Pact despite all Monsieur Mollet’s assurances to me. Her Majesty’s Government, on the other hand, are deeply committed to it. There would be the most serious repercussions here if it were to collapse.
- 5. If the U.S. Government are unable to join the Baghdad Pact at once, can they not make an immediate declaration of intent? The position is slipping, and action is needed in a matter of days.”3
Stressing desirability dramatic US move relation Baghdad Pact, Eden said he appreciated reasons previously given him by President and Secretary why the US could not join the pact at this time, but, referring to view that USG had not closed the door on future action, urged the value, if possible, of a statement now that we contemplate adhering at an appropriate later date. He was particularly annoyed at Mollet’s statements yesterday attacking the Pact after agreeing with him here so recently on general solidarity toward the Middle East and he mentioned as further evidence situation deteriorating rapidly Nasser’s pronouncements to which British felt it necessary react publicly last evening. Somewhat parenthetically he remarked, however, that he did not believe Nasser has as much strength behind him as his attitude would suggest, being considerably like Mussolini in his early days in that respect.
Eden was gratified that the US has been able to do something quickly to assist Libya and said that the UK expects to be able to go ahead with the Tripoli power plant project without delay.
I asked whether he had any particular reports to suggest that the position in Jordan is likely to disintegrate in the next few days, which seems to be the thesis this latest approach. He says he does not have, but that the situation there is virtually entirely dependent on the stability of the young King. Lloyd noted that while the King might weather a further revolt of Legion officers or from some other Jordan quarter, it is doubtful whether he could do so if Egypt should support such a revolt with the large subversive resources she possesses there. I also inquired whether the present conversation indicates a shift in emphasis in UK thinking since the dispatch of Lloyd’s message to the Secretary in which stress seemed to me to be on Syria whereas UK comments today emphasize Jordan, Iraq and the Baghdad Pact generally. Eden felt it to be a matter of timing. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] [Page 264] Only step he could see possible immediately to hold situation for the next few days would be a dramatic US declaration of support for the Baghdad Pact.
In conclusion Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the President’s response to his message and the hope that US policy consideration would be completed and its views forthcoming as early as possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2656. Top Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- See vol. XV, pp. 383–387.↩
- During a conversation with Sir Roger Makins on March 27, Acting Secretary Hoover showed Makins a copy of telegram 4228 from London. According to the memorandum of conversation, “The British Ambassador, in reference to numbered paragraph 5, regarding the question of the United States Government joining the Baghdad Pact at once, said he agreed with Mr. Hoover’s assessment of the inadvisability of the United States Government attempting to obtain Congressional ratification of an act of adherence on our part. He said he fully appreciated the difficulty this would produce in connection with Israel and that it would be impossible to segregate the two questions. He said he had reported this to London on several occasions but obviously his messages were perhaps not being read by the top people.” (Ibid., S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)↩