101. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State1
926. Baghdad Pact Council Deputies held special session March 9 to hear British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd who is transiting Baghdad. Prime Minister Nuri Said was in chair.
Nuri first welcomed Lloyd to Council meeting and reiterated deep attachment GOI has to principles and aims Baghdad Pact. He described it as necessity for defense and prosperity and stated GOI determined do all it can to help achieve pact aims. “We want friends and allies eager to cooperate with us” he said. Differences opinion re pact in some quarters should only induce members stand closer together. Nuri then invited Lloyd to speak.
[Page 253]Lloyd thanked Nuri for welcome and expressed his pleasure be here. UK position re Baghdad Pact he said had been stated by Eden previous eve in House Commons as one of unwavering support. UK intends do all it can maintain it. Pact “important feature” in UK foreign policy.
He then spoke of recent trip which he and Eden had made to US to exchange views with President and Secretary. US and UK he asserted had come to much the same conclusion re world situation. He scoffed at talk new Soviet look allegedly inaugurated by Khrushchev insisting it was deeds rather than words that mattered. Soviet deeds had been bad he said and cited Soviet arms for Egypt as well as Soviet loan and arms for Afghanistan, purpose of which could only be try stir up trouble for UK and allies. They did not suggest it safe let down preparedness. Both US and UK in agreement on this point.
Re recent SEATO meeting Lloyd commented there had been some advance pessimism that meeting might not prove satisfactory. Instead, however, SEATO meeting had been “great success” and practical steps re military planning, combating subversion, economic planning, et cetera, had been evolved. Meeting had shown real spirit friendship alliance and comradeship and SEATO well underway make effective contribution to peace. Even such sensitive issues as Kashmir and Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute he said had been disposed of in private sessions in 20 minutes. Re Pakistan-Afghanistan UK position is that Durand Line is border. Re Kashmir issue participants had agreed early settlement desirable either thru UN or thru direct negotiations. SEATO he felt was a strong alliance and he noted that two of its members UK and Pakistan were likewise members Baghdad Pact.
Lloyd next turned to reports re his recent visit to Bahrain. Bahrain incident he stated had been unfortunate combination circumstances. Contrary to reports his car had not been stoned but some of cars at rear end of motor cavalcade had had few windows broken. During dinner with ruler some 1,000 or more people were reportedly assembling at causeway to demonstrate. He had thought it better therefore wait “until they had gone to bed” rather than risk casualties and perhaps have to “shoot some people”. Situation in Bahrain confused with both ruler and opposition claiming they backed by British. Demonstration spurred on moreover by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money. He felt however that all elements on Bahrain had learned their lesson and that such incident would not recur.
Lloyd then turned to his recent conversation with Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser had said that he did not approve Baghdad Pact and that anti-Iraqi actions which he allegedly admitted had only been due to it. After its conclusion he had eventually accepted it. It had only been when recent effort was made bring Jordan into it that he reacted once more. Nasser had made it clear according Lloyd that he would be [Page 254] prepared tolerate Pact if it were frozen at least as far as Arab countries are concerned. Lloyd himself felt it “intolerable” and “humiliation” accept such suggestion to withdraw invitation to others come in. He had told Nasser he stated that “tolerable relations with Egypt” depend on whether Nasser stopped propaganda against Iraq, UK, Baghdad Pact, on general British position in ME. Nasser had allegedly agreed “taper it off”. During past week however he had been told Egyptian attacks on UK and Baghdad Pact had begun again. He felt therefore “not much reliance to be placed on understanding with him (Nasser)”. UK prepared consider getting along with him but must first wait for him stop his mischief.
Lloyd related he talked to Nasser about Jordan and Egyptian Prime Minister had appeared be genuinely surprised at strength refugees. Nasser had indicated that when he began operations against Jordanian adherence to Pact in November last year he had not suspected refugees so easy stir up and now appeared be “slightly frightened” over implications their strength. Nasser had stated he himself had tried settle 50,000 of them (presumably on Egyptian territory) but they had refused and he was powerless.
Lloyd’s own impression re Jordan was that there actually two Jordans, east and west bank. He was not certain whether same solution applied to both. In any case first stage he felt was conclude “closer association between east bank and Iraq” which in interest both Iraq and UK.
He next turned to Israeli problem and opined prospects early Arab-Israeli settlement bad. Neither side willing come to any settlement and situation complicated by fact that there 4 Arab states around Israel. Immediate task in his view was not to think of settlement but rather to take more active steps keep two sides apart and maintain the peace. Reprisals could only lead to counter reprisals and in due course to war. Additional physical steps required such as marking out demilitarized zones, more UN truce supervisors, et cetera, to assist keeping peace.
Turning to Saudi Arabia Lloyd remarked everyone saying UK must be strong and firm and it had been so in case of Buraimi. “Now some of our best friends are coming along saying we must make agreement.” If UK “climbs down and lets him (King Saud) back in” other Persian Gulf rulers will lose confidence in British protection. UK Lloyd said willing talk to Saud without conditions. At same time however there was “no question letting Saud and his men back into Buraimi”. He had talked to Secretary Dulles about the matter and there had been “very close unity of view” between US and UK. Both had felt UK must take stronger steps against people opposing West. Both support Baghdad Pact and will do everything strengthen it.
[Page 255]Lloyd concluded by commenting that while immediate aim of Pact must be expedite military defense planning he felt that as Pact develops its economic aspects would hold greater attractions.
Second part of meeting devoted to questions.
Nuri said he had heard Nasser had shown interest in Baghdad Pact economic committee and wondered if this were so. Selwyn Lloyd replied negatively. Nasser’s idea had only been that if invitation to other Arab countries join Baghdad Pact were withdrawn he would consider reviving idea building up ACSP with view to eventual association between it and Baghdad Pact. Nasser had made it clear however this would take time.
Nuri then asked what UK would do if Nasser continues his broadcasts against UK which were entirely contradictory to Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Lloyd felt Nasser needed economic help and that if he did not get it this would doubtless affect him. He was particularly interested in Sudan waters and had asked UK use its influence with Sudanese Government obtain agreement on water. He had seemed “quite nervous” whether he could get agreement on it. Present base agreements in Egypt Lloyd said suited UK while Egypt on her part gets some money out of it. If Nasser continues present line however “whole of our relations with him will have to be looked at”.
[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]
Nuri stated that in his view entire success of Baghdad Pact depends upon stopping Saud. He may be anti-Communist, he is nevertheless doing more harm than are the Communists. Nasser could do nothing without Saudi money.
All aid given by US to Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, etc., is largely nullified by Saudi activities in Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries. Something should surely be done stop this. Baghdad Pact he observed is not only Iraq but is also “UK and US and other powers” and Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be made understand this. Iraqi critics of Baghdad Pact ask why if West favors pact does it allow Saudi Arabia act the way it does. How long will it continue? Lloyd replied in somewhat general terms that it was true UK relations with Egypt had again reached “critical phase”. It was not tolerable continue accept Egyptian propaganda attacks against UK and Baghdad Pact. At same time he felt it was not in interest Baghdad Pact countries denounce Anglo-Egyptian agreement.
Nuri continued argue that in view Anglo-Egyptian treaty relations UK has certain right talk with Egyptians to straighten them out. He referred to his talks with Nasser in autumn 1954 before Baghdad Pact concluded and recalled Nasser’s problem had then allegedly been time required to condition Egyptian public to cooperation with West. In view uncertainty answer he, Nuri, has had take action himself.
[Page 256]Lloyd again related Nasser had just been accustomed to Baghdad Pact when effort had been made bring Jordan in. Nasser had said he prepared tolerate Pact if invitation to other Arab states be withdrawn. Nasser had been very successful in Jordan thus far but Lloyd wondered whether this might not change once he encounters more difficulties.
Nuri observed Nasser’s success outside of Egypt (he said he would not speak of situation in Egypt itself) was entirely dependent on Saudi Arabian money. “Stop this money for two months and see what happens” he said. Lloyd merely observed that immediate problem as he saw it was Jordan.
Lloyd asked how Nuri felt re development of Baghdad Pact thus far. Nuri opined it going well as did Iranian Ambassador. When asked re feeling on recent economic committee meeting Bashayan replied he felt this too going satisfactorily.
Lloyd next asked whether there were any weak points in organization and what could be done to improve this. Bashayan’s immediate reply was “one more Arab state in it would help greatly”. Although Pact had now been in existence for only short time work done to date “very encouraging”. Tehran meeting would show even more evidence of this.
British Ambassador Wright spoke [garble] work economic subcommittees and stated that Council had felt it desirable all member countries be represented at forthcoming economic committee session in Tehran at ministerial or junior ministerial level.
Secretary General Khalidi referred to mass of material currently being turned out by economic subcommittees and hoped this could be presented at Tehran meeting. He indicated however that small staff of Secretariat made work difficult and whole Secretariat staffing pattern and organization needed review after Tehran meeting. All agreed.
Wright [1½ lines of source text not declassified] observed Nuri felt that it would be useful establish cooperation and working link among radio stations of member countries. Iraq would soon have new strong transmitter to assist in this. Nuri said GOI already trying to organize radio cooperation with Iran and Turkey in order combat Cairo broadcasts which were all “big lies”. Tehran, Ankara and Karachi already had strong stations and Iraq would do so next summer. He in close touch with Pact member state Embassies in Baghdad on organization of programs. There were moreover some useful elements which might help including several dissident Egyptians. All of this was good he admitted but principal problem still was Saudi buying of newspapers and politicians in Syria and Jordan. If that stops opposition to Pact will collapse. He had discussed this on various occasions but thus far there had been no results. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]
[Page 257]I intervened at this point saying that I did not wish impression prevail that USG had not taken real seriously Nuri’s observations re Saudi Arabian activities. My talks with Nuri on the subject had been fully reported and had been given serious consideration. Secretary Dulles had pointed out in Washington that problem had to be carefully weighed. It was difficult. One could not tell any government to do this or that with its own revenues. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] To work it out required time. I added that I was pleased Lloyd had made it clear how closely our two governments were working together on the problem. As an observer I said I had gotten a lift out of fact that Nasser had not as the Foreign Secretary had pointed out gone on record as opposing our eventual adherence to Baghdad Pact. I thanked Lloyd for giving us his time and for his frankness.
Lloyd then asked re work military committee which Major General Daghestani (Iraqi director military operations) outlined for him; He concluded by indicating interim report would be presented at Tehran meeting. Planners work, Daghestani felt, was proceeding satisfactorily.
Iranian Ambassador Ghods-Nakhai [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] seize upon this to state that Iranian Government expects military committee meeting take place in Tehran at same time as Council. It had instructed its representative in Pact member countries to discuss matter with governments. It would be most useful if military committee met at same time.
Daghestani again pointed out final reports of military planners would not be ready but felt there was no objection if military committee wished meet in Tehran with Ministerial Council to discuss interim report. Main difficulty he felt was problem shifting classified files to Tehran. Iranian Ambassador again emphasized importance his government attaches to such meeting. Referring to fact that Ministerial Council and military committee had met simultaneously in Baghdad last fall he felt it would make bad impression in Tehran if this did not take place this time.
Lloyd asked for views of Air Marshal Sir William Dickson (Chairman British Joint Chiefs Staff) on subject.
Dickson stated UK had felt that time factor too short to have proper military committee meeting in Tehran. He was not certain whether there were any great advantages in having progress report and cautioned against hurrying the meeting too greatly. At same time he did not see any harm in having military present in Tehran meeting.
Pakistan Ambassador Quraishi remarked military committee should presumably meet only to discuss something. Whole question however was one for military committee to decide, if it wanted to meet to consider planning or interim report there could be no objection. He understood Iranian President had been writing of anticipated meeting [Page 258] military committee in Tehran. Ranking military men will in any case be present there as members delegation. Moreover 3 (actually 4) defense ministers likely to be there to head delegations. Even if possibility discussing substantive matter not great presence military should be sufficient to satisfy public which would in any case not be party to their talks.
Iranian Ambassador reiterated hope military committee would meet in Tehran.
It was agreed when concluding meeting that Secretary General might if asked by press state that Lloyd had met with Council Deputies and that there had been informal review of international situation as well as discussion re preparations for forthcoming Council meeting in Tehran. No record of meeting being prepared by Secretariat.
Lloyd emplaning for Tehran today.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–1056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, and Tehran.↩