Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, December 8, 1956—5:26 p.m.

Gadel 56. Re Delga 273.²Del authorized at appropriate time join co-sponsors of LA resolution reported Delga 279, conditional on revision draft resolution along lines set forth separate telegram.

Dept does not however concur suggestions in Delga 273 re allocation problem. Suggested preambular and operative paragraphs appear to us ambiguous view absence agreement on present allocation. Possibility cannot be discounted for example, that under this proposal USSR would claim two seats for Eastern Europe since it does not agree on Philippine eligibility succeed Yugoslavia. Moreover, amendment Charter ostensibly (though not in fact) in order give one seat Eastern Europe difficult explain and defend publicly. Our view it desirable establish any system allocations it may be necessary accept in terms allocation all eight non-permanent seats and not just two new seats. We also doubt explicit allocation two new seats only would be acceptable other areas which would then have to continue rely so-called “gentleman’s agreement.”

Dept further believes proposal in Delga 273 would not “head off” Soviet insistence on agreement covering more specific allocation. Obviously this presents serious difficulties for US, but it appears to Dept we will have to permit spelling out states comprising Eastern Europe if US to avoid onus for Soviet refusal ratify any Charter amendment increasing size SC. On assumption spelling out unavoidable, it our view we should seek least objectionable form for such spelling out. Dept sees four alternative methods by which spelling out could take place.

1. Another “gentlemen’s agreement”. While an agreement reached between US and USSR or among all permanent SC members would minimize difficulties multipartite negotiation such agreement even if in fact written and publicized has overtones side deal. US would be directly involved in arrangement that fails reflect true situation which is that initiative and drive for agreement meet USSR demands originates with vast majority not including US.

2. Statement by GA President for inclusion plenary record spelling out consensus concerning allocation eight non-permanent seats. This procedure might provide USSR adequate assurance and would permit tacit US acquiesence without direct involvement new “gentlemen’s agreement”. US could give its assurance if pressed to do so, it would not act contrary to the consensus stated by GA President by proposing or campaigning for any candidate to deprive Eastern Europe of its seat.

3. GA resolution, together with a consensus statement by GA President spelling out the states considered to be included in Eastern Europe, along following lines:

“Desiring to assure equitable geographical distribution in the representation of non-permanent members on the Security Council,

“Recommends that in elections following the coming into force of the present amendments, Member States act on the principle that the following constitutes an equitable geographical distribution: Latin America—2, British Commonwealth—1, Western Europe—2, Eastern Europe—1, Middle East—1, and Far East—1.

4. A GA resolution simply allocating all eight non-permanent seats and spelling out what is meant by Eastern Europe. Advantage procedures 3. and 4. is that US could make clear its position in debate, abstain in the voting out of deference majority view, and then indicate intention be guided by GA recommendation as understood by GA majority. Disadvantage of 4. is may give rise to pressures spell out states comprising other areas besides Eastern Europe.

Statement of consensus or GA resolution tends avoid appearance side deal or US initiative and direct involvement in meeting USSR demands. Both methods can maximize pressure for geographical spelling out rather than a formulation based on criterion “Soviet control”. As indicated Delga 272,³ resolution holds possibility two-thirds majority reversal.

These alternatives presented for Delegation’s consideration if and when it becomes clear to Delegation that further adherence original position will place onus preventing enlargement squarely on US. Dept believes Delegation can best assess Soviet position.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–656. Confidential; Priority. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Delga 272 contained the U.S. United Nations Mission’s Information Digest No. 116, which summarized the General Assembly’s debate on Security Council expansion. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.5/12–556)
4. In Gadel 57, December 8, the Department made several further drafting suggestions to the Latin American proposals in order to avoid difficulties regarding Chinese representation. (Ibid., 330/12–656)