Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

39. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 9, 1956—5 p.m.

486. For Acting Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re enlargement SC.

1. There has been dramatic change of attitude here toward USSR in last few days as result its armed intervention in Hungary. US policy toward allocation seats in an enlarged SC as set forth in draft paper dated October 29, 1956² should be re-examined with this in mind.

2. I recommend US policy be to agree ultimately to an informal allocation of one seat to Eastern Europe but not to agree that it should be a “satellite” or “Warsaw Pact” or any other Soviet hand-picked seat.

3. We should inform UK soonest that this will be our policy and urge them to adopt same attitude, abandoning current willingness support “Warsaw Pact” seat. We should also inform French.

4. We should continue to maintain in public complete flexibility on our attitude toward any “understanding” on an Eastern European allocation until circumstances in GA make it desirable to commit ourselves publicly.

5. We should maintain flexible attitude toward size of enlargement continuing to talk 2 but not ruling out 3 if pressure develops.

6. I recognize USSR may try seize US refusal to support “satellite” allocation as justification blocking increase. They would then try to turn Afro-Asian ire against US on grounds we are blocking agreement by refusing legitimate Soviet request. They could undoubtedly receive some support this thesis among states who would argue guarantee second Communist seat statistically justifiable.

7. This risk seems reasonable take in view arguments on other side: (1) in light experience of “London gentleman’s agreement”, it clearly undesirable commit US vote to Soviet candidate in advance as impossible predict changing situation; (2) current unrest in Eastern Europe weakens USSR argument for any particular group of states; (3) geographical allocation Eastern Europe perfectly defensible as normal approach as contrasted USSR proposed “ideological” allocation.

8. On balance I believe our interests best served by this recommended policy and that there is good chance both that USSR can be made to accept Eastern Europeans allocation and that if they do not we will not receive primary onus of preventing enlargement. Flexible US attitude recommended in (5) above toward size increase will help in maintaining good will for US.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–956. Confidential; Priority.
2. Not found, but see Document 37.