37. Memorandum From Richard F. Pedersen of the Mission at the United Nations to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
New
York, October 29,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Enlargement of Security Council
- 1.
- The UK Delegation has concluded that if the US and UK take the initiative in obtaining 30–40 sponsors of a resolution we can obtain an enlargement of the Security Council this year, and by 2 only. They seem convinced that the USSR and India are the only real opponents to a solution this year and that a large Latin American and European sponsorship can be obtained. They think it important to resolve the issue now so that the permanent member question cannot be effectively raised.
- 2.
- Our role in this question requires decision on one key point: Whether we will ultimately agree to an allocation of one seat to the “satellites,” described by the UK as the “Warsaw Pact” powers, or only to “Eastern Europe.” The UK is prepared to agree to a “satellite” seat and assumes we will also. The Department also seems prepared to agree to a “satellite” seat on the assumption this is the only way to achieve agreement on an enlargement and that we do not want to be put in the position of blocking it.
- 3.
- Objections you have previously sent to the Department about its position have applied to the tactical point of when we reveal our hand rather than to the policy.
- 4.
- The dramatic new events in Eastern Europe2 throw considerable doubt on the feasibility or desirability of agreeing to a “satellite” or “Warsaw Pact” allocation of an Eastern European seat. They also make the USSR case for such an agreement much weaker. Our experience in the past 10 years with the so-called “London Agreement” also argues against any US commitment to allocate the Eastern European seat to the Soviet candidate in advance.
- 5.
- The argument for agreeing to such an allocation is (1) that other non-communist countries will think the communist bloc deserves an extra seat in an enlarged Council and will blame us if the USSR refuses to ratify an enlargement because of US refusal to agree to such an allocation, and (2) that two Soviet-controlled votes in a 13 member Security Council would not present us with any real difficulties.
- 6.
- On balance I think the disadvantages of agreeing to a “satellite” seat outweigh the disadvantages of not agreeing, although we will undoubtedly receive considerable criticism.
Recommendations:
- (1)
- That we continue to maintain a flexible position on the size of the increase (2 but not ruling out 3), in order to appeal to those desiring enlargement.
- (2)
- That you recommend to the Secretary that the U.S. agree only to an allocation to Eastern Europe, undefined, and that this agreement not be made public until tactical considerations here make it desirable to do so.
- (3)
- That the U.K. should be informed of this decision, when made, at the earliest possible time and that we urge them to take the same attitude, arguing on the basis of the changed situation in Eastern Europe.
- (4)
- If the USSR remains adamant on a “satellite” seat in the GA and we are not supported by the UK, we would have to re-examine this policy at the last minute. However, any signs of weakness before then would be fatal to the objective.