Office of the Historian

124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, March 9, 1957—2:25 p.m.

2220. Department impressed by increasing evidence of desire Afghan Government strengthen its ties with free world and particularly Pakistan. Recent manifestations of this attitude include: [Page 247]

A.
Great interest in American Doctrine;2
B.
Statements of support of Afghan leaders for GOP position on Kashmir (Kabul’s 963;3 to Karachi 304);
C.
Eagerness of RGA proceed rapidly on Afghan–Pakistan regional transit project (Kabul’s 1009;4 to Karachi 313); and
D.
Afghan leaders’ statements to Pakistan Chargé and others that Afghans eager achieve settlement Pushtunistan issue (Kabul’s 963). Would appear from Kabul’s reports Afghans might accept any settlement Pushtunistan issue satisfactory Abdul Ghaffar Khan.5 Reports also indicate that if Abdul Ghaffar Khan could be persuaded make clear publicly his belief aspirations of Pakistan Pushtuns could be fulfilled under Pakistan administration of Pushtu areas, RGA might be willing discontinue Pushtunistan campaign.

Department does not believe RGA is considering abandonment its policy close association USSR which is bringing Afghanistan substantial assistance in both military and economic fields. In view proximity Afghanistan to Soviet Union unlikely Afghans will in general feel they can take an openly pro-West, anti-Soviet position in cold war issues. Also recognize possibility Afghans in their apparent willingness give Ghaffar Khan blank check in Pushtunistan settlement may be seeking maneuver Pakistan into embarrassing position. Nevertheless believe available evidence sufficiently substantial justify action by GOP to ascertain if Afghan “new look” represents real desire increase its ties with free world. Even if Afghans should prove reluctant make any real concessions we think attempt explore their intentions would be beneficial to interests Pakistan, US and other members free world.

Ambassador therefore requested at his discretion obtain appointment with Mirza and Suhrawardy (together if feasible) to discuss significance recent Afghan moves. In discussion Ambassador requested make points outlined above. He should also make clear US not at this time urging particular course of action on GOP. We believe however GOP should consider what is most effective and positive response it can make to Afghan overtures. We would be particularly interested in GOP views on possibility Ghaffar Khan and other prominent Pathans could be prevailed upon make gesture of support for GOP policies which might be sufficient Afghans drop Pushtunistan issue.

[Page 248]

Would also appreciate any suggestions from GOP on action US might take assist in Afghanistan–Pakistan rapprochement.6

Report soonest.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–957. Confidential. Drafted by Garrett H. Soulen and Jones and approved by Lampton Berry. Repeated to Kabul and London.↩
  2. Reference is to the economic and military aid program requested in the President’s Special Message to Congress on January 5, 1957, known as the American Doctrine for the Middle East or the Eisenhower Doctrine.↩
  3. Dated February 7, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.90D89/ 2–757)↩
  4. Dated February 19, not printed. (Ibid., 789.5–MSP/2–1957)↩
  5. A tribal leader of the Pushtun people within Pakistan.↩
  6. In telegram 2487, March 15, Ambassador Hildreth reported in part that he had met with President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan the previous evening and had related the above points to them. The Pakistani officials then proceeded to counter the American assertions that Afghanistan was showing increased interest in strengthening its ties with the “free world”; on the contrary, they stressed, Soviet influence in Afghanistan was increasing dangerously. In concluding this message, Hildreth made the following observations:

    “Foregoing shows great skepticism with which Pakistanis view Afghans. Nevertheless believe they seriously worried at what they regard as fast growing Soviet influence over Afghans. Believe they fully alive to necessity providing some counterweight to this influence but very wary falling into any trap or giving any credence to good faith of present dynasty…. GOP would gladly cooperate with any pressures or moves to wean Afghans toward Pakistan and free world. In this connection their emphatic rejection any hope of working with Ghaffar Khan seems significant. I pressed them hard on this.” (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5–1557)

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