Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI

50. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 6, 1957¹

Washington, June 6, 1957

SUBJECT

• US Military Relations with Latin America: Grant Assistance; Equipment; Proposed OAS Force

PARTICIPANTS

• Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
• Acting Assistant Secretary Rubottom
• Admiral Radford
• General Cannon
• General Pritchard
• Mr. Terry B. Sanders, Jr. (OSA)
• Mr. Weldon Litsey (REA)

The purpose of the meeting was to hear Admiral Radford’s views on military problems in Latin America, following the Admiral’s recent return from a trip to South America.²

Admiral Radford said that there is little military justification for our grant military assistance to Latin America. The theory of the grant program is, in part, that some Latin American military units which we are helping to develop would be moved to the Panama Canal Zone in time of emergency. In fact, however, we would not move those units, and if we did, they would not be satisfactory for the defense of the Canal.

The Admiral expressed the view that it would seem preferable to change the concept of the program and help most of the Latin American countries develop ground forces which could be transported by air and which could serve as units on call by the Organization of American States to maintain peace in the hemisphere. US assistance for this purpose could have a legal justification as a hemisphere defense undertaking.

In addition, said the Admiral, there would also be a military justification for our helping some of the Latin American countries in the development of anti-submarine naval units but certainly not cruisers or aircraft carriers. The emphasis should be on small simple types of naval vessels.

Admiral Radford explained that the equipment which we have been giving the Latin Americans is in large measure that which is being discarded by the US armed forces. We have been encouraging the Latin Americans to model their forces after our own, but this is a mistake since the structure, equipment, and style of forces in Latin America should be different in order to meet the particular requirements of under developed countries. The type of equipment which we should provide is not tanks or artillery, but mortars, pack howitzers, and other light items for use within the recipient countries and for OAS missions. It has been a mistake to provide the Latin Americans with anti-aircraft units and jet fighter bombers. These items are of questionable use to support the forces of the Latin American countries or to serve in Panama. Light fighter planes to carry 100 pound bombs and stay in the air four or five hours are a type of aircraft the Latin Americans need. Another useful type of aircraft would be a simple transport plane. The Latin Americans are simply unable to maintain the jets they are getting from us or many of the planes they have bought from the United Kingdom and other European countries. Ecuador, for example, for lack of pilots and funds, is not flying the jets that it bought from England. Jets that the Venezuelans have bought are likewise sitting idle for lack of pilots.

Armed forces in Latin America suffer acutely for want of trained personnel because of short-term enlistments and rapid turnovers of enlisted men although the officers, especially the younger ones, are good professional soldiers. To insure a more effective use of our assistance we should insist on more sensible enlistment policies as a condition to aid.

The United States should probably undertake to manufacture especially for Latin America and other under developed countries the light, simple types of equipment best suited to their needs. The Admiral said that he plans to speak to Secretary of Defense Wilson about this.

Some of our military and diplomatic representatives in Latin America are too enthusiastic about providing the Latin American countries with military assistance. They cite, for example, the small percentage (1%) of total US foreign military aid that goes to Latin America and conclude that Latin America should have much more. It is important that both the US military and diplomatic personnel should cease talking in these terms and encourage more sensible Latin American aspirations and undertakings in the military field.

Brazil’s acquisition of an aircraft carrier from Britain is an example of waste. The carrier is the result of rivalry between the Brazilian Navy and Army. It would not be possible for the United States to rebuild this carrier and make it a useful vessel. Attempting to remodel the ship will be unsatisfactory, and we should let the British do the overhauling and take the responsibility.

Mr. Rubottom said that Argentina is also interested in a carrier. He had heard a report from a source in the Republic Steel Company that a consortium of companies which is planning to build an oil pipeline in Argentina, is contemplating the use of an aircraft carrier on the flight deck of which they would roll plate into pipes, using power generated by the carrier.

Admiral Radford observed that the military men running the government in Argentina seem to be doing well in a difficult job but that, as in Brazil, there are serious service rivalries among the armed forces.

Mr. Rubottom pointed out that the OAS has demonstrated again and again its ability to prevent disputes in the hemisphere from degenerating into serious armed conflict. He said, however, that the Admiral’s suggestion about an OAS police force is an attractive one worth studying. The Admiral’s observations had been directed exclusively toward our grant assistance program, although it is in reimbursable assistance that we encounter most of our problems in military relations with the Latin Americans. The approximate $25 million that we give them annually in grant assistance is very small as compared with the large amount that the Latin American governments spend on their military establishments each year. In the grant program there is, of course, a force base for each recipient country. It would be helpful also to have an estimate by the US military of what would be a reasonable total force base for each Latin American country so that we would have a yardstick against which to measure the frequent requests that we have from the Latin Americans to buy military equipment for cash or on credit.

Admiral Radford replied that he did not believe the preparation of such estimates would be desirable. The Latin Americans might learn of them and expect us to help in equipping and training the force estimates. Also, an appraisal of Latin America’s actual military requirements would probably not be very valid, although certainly they would be small. It would probably be difficult, for example, for our mission personnel in Latin America to make reliable estimates from our point of view, since in the course of their military duties a good part of their time is spent in the employ of the local governments.

Mr. Rubottom added that it will, no doubt, take time to induce the Latin Americans to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures. As the grant program is terminated, reimbursable assistance will presumably need to take its place, and we should do all we can with an effective reimbursable assistance program to encourage the Latin Americans to channel their military expenditures along useful lines. Already in Venezuela there has been established a force goal to govern our credit sales of equipment. Mr. Rubottom suggested that it might be possible also to establish goals on a trial basis in one or a few other countries, such as Ecuador, Uruguay, or Paraguay.

Admiral Radford observed that Uruguay is a sad country. Mr. Rubottom responded that in its efforts to create a Utopia Uruguay was, indeed, in many difficulties. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs has assigned a small team of officers to study Uruguay’s troubles. This team is taking a completely new look at Uruguay with a view to making recommendations on US policy.

Admiral Radford said that he had received a letter from Ambassador Ravndal in Quito suggesting that Mr. John Broger, Deputy Director of Armed Forces Information and Education, go to Quito to carry out a “Militant Liberty” program on a trial basis. The Admiral and Secretary Wilson are willing to send Mr. Broger, and the Admiral left a letter with Mr. Murphy to this effect. The Admiral stated that in Ecuador he was well impressed with the President, the Minister of Defense, and the Foreign Minister. Ambassador Ravndal is eager to obtain US economic assistance to bolster President Ponce’s position.

Mr. Rubottom said that to help meet the Ambassador’s recommendations on economic assistance we have secured for Ecuador $2 million from the Smathers’ fund, and we are also giving what assistance we can to Ecuadoran Ambassador Chiriboga in his negotiations with the Export-Import Bank.

In Caracas, the Admiral said, the President of Venezuela told him that Venezuela has no territorial ambitions. However, the President added that if such territories as Curacao, Trinidad, and British Guiana should change hands, the Venezuelans would like to have them.

In conclusion, Admiral Radford asked that the Department give thought to the development of Latin American forces to serve the OAS. In each country such a unit could be an elite corps in which high personnel standards might be maintained, thus serving as a model for other forces. These units would be provided with air transportation. Their very existence might help to keep disputes in the hemisphere from arising.

In the course of the conversation Admiral Radford said that he would like to describe to Secretary Dulles his views on military relations with Latin America.

Action Required:

1. Before the Defense Department does anything about changing the concept and structure of the grant military assistance program in Latin America, along the lines suggested by Admiral Radford, the Admiral would like to have the views of the Department of State on the desirability of forces to be used by the OAS.

2. A reply should also be made to the letter, dated June 6, which Admiral Radford left with Mr. Murphy indicating the willingness of the Defense Department to send Mr. Broger to Ecuador, as suggested by Ambassador Ravndal.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5/6–657. Confidential. Drafted by Sanders and initialed by Murphy.
2. See Document 47.
3. Action on items 1 and 2, respectively, was assigned to Krieg and Wardlaw.