I do hope you will have the opportunity to dig into it personally. After
you have had a chance to do so, please telephone me so we can discuss
what further steps may be indicated.3
[Attachment]
MEMORANDUM
Unsatisfactory Status of Military Assistance Program
with Latin America
(1) The Latin American Grant Aid
Program
Grant military assistance, in the form of military equipment and
training, is being provided to eleven Latin American countries and
the provision of assistance to additional countries is under
consideration. The Congress has appropriated to date about $118
million for the program, which was begun in 1951 on the initiative
of the Defense Department.
The basic concept of this program is that certain countries which
have a military capability should be helped to develop designated
units of their armies, navies and air forces for employment in
collective hemisphere defense missions in the event of war or grave
emergency. According to the Defense Department, the use of effective
Latin American units for such a purpose would minimize the diversion
of U.S. military forces for the defense of the hemisphere.
The provision of assistance to a Latin American country is subject to
the conclusion of a bilateral agreement in which the other
Government agrees to make effective use of U.S. assistance for the
purpose for which it is provided. A supplementary and secret
bilateral military plan specifies the units eligible to receive U.S.
assistance and describes the tasks for which they are to be
developed and employed. The type of bilateral planning embodied in
the agreements and plans is consistent with the planning recommended
to the Governments of this hemisphere by the Inter-American Defense
Board, . . . .
[Page 229]
(2) Problems which have Arisen in
Connection with the Grant Aid Program
During the period in which the program has been in operation, a
number of important problems have arisen. The most recent and urgent
are whether it would be desirable to provide assistance to Argentina
and whether we should increase the amount of assistance planned for
Brazil and Colombia. It is necessary that the decisions made
regarding these problems reflect the best military judgment
available in the Defense Department, inasmuch as they will have an
important effect upon our relations with the Governments concerned:
- (a)
- Argentina. Argentina was omitted
from the original program because of the then unsatisfactory
state of U.S. relations with that Government. As a result of
the greatly improved climate, President Perón has requested
discussion of that country’s role in hemisphere defense, an
overture which may well mean that he would be prepared to
agree to the terms of a grant aid agreement. It is doubtful,
however, that Perón would agree to
conclude such an agreement without U.S. assurances to
provide assistance that would bear a reasonable relationship
to that provided Brazil, which has received in the form of
equipment and training roughly one-fourth of the
approximately $118 million appropriated for the Latin
American program. Defense has indicated that Argentina’s
defense role is important, but has not to date given us a
statement of even the general dimensions of the program
which it would approve. A clear-cut Defense position on this
question is highly important.
- (b)
- Brazil. Defense has requested us to
obtain Brazilian agreement to rights necessary to place
important U.S. military installations in Brazil. Preliminary
discussions with Brazilian military officials have been
authorized. In our view it is inevitable that increased
military aid will either be a Brazilian condition for
granting the rights desired or that such aid will greatly
facilitate reaching agreement. Over a year ago, the Joint
Brazil–U.S. Military Commission submitted to the Defense
Department a recommendation, endorsed by the three U.S. flag
officers representing the United States on the Commission,
that Brazil be provided with additional grant assistance
estimated at $50 million. Defense has made slight additions
to the Brazilian program, but these are believed
insufficient to assure Brazilian agreement to the
establishment of the U.S. military facilities desired in
Brazil.
- (c)
-
Colombia. Colombia has requested
additional aid, including the large amount required to
equip and train two infantry and one marine battalions.
We have emphasized that Defense take special note of the
Colombian contribution in the Korean conflict. The
position taken by Defense formally to the Department on
two occasions is that there is at this time no Western
Hemisphere requirement for additional forces from
Colombia. Defense has indicated that the Colombians are
not using equipment already provided satisfactorily and
are not likely to be able to support additional
equipment in any volume.
[Page 230]
Advised of the conclusive Defense position, the
Colombians have sought the intervention on their behalf
of Dr. Eisenhower, Amb. Lodge and Mr.
Rockefeller,
and have claimed support from such important Defense
officials as General Ridgway and Admiral Carney.
- (d)
- Engineering Battalions. Repeatedly
the idea has been suggested that the military defense
program in general should be revised to contemplate the
establishment of engineering combat units in various
countries in the hemisphere. The concept has been given
considerable impetus by high-level Defense and other
officials. The advantages of such a program are obvious. It
would give otherwise idle soldiers something to do and would
enable them to undertake road and bridge building programs
which would be of great value and which otherwise could not
be financed by the countries involved. We were informed in
April that the JCS were
studying this proposal, but no results have been made known
to the Department.
- (e)
- The Sale of Military Equipment on Credit
Terms. The sale of military equipment to foreign
governments on terms providing for repayment over a three
year period, and under certain conditions over a longer
period, is authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. It
is consistent with the NSC
statement of policy on Latin America that this authority be
used to promote arms standardization in Latin America. It is
desirable, however, that the military equipment sold to
Latin American countries on credit terms, particularly under
long-term credit arrangements, bear a clear relationship to
legitimate hemisphere defense requirements and objectives
that provide the basis for the grant military assistance
program. With regard to the extension of long-term credit,
it is in the interest of the attainment of our over-all
economic objective of encouraging Latin American countries
to finance necessary economic development projects that
there be imposed a specific limitation on the amount of such
credit approved for countries in the area during any one
year, but that the assurance be given that the amount
specified will be available. Assurances are also required
from the Defense Department that it will continue to finance
three-year credit for the sale of military equipment to
Latin American countries. Inability to finance credit for
such countries as Colombia and Ecuador, having financed
credit for Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, Brazil, Cuba, Peru and
Venezuela, would expose us to the charge of discrimination
by the former countries.
- (f)
-
Conflicting Defense Positions.
Specific or implied support has been given to additional
aid to a number of countries, including Brazil and
Colombia, by U.S. military representatives assigned to
the field and by U.S. military officials during their
frequent visits to Latin America. This has led to
expectations on the part of the foreign governments
which are proved false by eventual Defense decisions
that such aid either is not warranted or infeasible.
There are indications that incautious statements by
high-level officers have abetted these expectations.
More serious is the attitude frequently taken by Defense
officials that the Latin American program is essentially
political rather than military, despite the fact that
Defense originally proposed the program as a military
requirement. Without under-estimating the political
importance of inter-American military cooperation, we
have,
[Page 231]
with the
exception of the aid granted to Central American
countries in connection with efforts to remedy the
Guatemala situation, insisted that the decisions to
provide grant military assistance should be based upon a
Defense determination of a military requirement. The
often serious divergencies of view by Defense officials
at varying levels on this question lead to
confusion.
- (g)
- Lack of Military Evaluation of Success
of the Program. As indicated above, the grant aid
program is based on the concept that the Latin American
countries are capable of making effective use of grant
assistance to develop military units which would be of
tangible military benefit to U.S. armed forces engaged in
hemisphere defense in the event of war or grave emergency.
The program has been under way for almost four years.
Conflicting reports have been received regarding the
progress being made. To the best of our knowledge, no
realistic study has been made to determine how many of the
units which have received U.S. assistance are trained and
equipped to the point where they could be used in hemisphere
defense missions, or what needs to be done to make those
which could not be so employed effective. Any valid
assessment of the desirability of continuing or expanding
the program in any direction should be based on the results
of such a study.
- (h)
- Inability to Obtain Timely Defense
Department Views. The specific country problems
described above were posed to Defense in a letter dated
November 15, 1954, in order that adequate consideration
could be given to them in relation to the new Mutual
Security legislation. A renewed request for Defense
positions on these points and the proposal relating to
combat engineering battalions was made on April 1,
1955.
The reply received on April 20 was too late to be of value in
relation to the FY 1956 Mutual
Security legislation. It was ambiguous on the important question of
possible aid to Argentina, and negative on Colombia and Brazil. It
stated that the suggestion on engineering battalions was under
study. Renewed informal efforts to obtain a clear-cut position on
Argentina have been fruitless.
Conclusion:
The problems outlined above point to the conclusion that a thorough
revaluation of our Defense relationship with the Latin American
countries, particularly that involving the question of continued
grant assistance, is essential. The crucial question is whether we
move forward in the assumption that their military forces can be
trained and equipped to join with our forces in collective
hemisphere defense or whether we fall back on the assumption that
the most we can expect of them is the maintenance of internal order
and limited national defense. The answers to important questions in
our relations with a number of the Latin American countries depend
upon the answer to that question.
[Page 232]
Recommended Courses of
Action:
- (1)
- That Defense be requested to undertake a review of the
entire military aid picture in Latin America with particular
reference to the following points:
- (a)
- What needs to be done by ourselves and by the
other countries in order to achieve the original
objectives of the Latin American grant aid program,
and what changes, if any, are desirable in those
original objectives;
- (b)
- Definitive answers to the following questions:
- 1.
- What is the size of the program contemplated
for Argentina;
- 2.
- What increase, if any, is Defense prepared
to make in the Colombian and Brazilian
programs;
- 3.
- What is Defense’s position with respect to
the provision of grant assistance to Latin
American countries for the development of
engineering combat units;
- 4.
- Will Defense agree to condition the granting
of long-term credit for the purchase of arms in
this hemisphere upon commitment to hemisphere
defense; agree to make available funds within a
specified ceiling for meritorious requests; and
agree to finance additional three-year credit for
the sale of equipment?
- (2)
- That Defense decisions on the above problems be
cleared through the highest levels in Defense in
order that we may avoid the possibility of changes
as a result of political pressures from the other
countries.
