Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

33. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1956¹

Washington, July 13, 1956

SUBJECT

• British Proposal to Review NATO Strategy

The Secretary said he recognized the urgency which the British attached to receiving some word from us regarding their proposal to review NATO strategy, looking to a reduction in conventional forces, and therefore had discussed this matter with the President when he saw him this morning.² The Secretary said the President is prepared to bring our thinking on this subject to a head during the first fortnight in August so that we would be in a position to discuss this problem with the British about the middle of August, with a view to proceeding thereafter as we might mutually agree to some broader exchange of views with other NATO powers. He added that part of the problem was whether we could deal with the British proposal until such time as we had completed our own thinking in some detail regarding our own problem of the level and composition of US forces. However, in view of the urgency which the British attached to this problem, the President felt that we need not complete in detail our study of all aspects of our own problem before talking with the British. To summarize, the Secretary said, we will try to be in shape to hold discussions with Ambassador Makins about mid-August.

Sir Roger expressed deep appreciation and said this news would be most welcome to his Government. He then made reference to the article in the New York Times this morning indicating that Admiral Radford was seeking an 800,000-man cut in the US military forces.³ The Secretary said it was a terrible article and was obviously based on speculation coupled with some vague knowledge that studies of various assumptions and possibilities were in progress in the Pentagon. The Secretary explained that in approaching the problem of our own forces a number of teams were set up to dela with different assumptions and that his was simply a part of the normal planning cycle. The Secretary thought he could assure Sir Roger that nothing like what was portrayed in the article would emerge when the final solution was arrived at.

Sir Roger said that one of the problems about studying these matters was leaks, and that London had certainly been guilty of some during planning duties, although he thought the situation had improved in the last three weeks to Selwyn Lloyd about the dangers of leaks. The Secretary agreed that leaks create much confusion and said that while we had been unhappy about some of the stories coming out of London, we ourselves were now guilty. However, a statement was issued this afternoon by the Department of Defense to explain the situation and to correct the impressions created by the New York Times article⁴ of this morning.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1556. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. Cleared by Dulles.
2. The July 13 memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with the President is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers.
3. See the New York Times, July 13, 1956, p. 1.
4. Ibid., July 14, 1956, p. 1.