Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

32. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, June 29, 1956¹

Washington, June 29, 1956

SUBJECT

• UK Proposal for NATO Review of Strategy

The Secretary asked Sir Roger Makins to call on him at 3 o’clock today.

The Secretary opened the conversation by referring to the meeting on June 18, at which time Sir Roger had discussed with him the British Government’s proposal for an early Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council to issue a new directive to the NATO military authorities to review NATO strategy.² The Secretary said that the U.S. Government had now formulated its views on the matter, and he handed Sir Roger a memorandum setting forth those views, which Sir Roger read.³

The Secretary commented that, as Sir Roger would see from the memorandum, the U.S. Government felt that the British proposal was too spectacular and would cause public opinion to feel that a serious crisis exists. The Secretary said that we felt it was much better to start from the bottom, as it were, with the military studies now in process.

Sir Roger commented that the idea of the British Government had been not to get this matter in the first instance into military channels, which the British felt might not produce the desired results, but rather that it should be dealt with first at a political level.

The Secretary said he had had a long talk on this matter with General Gruenther, during the latter’s recent visit to Washington.⁴ The Secretary said that he thought it would be possible to bring political considerations to the forefront and to make them known to the military authorities in an appropriate way. The Secretary said he did not feel that a Ministerial meeting, which was open to all of the objections set forth in the U.S. memorandum, was needed for this purpose.

The Secretary commented that he felt that political views could be presented informally to the military. He felt certain that if our Governments indicate to the military authorities what is wanted, the latter will cooperate.

Sir Roger said that he was glad to have the Secretary’s views on this point and that he would direct London’s attention to them.

The Secretary went on to say that he had stressed to General Gruenther, and that General Gruenther was in full agreement, that the military posture in NATO must not be allowed to fall apart, but must evolve to meet changing situations.

Sir Roger said that, as regards the timing foreseen in the U.S. memorandum, it seemed to him to be too slow. He remarked that he had already told London that a July meeting was out of the question. Sir Roger inquired what was meant by the phrase “early autumn”. Mr. Timmons said that he felt it was difficult to be more precise at this time, until the NATO military commanders had had an opportunity to consider the state of the various studies now in process, and to indicate when it might be feasible to complete such studies.⁵ The Secretary said he thought “early autumn” would not be before the latter part of September.

Sir Roger said that on this schedule it did not appear that there could be any consideration by the Council before November, which he felt certain was “too late” for London. He went on to say that the British Government does not feel the situation can be allowed to go along until December. Sir Roger then said he felt he should say no more at this time on the question of timing. He would report at once to London the U.S. views, as set forth in the memorandum. He then did add, however, that the U.S. reply does not correspond to the “more radical” views of the British Government. He said that it could, of course, be said that the procedure referred to in the U.S. memorandum was a possible way of facing the problem, particularly if the military authorities are ready to respond to political guidance given in an informal manner. The Secretary wondered if it would not be possible to have an informal meeting between the political authorities of the U.K., the U.S., and France, and their military representatives on the Standing Group, to talk over the whole situation toward the end of July or in early August. This could provide an opportunity for giving the military authorities informal political guidance.

The Secretary emphasized how imperative it is to avoid public discussion of a proposed review of NATO strategy while the mutual security legislation is before the Congress. He spoke of the encouraging developments with respect to this legislation yesterday, but reminded Sir Roger that it will now be necessary to go through the whole process with the Appropriation Committees. Sir Roger said that he had this point fully in mind and had strongly emphasized it to London.

The text of the memorandum handed to Sir Roger Makins is attached hereto.

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State⁶

[Washington,] June 29, 1956.

1. The proposal of the British Government for an early Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council to prepare a directive to the NATO military authorities, has received the most serious consideration of the United States Government.

2. The United States Government believes it would be most undesirable to call a special Ministerial Meeting. Its concern in this matter stems from a number of important factors, among which are the following:

It is feared that public opinion would interpret a call for such a meeting as indicating that NATO is faced with some kind of dire emergency.

The effect is even stronger on the United States Mutual Security Program and would, it is believed, be adverse and far-reaching.

The impact on German efforts to develop its military contribution, which is essential to NATO security and a meaningful defense posture in Europe, as well as on the orientation of German foreign policy, would in the view of the United States Government, be very serious.

The implications of the assumptions set forth in the British approach, on which the directive to the NATO military authorities would be based, are of such a nature as to affect the very basis of the NATO alliance.

There might be important counter-productive results with respect to the general posture of NATO, both political and military, vis-à-vis the Communist bloc.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the United States Government urges that no further approaches to other governments on this subject be made at this time.

3. Moreover, the existing directive to the NATO military authorities already calls for a continuing review and study with respect to the problems of NATO defense, including the level of forces. Paragraph 39 of M.C. 48 states, “The most effective pattern of all NATO forces must, of course, be examined continuously in the light of new problems posed by the advent of atomic weapons.”⁷ Such studies are already being conducted by the NATO subordinate military commanders, under the direction of the Military Committee.

4. As the British Government is aware, the Permanent Council will be meeting informally with General Gruenther at SHAPE on July 13. This will afford the various NATO representatives an opportunity to raise with SACEUR and the SHAPE staff any questions they may wish to discuss regarding European strategy, including those of according full weight to the deterrent effects of thermonuclear weapons and of maintaining NATO forces at the lowest possible level consistent with security requirements.

5. The United Kingdom Permanent Representative might wish to suggest that the Permanent Council urge that the current military studies, including the SHAPE re-evaluation, be completed as soon as feasible, possibly in the early autumn, so that they could be forwarded to the Standing Group for consideration by the Military Committee and the Council. This procedure would enable orderly consideration by the NATO military authorities, and allow the NATO Council, prior to the end of this year, to consider the question further if that were deemed desirable.

6. This procedure would obviate the unfortunate effects that would be produced by a new directive to the military authorities and would take advantage of outstanding directives which contain adequate provision of a prompt review of the situation.

7. The United States Government attaches the highest importance to avoiding publicity on these matters until the Council has determined appropriate action that could be taken with respect thereto. The question of the level and type of forces required to maintain the deterrent and to provide defense in the event of aggression is a military and political question of great complexity. Premature disclosure of the fact that a review is being undertaken might, in addition to the considerations mentioned above, be misleading as to the outcome of such a study. In addition, the timing of the disclosure of such studies and of any reductions that might result therefrom should receive most careful consideration in light of the status of relations with the USSR, particularly the negotiations on disarmament and related matters.

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, Europe. Top Secret. Drafted by Timmons.
2. A copy of Timmons’ June 18 memorandum of conversation of the meeting held that day is ibid., Central Files, 740.5/6–1856. A copy of the British Government proposal is attached to that memorandum.
3. Attachment below. The Department of Defense approved the memorandum.
4. While in Washington, June 21–25, Gruenther met with MacArthur on June 21 and with Dulles and Radford on June 25 to discuss the British proposal. A copy of MacArthur’s June 21 memorandum of the meeting that day is in Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–2156, but no record of the June 25 meeting has been found in Department of State files.
5. None of these studies under reference has been found in Department of State files. Presumably they are the ones referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the attached memorandum.
6. Top Secret. Handed to Makins on June 29.
7. On December 18, 1954, at its meeting in Paris, the NAC approved MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength for the Next Few Years” as a basis for planning and preparation by NATO military authorities. This document has not yet been declassified by NATO authorities. For a report of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 1, p. 557.