Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

31. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 19, 1955.

RE

• Military Activity in the Formosa Straits

You may be interested in the attached report prepared by CIA² which tabulates ground, naval and air activity by the ChiNats and ChiComs in the Formosa Straits during July and August.

From this report, two points seem to me to stand out:

1. The ChiNats have continued various forms of activity. They have (a) made or attempted a number of raids on the mainland, (b) maintained sporadic artillery fire in the vicinity of Amoy, (c) continued to harass shipping in the straits and harbors, and (d) engaged in extensive overflights.

2. The ChiComs have initiated little action, especially since July 20. On July 14 they fired 21 rounds; and on July 20, fired 244 rounds to which the ChiNats responded with 521; otherwise they seem to have refrained even from responding to ChiNat fire. They have, of course, sought to interfere with the overflights. And they have sent over a few “frogmen”, mainly by ones and twos.

According to Amory, all the ChiNat raids were made without the approval of Admiral Stump’s command and, in particular, of the MAAG commander on the spot.

RRB

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Secret. A notation on the source text in Phyllis Bernau’s handwriting indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.
2. The report under reference, headed “Clashes Between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, 1 July–18 August, 1955,” unsigned and undated; bearing a notation by Phyllis Bernau that it was seen by the Secretary, is not attached to the source text but is filed with a copy of a covering memorandum of August 18 from Robert Amory to the Director of Central Intelligence. The report’s introduction notes that it is based solely on daily reports from the Formosa Liaison Center. Amory’s memorandum states that Admiral Stump had categorically asserted that the recent raids were not coordinated with any echelon of his command. Major General John C. Macdonald, former Deputy Chief, MAAG Formosa, had also stated emphatically that the raids were unilateral efforts by the Chinese Nationalists but had cautioned that Nationalist reports of the raids might be exaggerated. Referring to the President’s authorization on January 13 of the continuation of “small-scale” raids by the Nationalists for intelligence purposes, Amory stated that he had considered that this meant at most a squad of 8 or 9 men and by no means as many as 50 men, as was the case with a recent Nationalist raid. He questioned “whether present efforts to secure a de facto cease fire are not apt to be disturbed by Mainland raids of any size to an extent that outweighs their marginal intelligence value”. (Ibid.) For the President’s January 13 authorization, see vol. ii, Document 9.