Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

193. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, July 8, 1956¹

Taipei, July 8, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang Kai-shek
• Vice President Chen Cheng
• Premier O.K. Yui
• Secretary General Chang Chun
• Foreign Minister K.C. Yeh
• Colonel S. K. Hu
• Vice President Richard M. Nixon
• Ambasaador K. L. Rankin
• Mr. Paul W. Meyer (Reporter)

INTERPRETED BY

Foreign Minister Yeh

President Chiang opened the conversation by asking whether Vice President Nixon had any advice to offer.

Vice President Nixon replied that he would give President Chiang a summary of opinions in the United States Government and among the American public on the world situation, including the issue of Communist China’s admission to the United Nations. He said that the so-called “New Look” of the Communists was receiving more emphasis than it deserved. There were columnists and radio commentators in the United States who were urging a drastic change in American policy, with a softening of our attitude towards Soviet Russia and communists in general. However, these opinions had not affected the views of top level officials of the United States Government, such as President Eisenhower and the Secretary of State. Vice President Nixon said that he thought that President Eisenhower’s personal letter² to President Chiang pretty much summed up President Eisenhower’s feelings.

The present attitude of the American Government toward Soviet Russia and the satellites was approximately as follows: the United States would go along with the idea of exchanging visits, on a highly selective basis. There would, however, definitely be no lessening of United States military preparedness. On the economic side, the United States would attempt to meet Soviet moves on a realistic basis, i.e., to counter their actions, wherever they may be, with our own actions.

With reference to United States relations with Communist China, pressure is building up on two fronts: trade and admission of Communist China to the United Nations. With regard to trade, Great Britain is exerting a great deal of pressure supplemented by Japan’s agitation for a relaxation of trade restrictions. We may expect to hear many irresponsible comments by radio commentators and columnists and even some of the political leaders trying to influence the United States Government to soften its policy. But the position of top level Government leaders is still the same as three years ago, i.e., firm and unaffected by any campaign waged to soften United States policy.

In summary,

President Eisenhower’s and Secretary Dulles’ position re Red China is the same as three years ago.

Admission of Red China to the United Nations would produce violent political repercussions in the United States. As of today, Congressional reaction would be for the United States to get out of the United Nations.

President Chiang then requested the views of the Vice President on his present trip.

The Vice President stated that in the Philippines there had recently been anti-United States sentiment stirred up by enemies of Magsaysay, primarily over bases. This controversy has now been resolved.

In Vietnam, Diem is a capable leader who has the support of the people and who understands communism. There is no neutralism there.

It would be unrealistic not to recognize grave dangers that exist in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Burma. What we must do is to maintain the position we now hold. We must keep our defenses solid and strong, and meet communist economic and subversive activities.

We also must consider Korea and Japan. There is a subtle campaign being waged in Japan by the communists, especially along economic lines.

One result of the Communist “New Look” is that if the Chinese Reds make one aggressive move all the world opinion would be mobilized against them. The basis for a holding action is the hope that the Chinese communists will make a mistake. All communists are now on trial, because, if one of them should do something contrary to the “New Look”, world opinion would be against him.

The Vice President requested President Chiang’s views of conditions on the Mainland since the Communist “New Look”, and any questions he might have in regard to our policy in the Far East or in general.

President Chiang asked, with reference to the “New Look” and putting the Communists on trial, would the United States take action in the event of Communist aggression?

The Vice President replied that we would live up to our treaty obligations. In the event of clear-cut aggression, there would be strong support in the United States to oppose that aggression. With reference to Kinmen and Matsu, these islands are not covered by treaty, but a strong attack launched now would more likely be considered a threat to Taiwan than formerly, since the “New Look” pinpoints any aggression and makes it more apparent. (At this point the Foreign Minister observed that the final decision in regard to the offshore islands must be taken by President Eisenhower himself.)

President Chiang requested that his following views be conveyed to President Eisenhower: In our present holding operations it is imperative that the United States should remain firm and not yield any ground on any front in Asia. It is only thus that we can maintain our friends in the Far East. By not giving in we may be able to prevent war. Retreating, even a little, would result immediately in war.

The Vice President stated that that was his position in the Security Council a year and a half ago. In his view the time is past when we can give up even a little territory.

President Chiang stated that Secretary Dulles has often said that war comes about by miscalculation. Any indication from Washington that the United States is even contemplating softening its policy will encourage Communists to miscalculate, and President Chiang hoped that President Eisenhower would give this matter adequate attention. The United States has just barely maintained the situation in the Far East during the past two years by giving the impression the United States would strike back against aggression. If now we give the impression that we will negotiate and compromise, the Communists will test our intentions by some aggressive action. President Chiang said that he was convinced of the importance of what he had just said and asked that it be transmitted to President Eisenhower. He added that this was not just applicable to Kinmen and Matsu but to the entire Far East.

The Vice President then said that if the Communists should take over in Indonesia, for example, it might start a chain reaction. He cited this as an example of testing us out.

President Chiang stated that he had another very important observation which was also to be conveyed to President Eisenhower. There are many overseas Chinese in the various countries of Asia. They are very important in the economy of all of those countries. Most of the leaders in these Chinese communities have been for many years closely associated with government officials where they reside. The best way to stop Communist infiltration is to keep these Chinese leaders on our side. In recent months he has been alarmed by the inroads made by the Communists in Chinese schools in Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia, and other countries of Southeast Asia. American economic aid should be directed to help the economic well-being of these Chinese communities. He hoped that some arrangement could be made to divert United States aid to overseas Chinese communities in order to insure their security. The President mentioned two memoranda³ prepared at his direction for the American Government suggesting methods to counteract this kind of infiltration. He requested these two memoranda so that our experts could work out details together. He said that as it is, the United States is getting the value of $1.00 for each $2.00 spent in aid; by working through Chinese communities we could get $2.00 value for each $1.00 spent.

At this point the Vice President mentioned the problem of working with the governments where these Chinese communities live. The Foreign Minister pointed out that it was not their intention that the leaders of these communities should be used as agents. He said Thailand was flooded by Chinese Communist goods. These same articles can be made on Taiwan at the same price but of better quality. He recommended that such trade be for propaganda purposes rather than as a commercial enterprise, thus countering Communist infiltration.

Madame Chiang added that in this way Taiwan would be dealing with the overseas Chinese rather than having them deal with the Communists.

The Vice President considered this an imaginative proposal and would look into it.

The Foreign Minister stated that overseas communities are uncertain about the United States attitude. They want to be sure. Chinese businessmen in Thailand have little business because of inability to get Chinese products. He considered it important that they be supplied with commodities so that they might stay in business and remain strong supporters of this (GRC) government.

The Vice President asked about the current situation in Communist China as President Eisenhower would be much interested in President Chiang’s estimate.

President Chiang said the situation there depends on how much support the Government receives from the people, and the effect of the Communist “New Look”. The Chinese Communists, like the Russians, are putting on a “New Look” on the Mainland as well as towards outside countries. The “New Look” has advantages for us in the free world. The main reason for shifting policy internally is that it was found that the Communists could no longer keep the people under their thumb. Six years ago, if the Communists had come out with the “New Look”, it would have been more effective than now. The recent peace overtures by the Communists mean that the people on the Mainland realise that Taiwan has strength.

In explanation of these remarks President Chiang stated that the National Peoples Conference and various cultural conferences had ended in general criticism of thought control. The more Communists try to cover up faults, the more dissatisfied the people become. The “New Look” internally can only result in exposure of Communist weaknesses but cannot give freedom to the people. The principal reason why the Communists adopted the “New Look” was that they could no longer retain support of the people. As long as this Government (GRC) exists and makes progress, and the United States and China stick together, the Communists on the Mainland will not be able to succeed in what they are doing. This he can guarantee. He has told American friends often that the core of all Asian problems centers on the Chinese Mainland. Today the anti-communist front in Asia is being supported by depriving Red China of membership in the United Nations. Once Red China is admitted to the United Nations the entire anti-communist front in Asia will collapse.

The Vice President inquired how President Chiang felt about trade with Communist China and visits to Communist China.

President Chiang stated that no useful purpose is served either by trade or visits to Communist China.

The Vice President inquired whether the lowering of trade barriers would have the same effect as admission of Red China to the United Nations.

President Chiang stated that the effect would be approximately the same and would be bad. The Geneva talks were in the same category. The Chinese Communists are using trade for their own purposes and are making progress in this regard.

Vice President Nixon stated that he was concerned about these developments, and that time was not really on our side. He cited the Communist education of youth, the result of which would be a new generation of Communists in a very short time, and asked whether the President shared this view.

President Chiang stated that in another five years, the situation would be incorrigible. For example, a five year old child entering school in 1949 would be of almost university age when the return to the Mainland occurs. He was confident of ultimate victory, but this was the thing that worried him most.

The Vice President then stated his understanding of President Chiang’s position as follows: (1) The “New Look” was due to necessity but was dangerous; (2) the United States should not change its policy.

President Chiang stated that the Chinese Mainland is Soviet Russia’s greatest capital asset. He believed that President Eisenhower would agree that the loss of the Mainland was responsible for many liabilities that have developed for us. The China Mainland is of great importance to the Soviets. What he has said is his personal opinion and he has not always been right. He has no intention of getting the United States involved or of damaging its position. His only purpose is to strengthen the position of the United States in Asia. He hoped that President Eisenhower would accept his views of the importance of the Mainland, as he is in a position to judge this matter.

The Vice President stated that President Chiang’s opinion was most helpful, and felt that the Chinese Communists were under the complete discipline of Soviet Russia.

President Chiang said that Soviet Russia maintains monolithic control. There were differences between Red China and Soviet Russia prior to Stalin’s death. Now a Tito-like movement is not possible. The present system is much tighter for the Chinese Communists than formerly. Khrushchev has filled all the cracks between Russia and Red China and the relationship now is closer. There is less control over the people since Stalin’s death than formerly, but there is more solidarity among Communist countries. This makes our position more difficult than before.

Vice President Nixon then stated that dictatorships, when they loosen controls, may set free forces that will destroy them. His guess was that eventually the Soviet Russian regime would have to revert to purges in order to remain in power.

President Chiang expressed the opinion that in another three years the pendulum would swing that way.

The Vice President stated that meanwhile all we can do is to hold the line.

President Chiang said that this depended upon the United States and China; these two countries primarily. In conclusion, he said that the United States and Free China are so closely related that they must share the same fate. The most urgent problem is to work together to prevent Red China getting into the United Nations. He expressed the hope that the Vice President would emphasize this to President Eisenhower. If Red China is admitted to the United Nations the cause of freedom in Asia is lost.

The Vice President stated that there was no question as to where he stands on this issue.

At this point Madame Chiang stated that she concurred in the necessity of maintaining the status quo in Asia but that this meant that we could not stand still. No method has yet been found for combatting Communist infiltration by trade and propaganda.

The Vice President agreed that we cannot be static but must find imaginative ways to combat Communist activity. This is a difficult problem. With regard to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations there is no question where we stand. Pressure on us will increase for United Nations admission and trade with Communist China. The United States will resist pressure in these directions. He was confident that we will continue to take a strong stand. He also mentioned that we should always consider the possibility that our enemies might make mistakes. The “New Look” presents us with a difficult situation; it may result in forcing the Reds to institute repressive measures at home, and after a while the smile will be replaced by aggressive action abroad with adverse reactions. The Communists are playing with fire with the “New Look”. They will eventually make mistakes but we should not count on this.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/7–2656. Secret. Drafted by Meyer. Meyer sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation as an enclosure to a July 26 letter to David C. Cuthell, Officer in Charge of the Office of Philippine Affairs. The memorandum printed here is attached to that letter, ibid. Meyer noted, in the letter to Cuthell, that he arrived after the conversation had begun and had to rely on the notes taken by Colonel Hu for the first part of the conversation.

2. Nixon delivered this letter, dated July 4, upon his arrival in Taipei. In the brief message. President Eisenhower reassured President Chiang concerning the “steadfastness” of American support for the Republic of China. (Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1956, p. 151)

   President Chiang responded on July 20 with a letter to President Eisenhower in which he stated his concern over the “danger confronting Asia”:

   “In my opinion the greatest danger confronting Asia today is the effect already evident in Asia of the ‘smile’ tactics and economic penetration waged by Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, with the opportunist collaboration of the so-called neutralist countries. The growth of neutralism has greatly helped Communist infiltration in Asia and weakened the solidarity of the free world. In order to hold on to our present position, it is necessary to combat the effect of neutralism, particularly in Asia. Any advance of neutralism in this part of the world is tantamount to retreat on our part. I feel strongly that we must refrain from giving any encouragement to neutralism by word or by deed. I am sure that with your wisdom and statesmanship, you will continue to take effective measures to counter this new Communist tactic.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611. 93/8–356)

3. Presented to the Department under cover of a letter from Foreign Minister Yeh to Secretary Dulles, Document 166. The memoranda are not printed but are summarized in footnotes 2 and 3, ibid.