Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

182. Memorandum From the Secretary’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong)¹ to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 31, 1956.

SUBJECT

• NIE 100–5–56: Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area and Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six Months²

On May 23,³ in response to your recent request, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved an estimate of Chinese Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in the Taiwan Straits.

The IAC concluded that Chinese Communist military capabilities in this area have increased substantially during the past year and that the Chinese Communists, against Nationalist opposition alone, could seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups with forces now in place or readily available in East China.

The IAC confirmed its previous estimates to the effect that, although policies of the Peiping regime remain firmly committed to the extension of control over the offshore islands, Taiwan, and the Penghus, the Chinese Communists are unlikely to attempt to seize Taiwan or the Penghus in the face of US commitments to defend those areas. The IAC also continues to believe that Communist concern over the risk of US intervention and the over-all requirements of current Bloc “peace” tactics will continue to make major attacks on Quemoy and Matsu unlikely. These considerations, however, were not viewed as ruling out the possibility of Chinese Communist efforts to seize some of the minor Nationalist-held offshore islands or of substantial harassing or probing action against major offshore islands.

The estimate concludes with the judgment that a Communist decision to break off the Geneva talks would not necessarily indicate any major change in Chinese Communist policy, and that the chances of communist attempts to seize Taiwan or the major offshore islands would not be materially affected. A break-off would, however, remove one of the restraining elements to action against one or more of the small lightly-held offshore islands.

The IAC has not yet considered the release of this estimate to any foreign countries.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.001/5–3156. Secret.
2. A copy of NIE 100–5–56, dated May 22, is ibid., INR–NIE Files.
3. According to a note on the cover sheet of NIE 100–5–56, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in the estimate on May 22 rather than May 23.